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Abstract:
This dissertation examines the critical role played by modern architecture and
planning in shaping the discourse on Third World development after the Second
World War. At stake here is an ignored dimension of the history of modern
architecture and planning as well as that of the development discourse that sheds
important light on the relationship of both these discourses to the trajectories of
global domination and control. Critiques of development have largely focused on
how the economic approaches proposed by international institutions such as the
World Bank and the UN have favored the financial and political agendas of global
industrial powers. This dissertation argues that design practices like architecture
and planning-usually thought to be concerned only with shaping the physical
environment-have also played a significant role in shaping the key assumptions
of the development discourse, from the existence of urbanizing masses caught
between demands of tradition and modernization to the exploding Third World
city that is unable to manage its emergence into modernity.
After the Second World War, as modern architecture began to lose its disciplinary
footings as a medium of social reform in the industrialized world, modern
architects and planners found tremendous opportunities as "experts" in programs
of Third World development. The United Nations Housing Town and Country
Planning section (HTCP), headed by Ernest Weissmann, a member of Congres
International dArchitecture Moderne (CIAM), sent out hundreds of missions,
featuring famous housing and planning names such as Charles Abrams, Otto
Koenigsberger, Catherine Bauer, and Jacob Crane, among others. These missions
produced master plans for cities from Singapore (recounted most famously by Rem
Koolhaas in SMLXL) to Kabul to Beirut to Lima to Lagos, organized numerous
conferences, and set up planning and public administration bodies, building
research centers, and schools of architecture all over the decolonizing world. This
dissertation examines this wide range of activity to identify particular modes of
social and economic intervention, such as self-help architecture, "core" housing,
and regional planning, that were able to negotiate the demands of postcolonial
nation-states, the Cold War geo-political context, and the agendas of institutions of
international finance emerging after the war.
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1 Introduction
Modern architecture reached its symbolic apex in the spectacular postwar capital
complexes of Le Corbusier's Chandigarh, Kahn's Dacca, and Niemeyer's Brasilia.
From here on, its social aims were seen to be diminishing, till they were finally
extinguished-as recounted most famously by Charles Jencks-with the
destruction of Pruitt-Igoe in 1972. This dissertation challenges this mainstream
narrative by claiming that modern architecture had a far more permanent and vital
role to play in the postwar era in the making of the Third World.
To understand this history we have to look at the numerous "development
missions" staffed by modern architects and planners that were sent to the
emerging Third World by international agencies such as the UN, the Ford
Foundation, and the USAID (FIG. 1). After the Second World War, as modern
architecture began to lose its disciplinary footings as a medium of social reform in
the industrialized world, modern architects and planners found tremendous
opportunities as "experts" in programs of Third World development. The United
Nations Housing Town and Country Planning section (HTCP), headed by Ernest
Weissmann, a Yugoslavian architect and a member of Congres International
dArchitecture Moderne (CIAM), sent out hundreds of missions to the decolonizing
world. Focused on the question of Third World urbanization, these missions
produced master plans for cities from Singapore (recounted most famously by Rem
Koolhaas in SMLXL) to Kabul to Beirut to Lima to Lagos, organized numerous
conferences, set up planning and public administration bodies, building research
centers, demonstration projects, and schools of architecture all over the
decolonizing world.
This dissertation argues that an account of this activity is crucial to the history of
modern architecture in the postwar era-not only because modern architecture
gained actual global dominance through its role in this sphere, but also because
here it participated in shaping the very idea of Third World development that has
inaugurated a new era of global dominance and control.
1.1 Significance:
In charting this sphere, this dissertation has a two-fold agenda: to map not only an
important dimension of the history of postwar modern architecture and planning,
but also of the development discourse itself to shed important light on how ideas
of development have intersected with hidden trajectories of global domination and
control after the war.
Critiques of development have largely focused on how the economic approaches
proposed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN have
favored the financial and political agendas of global industrial powers. The
question of how this relationship was forged is either ignored or is based on a
caricature of colonial governance-economic exploitation justified through the
civilizational mission of bringing "primitive" people into the fold of modernity.
Challenging such linear and continuist narratives, this dissertation draws attention
to precisely the enigmatic and diffused terrain where relations of power are
secured at the intersection of humanistic, social, economic, nationalist, and
aesthetic agendas. Our focus will be on identifying those new modes of socio-
economic intervention that are based on the idea of establishing programs of
mutual participation and forging partnerships between the developed and
underdeveloped worlds, where technical and administrative advice is claimed to
be exchanged for lessons on how to recoup social and traditional values lost by
the West during its course of industrialization.
Innocuous as the language of participation, cooperation, and mutual learning may
seem, it has formed a critical part of a new discourse of managing the contours of
the geopolitical arena after the Second World War. The image of native
participation--of people learning to help themselves-has been a critical element
of the World Bank's "structural adjustment programs" for developing market-
economies. These and other Third World "development" projects, conceived to by-
pass nation state protections, have subsequently opened up Third World
economies to international trade for the benefit of multinational corporations,
leaving the very populations the projects claimed to help more vulnerable to the
fluctuations of global economy. Our purpose in this dissertation is not to recount
the effect of these policies and development programs as there have been ample
critiques of the idea of Third World development and its relationship to
international finance and management of power in the postwar geopolitical arena.
What remains generally absent in these critiques, however, is how the key
assumptions of this discourse, such as the image of the participating native, are
constructed and managed; assumptions that, to paraphrase Michel Foucault,
"render intelligible" this discourse.1
1 Foucault's sentence reads as follows: "La condition de possibilit6 du pouvoir, en tout cas
le point de vue qui permet de rendre intelligible son exercise.. .C'est le socle mouvant des
The emphasis on participation and partnership figures prominently in UN
development projects, reflecting the organization's particular position in the
postwar geo-political global arena. As Thomas Weiss et al. have argued, other
specialized intergovernmental organizations - such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD, of the World Bank), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - that were created during the first half of
the twentieth century and continued in the postwar era, were created in large part
to establish an international infrastructure for what is now often called the global
liberal economic order.2
Funded directly by Allied members with stakes in creating global economic
conditions necessary for the working of private markets, this system of
organizations favored its major donors. It is not surprising that after the war most
of the funding for these organizations came from countries in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a group that originally
contained the benefactors of the US funded Marshall Plan.
At the time of its establishment, the UN format too was largely determined by the
interests of the major Allied countries. From the location of its founding
rapports de force qui induisent sans cesse, par leur inegalit6, des 6tats de pouvoir." Michel
Foucault, La volontd de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976) p. 122. The sentence is quoted by
Gayatri Spivak, to draw attention to the unfortunate translation of "rendre intelligible" as
"understanding" by Robert Hurley in the book's English edition, The History of Sexuality,
trans., Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980). Spivak quotes the sentence in "More on
Power/knowledge," in Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.
30-31.
2 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsyth, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and
Changing World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
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conference in San Francisco in 1945, to the location of its permanent headquarters
in New York (now known to have constantly been under CIA surveillance), to the
appointment of subsequent Secretary Generals that supported US foreign and
economic policy positions, the UN was not as "free" a body as it was presented to
be. Yet unlike the World Bank, or other Bretton Woods related organizations, the
directives of the main UN assemblies (the General Assembly and the Security
Council) and its specialized agencies were not determined by finance-related
weighted voting that gave large donors more power over smaller ones. The UN
platform was open to contestation by the communist bloc and the decolonized
nation states seeking to protect their position in international markets. It is
therefore not surprising that the enthusiasm for laissez-faire economics, private
markets, and liberal trade shared by the United States and the OECD countries was
often condemned on the UN platform.
These contestations, however, meant that the funding available to other
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) was not easily forthcoming to the UN.
Towards the end of the war in 1943, the US had helped fund the UN Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) for assisting refugees. The UN Generally
Assembly sought to extend this model of assistance by large donors beyond the
European and Japanese postwar contexts by establishing the Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1950. The EPTA was initiated as an outgrowth of
President Truman's Point IV proposal and was designed to be largely funded by
the US government through the 1949 Act for International Development. Yet, from
the beginning, Washington insisted that given the open-ended geographical scope
of the program, its funding should not be dominated by the US. The EPTA started
with a nominal operating fund of $20 million in 1951, whose growth was
hampered when the United States reduced it contribution from 60 percent to 40
percent of the total in the coming years.
The impasse over conditions of funding resulted in reorientation of the UN
program, with greater emphasis on training, technical advice, and preference for
promoting private investment and savings. Yet it is precisely in this separation
between the UN and other IGO programs that a relationship of mutual
legitimization begins to emerge. The emphasis on participation and private
investment by the UN economic development programs was the primary
"condition" demanded by the World Bank and IMF loans. Instead of undermining
each other's scope, UN programs lent the latter with an air of legitimacy.
The lack of available funds was not only a consequence of the multilateral nature
of the UN platform. The reluctance to form a centrally coordinated funding source
also stemmed from the resistance of UN specialized agencies - such as the FAO,
the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) - to a
reduction of their relative autonomy. The emphasis on a language of participation
without financial commitment that we see in financially deficient EPTA projects
allowed this autonomy.
' The idea of regional commissions was raised and rejected at the founding San Francisco
conference. Even though the regional Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) were established within ECOSOC to
assist in the postwar recovery efforts there, it took much effort by Latin American
countries to secure a similar body, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), in
1948. And it would take another decade to establish the regional commission for Africa,
given the continuation of colonization in the continent.
4 The limitations of the EPTA program led many developing countries to apply pressure in
the early 1950s to create a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
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It would, however, be a mistake to see UN programs simply as an extension of,
say, the World Bank agenda. The two organizations followed different directives,
with the UN platform more open to challenges from aid-receiving countries. Yet to
the degree that UN experts attested to the language of participation, savings,
private investment, and partnership, their proposals intersected with the interests
of the World Bank and other organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, with
agendas that followed the line of Cold War politics.
It is against this background that this dissertation identifies architecture and
planning in the development arena as a mutually legitimizing terrain where we see
these differing agendas meet. Architecture and planning projects stressed the need
for private investment, savings, and participation that satisfied both the UN and
other IGOs' requirements. From the valorization of "traditional" building practices,
the celebration of the ingenuity of "squatters," to the framing of urban migration as
a demographic movement driven by the desire for modernization and urban life,
architecture and planning practices constitute the field where development is
(SUNFED) that could combine technical assistance with long-term low-interest loans. The
United States, refusing to commit resources to a multilateral assistance fund over which it
did not have control of disbursements, countered the majority opinion in the UN. The
SUNFED too, like the EPTA was handicapped because of the lack of resources. As a
result of these limitations, in 1958 the UN General Assembly approved to create a Special
Fund that were to provide "preinvestment" capital to "stimulate" private investment that
complimented the UNs' technical assistance program. The special fund was able to gain
traction in the UN because allowed United States and other major donors to dictate the
terms under which the funding they attributed would be distributed. In 1965, the General
Assembly combined the Special Fund with EPTA into one entity, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). Yet the divisions between different specialized
agencies were reluctant to subscribe to the subordination that reduction of fiscal
autonomy implicit in this arrangement. The desire for autonomy continued to undermine
coordination efforts. For this reason, even though the new Special Fund was meant to be
closely coordinated with EPTA projects, it operated quite independently even as it grew in
size.
23
framed not as a project to modernize primitive populations, but as a representation
of the demands and desires of populations already in transition to modernization.
In this sphere, development is increasingly presented as a program of forging
partnerships between the developed and underdeveloped worlds.
The primary form taken by modern architecture in this terrain is that of self-help
projects, where the participants are enlisted under a variety of administrative
arrangements to build their own houses. These self-help programs took many
forms, beginning with institutionally provided housing to sites-and-services and
"core"y schemes that provided only minimal services to new or existing settlements,
leaving all remaining construction to be done by the inhabitants over time
according to their own prerogatives. In all these cases, we see architects and
planners deemphasizing the centrality of formal design and emphasizing the
importance of savings, investment, incremental construction, and inhabitants'
participation.
This was indeed a disappointment for many modern architects seeking
opportunities on the development platform. Key names of the prewar modern
architectural movement, such as Sigfried Giedion, Jose Luis Sert, and Richard
Neutra, were present at the founding UN conference in San Francisco. Giedion
had been in touch with Unesco's fist Directory General, Julian Huxley, and had
found their exchange encouraging.' Huxley, however, wrote soon afterwards to
Giedion that architecture could not be treated as a special cultural activity under
' The promise of this relationship can be seen in Giedion's enthusiastic letter to W.
Wurster, December 19, 1946, announcing that "leading personalities of UNESCO, Huxley
and Carter, are form of out ideas and of us" Cited by Jos Bosman in "CIAM After the War:
a Balance of the Modern Movement," The Last ClAMs, Rassegna, special issue, 52:4
(December 1992): p. 14 .
the Unesco umbrella. On the development platform, architecture appeared
concomitant with planning as an instrument of guiding economic and social
activity and was to be situated under the UN Social and Economic Affairs Division.
As a result, the opportunities presented here were to a cadre that was of a
different background. It was Catherine Bauer, the famous American planner and
housing activist who, in collaboration with CIAM secretary Jacqueline Tyrwhitt,
proposed the formation of the UN Housing, Town, and Country Planning section
at the 1946 Hastings Conference of the International Union of Architects (UIA), a
European planning body that later provided many returning colonial planners as
experts for UN missions. As mentioned above, the first chief of the UN HTCP was
Ernest Weissmann. Though Weissmann was a CIAM member and attended the
organization's initial meetings in New York after the war, along with Giedion, Sert,
Walter Gropius and others, he was interested in seeking those figures for UN jobs
who had a background in housing finance, legislation, and planning coordination.
As a result the leading architectural and planning figures in the development
context were figures such as Catherine Bauer, Charles Abrams, the prominent US
housing activist and sometime Rent Commissioner of New York State, Otto
Koenigsberger, the Director of the Department of Tropical Architecture at the
Architectural Association (AA) in London in 1950s, who had also been the Chief
planner of the State of Mysore in India, and Jacob Crane, the Assistant Director of
the US Housing and Home Finance Agency, among others.
The housing and planning proposals by these figures and others, more than
projects of shaping the physical environment, formed the discourse where the key
fictions of the development discourse - including the idea of a participating and
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consensual clientele - are staged. It is here that the Third World is presented as a
sphere headed toward inevitable industrialization and urbanization. It is here that
development appears as a discourse based on allocation of agency, rather than its
denial, on recognition of economic and political demands and existing needs,
rather than imposition of external ideals. It is here that development is transformed
from a possibility to an inevitability. These projects constituted the terrain where
the profile of the development subject in transition between tradition and
modernity, partially homo economicus, partially homo traditionalis, is staged as a
participant in the development enterprise
The primary contribution of this dissertation then is to identify the critical role of
modern architectural and planning practice in the postwar development arena.
With this focus, it does not claim to map a comprehensive field of activity of
modern architects and planners within development institutions. Instead, it
examines in detail particular ideas of Third World urbanization and modernization
proposed by architects and planners and the impact of these agendas in molding
the contours of the relationship between the so-called developed and
underdeveloped worlds.
As mentioned above, the foremost idea studied in this dissertation is that of self-
help architecture, that concept often commonly held as an axiom by architecture
students volunteering for Habitat for Humanity and other similar organizations,
that people are most effective when they are "empowered" to employ their own
resources, make their own decisions, and use their own labor to house themselves
or improve their living environments. This dissertation argues that self-help
projects established the quintessential mode of development intervention that
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bypassed restriction of capital investment while facilitating incorporation into
circuits of global finance through land reform, property tenure, and loan
mechanisms. This dissertation, thus, can be said to map a selective set of agendas
where architecture and planning intersect with development to establish their
contribution in the postwar geopolitical arena.
1.2 The Canon:
Why has this involvement been ignored by seminal histories of modern
architecture and planning? This erasure, this dissertation maintains, stems from
insistence on viewing the postwar architecture and planning production through
the formal language of architecture and planning and through the conventional
category of the avant-garde. The presence of modern architecture in the Third
World in these accounts remains limited to the showcase example of capital cities
or to the few houses for the wealthy designed by famous architects on their
sojourns to the non-Western world. The role assigned to modern architecture and
planning in this domain remains limited to negotiating postwar dilemmas of
national identity formation. The question of how notions of national, regional, or
cultural identities undergird the agendas of socio-economic reform and
development remains unexamined.
For William Curtis, the history of modern architecture in the twentieth century is
related to the migration of the "modern masters" from Europe to America (with the
exception of Frank Lloyd Wright).' After the Second World War, this trend was
6 William J.R. Curtis, Modern architecture since 1900 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-
Hall, 1983, c1982). Curtis' other books also approach the question of modern architecture
outside of western context through the narrative of avant-garde and identity formation,
i.e., famous modern architects, both western and non-western, struggling to resolve the
conflict of modern and traditional identities faced by the decolonized nation State:
27
reversed as the current of avant-garde thought flowed back to England and
Scandinavia. The presence of modern architecture in the Third World enters this
narrative only under the "Problem of Regional Identity" in the 1960's. The latter
features a discussion of formal references to the cultural stock of "local traditions"
in the work of Luis Barragin and Oscar Niemeyer. This discussion ends with the
example of Hassan Fathy's design for the New Gourna village near Luxor, Egypt.
From the essentialist view of cultural identity taken by Curtis, the primary issue
facing these architects working in the Third World was to carve out suitable
images of contemporary national identity out of the "collision of the old and new."
Kenneth Frampton's view of Critical Regionalism in this regard is well known.' For
Frampton too, the primary contribution of modern architecture to the international
arena is in staging claims of cultural identity under the flux of globalization.8 "The
concept of a local or national culture is a paradoxical proposition," Frampton
maintains, "not only because of the present obvious antithesis between rooted
culture and universal civilization but also because all cultures, both ancient and
Balkrishna Doshi: An Architecturefor India (New York : Rizzoli, 1988); Le Corbusier: Ideas
and Forms (Oxford: Phaidon, 1986).
7 "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism," in Perspecta 20 (1983): pp. 147-162; "Universalism
and/or Regionalism: Untimely Reflections on the Future of the New," in Domus, 782 (May
1996): pp. 4-8.; and more recently, "Place, Form, Cultural Identity," in Arcade, 20:1(Autumn 2001): pp. 16-17.
8 Kenneth Frampton, Modern architecture: A Critical History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980); Also see, Frampton's essay in Charles Correa (London: Thames &
Hudson, 1996); Kenneth Frampton, ed., World architecture 1900-2000. A Critical Mosaic(New York: Springer, c1999); Kenneth Frampton, Charles Correa, David Robson,
Modernity and Community: Architecture in the Islamic World (New York: Thames &
Hudson; Geneva: Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 2002); "The Jerusalem Seminars in
Architecture" also situates identity formation as the primary role of architecture in the
public domain. See, Kenneth Frampton, Arthur Spector and Lynne Reed Rosman, eds., The
Jerusalem Seminar in Architecture: Technology, Place & Architecture (1996); Technology,
Place & Architecture (1994); Architecture, History & Memory: The Public Building, Form
and Influence (1992).
modern, seem to have depended for their intrinsic development on a certain cross-
fertilization with other cultures." In this terrain of conflicting yet unified cultural
identities architecture again only occupies a secondary role, of re-presenting, in
some desired balance, what is constantly being muddled up in cross
disseminations of history. The notion of "critical" is limited to the ability of
architects to achieve the mixture of "occidental" and "oriental" symbolic references
appropriate to the location and the project at hand.
Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre also situate the idea of Critical Regionalism in
a similar essentializing vein: a current of modern architecture at the periphery that
resists homogenizing forces of globalization.10 For the authors, this movement was
sustained not only by the work of famous Western architects-such as Maxwell
Fry, Jane Drew, Le Corbusier, Louise Kahn, and Neutra-in various non-Western
contexts, but also by a range of Western-educated but non-Western architects and
designers, such as Minette da Silva in Sri Lanka, Tay Kheng Soon and William Lim
in Singapore, Mick Pearce in Zimbabwe, Lina Bo Bardi in Brazil, Oluwole
Olumuyiwa in Nigeria, and Ricardo Porro in Cuba." For Tzonis and Lefaivre, these
figures were able to resolve, at different moments in the postwar era, the
paradoxes of identity formation and cultural representation faced by the
Ibid., pp. 313-4.
10 Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "Why Critical Regionalism Today?" in Architecture
and Urbanism (May 1990): pp. 23-33; Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "Critica y
regionalista," in A & V, 24 (1990): pp. 22-24, 1990; Alexander Tzonis, "Critical Regionalism:
An Attitude, Not a Style," in Architecture ofIsrael: AI, 19 (August 1994): pp. 78-89.
" Alexander Tzonis, Liane Lefaivre and Bruno Stagno, eds., Tropical Architecture: Critical
Regionalism in the Age of Globalization (New York: Wiley-Academic, 2001).
decolonizing world as it attempted to preserve "age-old traditions" while facing
nationalist aspirations of modernization.
Tafuri and Dal Co's seminal history takes exception to the focus on identity
formation and asks the question of the role of modern architecture and planning
in the postwar era as it related to the changing political and economic terrain."
The answer they give, however, is the same as the one assumed by the others: the
role was inconclusive and insubstantial.
Tafuri and Dal Co maintain that modern architects and planners only "marginally
affect[ed] the global setup in the postwar era." Most of the projects proposed by
the "neo-avant-garde," they insist, remained on paper. This "bankruptcy resulted
from the quest to preserve [the] avant-garde autonomy after the war." The
postwar projects, the authors stress, were informed by the prewar "utopian-
futuristic... climate of technological vitalism," and were based on "[ideas ofi
traditional division of labor." As a result, these proposals remained oblivious to the
"direct linkage between...new modes of production and institutional reforms"
being forged by the postwar global "capitalist system." For Tafuri and Dal Co, the
"neo-avant-garde" proposals within the postwar climate of "integrated" planning
can at best be considered "mere decorative enhancement[s] of the metropolitan
chaos [they] once aspired to dominate." 3
Holding up a few selected Metabolist projects as examples of modern architects'
disconnect from the ideological climate of the time, however, betrays a conceptual
12 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture, trans. Robert Erich Wolf
(New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1986).
13 Ibid., pp. 363-4.
myopia that is similar to the limited perspective taken by other prominent histories
of modern architecture and planning. The insistence of these histories to view the
postwar developments in architecture on the global stage through the traditional
category of the avant-garde and their formal contributions ignores the crucial arena
of development intervention where such categories did not hold. This dissertation
draws attention to the postwar era which saw the emergence of a wave of
architects and planners whose projects did not find a voice- couldn't have found
a voice-within the formal architectural canon. These were figures whose training
and experiences traversed conventional disciplinary boundaries: lawyers turned
planners, planners turned economists, engineers turned architects, and architects
turned urban designers, even sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.
Collectively they comprised the profile of the figure through which modern
architecture gained global dominance: the development expert. These figures
constituted the new face of modern architecture and planning in the postwar era,
one that did not speak the traditional language of architectural form, but rehearsed
a language of finance, statistics, project reports, programs of community
development and social organization, proposals for savings and loan associations,
and design of administrative and planning bodies. Often close associates of those
recognized as avant-gardes by mainstream chronicles, these figures populated
countless United Nations, Ford Foundation, and Unesco projects as well as various
national institutions. There, they played a crucial role in establishing an
international discourse of social reform that, to borrow Tafuri and Dal Co's phrase,
blurred institutional boundaries, realigned existing divisions of labor, and
established new modes of production. In short, as development experts, modern
architects and planners exhibited precisely the characteristics whose absence
Tafuri and Dal Co proclaim as the chief cause of modern architecture's demise,
and whose existence remains invisible in other histories of modern architecture
and planning as well.
1.3 Structure:
The body of the dissertation is divided into three parts. The first section,
"Committing Doubts: Self-Help Housing and the Question of Value," deals with the
emergence of the idea of self-help in the development discourse. Here we
encounter the multiple reiterations of this idea by different figures in a series of
sub-sections, beginning with initial self-help missions to the "tropics" (including
Jamiaca, Puerto Rico, Indonesia, and Philippines) headed by US housing activist
and assistant director at the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Jacob Crane.
This section continues to situate this activity against the backdrop of changes in
the geopolitical and economic systems, particularly the establishment of the so-
called Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the International Bank of
Development and Reconstruction (later, the World Bank). Here we look at how
the changes in global economy brought on by decolonization are managed in the
Keynesian monetary system. We will trace how the first self-help projects in Puerto
Rico reflect the positioning of the project of Third World development in the
postwar political economy. This discussion also contains views and proposals of
Crane's Puerto Rican counterparts such as Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto
Rico Planning Board and Luis Rivera Santos, the Director of Puerto Rico's Social
Program.
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At this point in the first section, we will see how the conceptualization of "value"
in Marx as a realm forever at the threshold of political economy can be instructive
in understanding the relationship between tradition and modernization in
development. We will then return to the historical analysis of self-help
organizational techniques and procedures in various projects across the globe to
identify the "coding" of socio-economic value in this realm.
The first section will end with a look at the broader field of UN experts' influence
on the design of administrative and planning structures in various Latin American
countries under the umbrella of self-help programs. Here we will argue that these
transformations in the administrative and policy structures laid the fundamental
ground work for imposing later World Bank adjustment programs.
After we have looked at the broader field of initial self-help programs, their scope,
and their theoretical and geo-political foundations, the second section, "Core: the
Tyranny of the Individual," narrows the discussion down to a particular trajectory
of the self-help discourse: the idea of "core" housing introduced by the famous
American housing advocate and development consultant, Charles Abrams, as a
critique of the self-help approach, and coded into the technical vocabulary of
climatology by Otto Koenigsberger, the former Chief Architect and Planner of the
State of Mysore, India, and the Director of Development and Tropical Studies at
the Architectural Association (AA), and later of the Development Planning Unit at
the University College, London..
Abrams and Koenigsberger argued that the core approach replaced the
"impossibly high building standards" and "administrative requirements" of previous
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self-help schemes with elemental "core" construction and services that allowed
immediate occupation of the site. This lowered the amount of loan needed as the
occupants were to later finish the house according to their own requirements, with
their own investment, and on their own time. In this section we will see how
through this shift Abrams and Koenigsberger advocated instituting a legal structure
of individuated property ownership which provided greater security for the
lending institution while increasing the risk for the inhabitants who invested in and
contributed to the construction of the core house asymmetrically along gender
lines. This section explores how development operates by a mode of auto critique
which extends its agenda precisely by claiming to recognize the agency and
demands of the development subjects themselves.
We will conclude the second section by looking at the work of John Turner, the
British architect who spent almost ten years in the squatter settlements of Peru as a
advocate of funding squatter building practices before joining MIT and later
returning to the AA in England. This section argues that all these proposals gain
their significance in the context of a series of concerns raised by major theorists of
development economics regarding the beginning and perpetuation of the
development process in the Third World. Here architecture is seen as a critical
corollary, both opening a space for and drawing on the propositions in
development economics, supplying the latter with some of its founding
assumptions regarding the presence of independent, self-motivated, yet
uncompetitive and politically undemanding populations. Looking closely at the
work of Abrams, Koenigsberger and Turner, we will not only map out the profile
of the development subject but also a new profile of the development expert as an
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advocate of the poor poised against the institutions he works for, and see how this
combination precludes the possibility of situating discussion of land reform and
housing as politically charged issues.
The third, and last, section, "Pushing Patterns: Planning the Third World City,"
looks at the how the self-helping development subject appears in the larger
conceptualization of the process of Third World urbanization by planning figures
such as Catherine Bauer, Martin Myerson, Lloyd Rodwin, Jacob Crane, sociologists
like Philip Hauser, and anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead,
among others. These framing are contrasted with framings of the postwar
European subject by Horkheimer and others involved with the UN project,
Tensions Affecting International Understanding, concerned with promoting "peace
and understanding" among postwar industrial powers. The primary question posed
by this section is, how does the assumed difference between these two subject
positions, one supposedly preceding the emergence of modernization and the
modern nation state, and the other emerging from the crisis of modernity and the
conflict of modern nation states, work to shape the "center" and the "periphery" in
the image of the development analyses?
In conclusion we will discuss how the idea of agency, development, tradition and
modernity staged by modern architects and planners in the development terrain
are very much with us today in the discussions of land reform, housing, and
globalization. We will identify the continuation and displacement of these ideas in
the present through examples ranging from [projects of UN Habitat for Humanity,
to] Rem Koolhaas' recent fascination with the "informal" modernism of Lagos to
the Peruvian economists Hernando De Sotto's proposal for enabling the extra-legal
"assets" of the Third World poor as collateral for loans, a proposal that has been
valorized as key to the crisis of Third World development by former president Bill
Clinton and figures in the current US administration.
The primary archives for this inquiry have been the UN Archives in New York.
This research was supplemented by material from Jacob Crane and Charles
Abrams Papers at Cornell University, the Catherine Bauer Archives at Berkeley, as
well as numerous reports and publications by the UN and the World Bank that
were deposited at various libraries having the status of "UN depositories" at
different times (The Firestone Library Princeton, the Lamont library at Harvard,
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library at Columbia, and the Doe library at Berkeley).
This dissertation by no means claims to be an exhaustive history of self-help
schemes or modern architects and planners' careers in development agencies.
Rather it is an attempt to identify, though self-help, a dimension of modern
architecture and planning and the development discourse that has had a critical
role in the framing of power relations in the postwar geo-political arena, as well as
in framing how we perceive and attempt to answer the key questions of Third
World development and its role in the current configuration of globalization.
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2 Committing Doubts: Self-Help Housing and the Question of
Value
No "local center," "no pattern of transformation" could function if through a series
of successive linkages, it were not eventually written into an over-all strategy... The
[disciplinary] apparatus, precisely to the extent that it [is] insular and
heteromorphous with respect to the other great "manoeuvres"...
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 4
It [is] sheer madness to think the Empire can create a cave where we take in one
another's washing and ignore the rest of the world!... The countries we sell to are not
necessarily the countries from which we buy, and if we begin unilateral trading we
return to barter, the survival of the fittest and more war.
John Maynard Keynes"
In a stratified society, discrimination of wages and jobs/occupation by caste and
sex is not a feudal remnant but perfectly consistent with the play of market
forces...If the wage-and-access differentials follow the lines of traditional privilege,
then attention gets conveniently deflected from the adaptive dexterity of capitalist
exploitation processes to the stubborness offeudal values, when it is actually a
symbiotic relationship between the two.
Kalpana Bardhan"
2.1 Igloos in the Third World
On a pleasant January afternoon in New Delhi in 1954, images of arctic ice began
rolling on the screen of a large conference hall. The film titled, "How to Build an
Igloo," began with a voice-over, describing various construction techniques used
by the native population in the Arctic Circle to build elaborate structures out of
14 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, Robert Hurley trans. (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 99.
" John Maynard Keynes, quoted in Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fightingfor
Freedom (1937-1946), vol. 3 (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 331.
16 Kalpana Bardhan, "Women's Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition and Change
in India," in South Asia Bulletin, 6:1 (1986): pp. 3-16. The above quote is on p.5.
ice. Yet, the building material under consideration did not seem out of place in
the mild north Indian winter to the international crowd in attendance as they
discussed their organized "expeditions" to the nearby villages and tours of the
demonstration "village center" under construction-out of brick and mud-on a
nearby site. Gathered to attend the two parallel running "seminars" of the United
Nations' Social Affairs Division and the International Federation of Housing, Town,
and Country Planning, the attendees had their eyes on a more abstract set of
concerns that made ice commensurable with brick. These included: organization
of "labor," distribution of "responsibility," and building of "community spirit," all
summed up under the banner of "helping people to help themselves." The agenda
at hand, reflected in the UN seminar's title, was "community improvement"
through "self-help" schemes. Its key challenge: identifying moments when
modernization projects could find resonating similarities in "traditional" practices,
so that economic development could have a lasting socio-cultural effect.
The seminar audience included such well know names as Jacqueline Tyrwhitt,
CLAM's secretary and director of the UN seminar; Constantine Doxiadis, who was
working for the Ford Foundation missions in Calcutta and Karachi at the time;
17 The full title of the seminar was: United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community
Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January - 17 February 1954. A
report on the proceedings was also published under the same name by the UN Technical
Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1. UN Archives, New York.
The film titled, How to Build an Igloo, by the Canadian Film Board, was part of a film
series that ran during the seminar and included other similarly "related" titles, including
one by Disney: Aided Self-Help House in Mexico (UN Film Division); Good Neighbors
(British Information Services); A Plan to Work On (British Council); Tale ofNew Cities (US
Information Services); TVA Town (US Information Services); Triumph in the Wilderness
(US Information Services); Waters ofLife, Ceylon (British Information Services); Beaver
Valley (Walt Disney), Yellow Knife (Canadian Film Board), among others. Ibid. Appendix
4, p. 73.
Michel Ecochard, CLAM member and director of the French Protectorate in
Morocco, serving as "TAA advisor to the Government of Pakistan on Town
Planning;" Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew and Pierre Jeanerette, in India at the time with
Le Corbusier at Chandigarh.
Yet the debate was led by another set of figures. These included, Jacob Crane,
Assistant to the Director of US Housing and Home Finance Agency; Ernest
Weissmann, CLAM member and head of the UN Housing Section; Rafael Pico, the
Chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board; Luis Rivera Santos, the Director of
Puerto Rico's Social Program; F. J. Adams, professor of town planning at MIT and
the Director of the Joint Center at Harvard and MIT; Charles Abrams, the famous
US housing advocate and development consultant who was also teaching at MIT at
the time. It was this groups that had led the way in defining the contours of the
term self-help on the development platform.
At a general level, "self-help" was considered to describe those projects in which
the "members of a community" themselves carry out the construction of houses
and community facilities-schools, village-centers," and like-themselves under
technical and administrative supervision. This labor was meant to bring down the
cost of the resulting houses to the extent that the prospective inhabitants could
then afford to purchase them on loan from the sponsoring agency. Yet the
suitability of self-help for Third World development programs was seen to reside
not just in its economic dimension, but in its promise to find the roots of the social
and cultural transformations required by modernization in different traditional
contexts. The aided self-help and mutual-aid approach, as it came to be known,
represented a counter-current in the development discourse which, instead of
shunning tradition as a sphere of pre-modern practices that needed to be
displaced by modernization, sought to reframe tradition as a necessary condition
for any project of modernization in the Third World.
We see in self-help projects the emerging contours of a new model of social
intervention that professes, not the urgency of modernization, but the necessity of
its delay to discover the optimum and sustainable "pace" of historical change. In
self-help we witness a systematic unfolding of top-down agendas of social
organization and resource distribution though elaborate loan structures advanced
by national governments and international organizations, all in the name of
reflecting the conditions of the "poor." The emphasis on engaging the traditional
social structures amounted to a particular mode of partial incorporation into the
structures of global capital. With tradition as a gender-exclusive alibi, self-help
programs set the stage for the next wave of market reforms that appealed to
patriarchal social structures to construct flexible labor reserves and elaborate
micro-credit schemes.
Self-help, by employing a language of cultural relativism, operates by establishing
interstitial socio-cultural realms of partial incorporation and modernization that can
be held at the threshold of the circuits of global capital. This reading affords a
story of modern architecture and planning that is lost under the conventional
historical emphasis on the material realm of built projects as "real" evidence of
architectural modernism in the Third World. Entering the realm of reports,
manuals, and surveys, we will see how modern architects and planners as self-
help experts identified the historical constraints they imagined were faced by them
and laid out strategies of organizing a broad set of financial, administrative, and
40
material conditions. Here, architecture and planning appear as texts that
continuously permeate development at various levels of the discourse-material
and discursive-and precede and proceed built form.
2.2 Design(ing) Intervention
2.2.1 Delayed Development
Even as propaganda-be it the latest brochure from UN-Habitat, or early UN
funding proposals to the US Congressional Committees-self-help housing is not
presented as a remedy but only as a palliative, and a perpetual one at that, to the
rising world housing crisis it identifies.'" It's the doctor telling the patient: take two
tablets and every morning, keep taking two more.
Development's reservation about its own scope has been largely ignored by its
critics. Development is usually seen as an overtly rationalist discourse; its strongest
foothold, a universalist belief in "technological progress." For Arturo Escobar, the
claims to truth and singular solutions represent development's primary modus
operandi through which it discards contextual contingencies, conflicting
arguments, and unsupportive evidence, rendering them irrelevant, outdated, and
pre-modern.'" For James Scott, institutional forms of power-from colonial
governments, to nation states, to international organizations-regulate the domains
18 The examples are numerous: The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003, United Nations Human Settlements Programme; Co-operative Housing:
Experiences of Mutual Self-help, UN-Habitat, 1989; International Development Assistance
Act of 1979: Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Congress
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1979; Study of International Housing, United
States Congress-Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Govt. Print Office, 1963;
Technical Cooperation in Latin America: Recommendations for the Future, National
Planning Association, 1956.
19 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
they seek to govern by viewing the latter as standardizable and quantifiable
concepts. Development institutions are no exception to this procedurality.20 For
Deepak Laal, to undo this developmental objectivism, we have to expose the
analytical confusion and self-contradictions that underwrite economic and social
theories taken as expositions of universal truths." After all, Laal tells us, it was
Keynes himself who had pointed out the fallibility of taking economics as an
objective science rather than a collection of opinions."
But in self-help schemes, we see developmental claims to social intervention
written not only in a logic of standardization, universalism and objectivity, but also
with an infinite penchant for variation in application, abolition of standards, and
recognition of limitation and failure. Even though "practicality"-that pragmatic
slogan ever stressing the instrumentality of thought as a mediating realm between
organism and the environment-routinely appears in self-help rhetoric, it too is
devoid of any positivist certainty. If development is a pragmatic discourse, it is
John Dewey at his most pessimist moment, accepting the hopeless obscuring of
concepts by environmental contingencies.2 1 Self-doubt and revisionism permeates
20James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
21 Deepak Lal, The Poverty of "Development Economics" (London: The Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1983).
22 "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madman in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler a few years
back.. .soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interest, which are dangerous for good or ill."
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan,
1936), pp. 383-4. Quoted in Lal, The Poverty of Development Economics, op. cit., p. 1.
23 This is the later Dewey of Essays in Experimental Logic, and Logic: The Theory of
Inquiry, rather than the collaborator of William James in Pragmatism (1907).
the language of development, always anticipating the crisis it has yet to face; its
penchant for defeatism operating like perpetual hiccups in a utopian speech,
interrupting its own claims, expanding duration, and deferring comprehension.
Here, confusion manifests itself as a mode of operation; the tactics of self-doubt
reproduce themselves as strategic maneuvers. To recognize the modes of power
specific to the development discourse, we must take into account development
organizations' propensity to recognize crisis as a necessary element of their
operations. We must see in the intermittent cycle of self-doubt and assurance, of
defeatism and utopianism, a model of appropriating contingency and
accommodating commitment. Let us begin with the much common practice of
listing statistics on urbanization in self-help reports that announce both the
promise and the impossibility of development.
2.2.2 The "Magic Formula"
In 1950, soon after the establishment the UN's Housing, Town and Country
Planning Section (HTCP), its chief and CIAM member, Ernest Weissmann,
approached Jacob Crane, the well known American housing advocate and the
Assistant to the Administrator of the US Housing and Home Finance Agency, to
head a UN Mission on the housing conditions in the "tropics."24 Between
December 1950 and January 1951, the "mission" traveled to India, Pakistan,
24 Report of the Mission of Expert on Tropical Housing, South and South-East Asia,
December 1950 and January 1951. UN Document No. E/CN.5/251, UN Archives, NY.
Hereafter cited as Tropical Housing Mission Report, 1951.
In addition to Crane, the mission included Jacobus P. Thijsse, a Dutch colonial planning
official who had taken the post of a professor at the University of Indonesia after
independence; Robert Gardner-Merwin, the Chief Architect and Planning Officer of the
Department of Health for Scotland (also the mission's Rapporteur); and Antonio C.
Kayanan, professor and chief planner of the National Urban Planning Commission of the
Philippines, acting as the mission's secretary.
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Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Indonesia, producing a report, published by the
UN in 1951, that announced the discovery of a congested world:
Prevailing conditions in [these areas represent] the greatest housing problems in
the world.. .the Mission was informed that more than 100,000,000 Asian families
(perhaps as many as 150,000,000) at present live in crowded, insanitary,
substandard quarters, urban or rural."
With time, the magnitude of this pending disaster increased. In 1964, the UN
published a Manualfor Self-Help Housing.6 The manuals' opening line gives us an
update on the statistics of crowding: "The United Nations estimated 'that over
1,000 million people in Africa, Asia and Latin America - about half the total
population of these continents - live in housing which is a health hazard and an
affront to human dignity."'27
There should be nothing exceptional in these iterations. In social reform
discourses, from the reconstruction of London after the Great Fire to New Deal
urban renewal schemes in the US, statistics find their gravity within a moralist
discourse around such anchors as "blight" and "congestion." Malthusian
demographics too drew on the dialectic between statistics and moralism to argue
25 Tropical Housing Mission Report, 1951. p. 3.
26 Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, Manual on Self-Help Housing,
1964. UN Document No. ST/SOA/53, United Nations Archives, New York. UN Publication
Sales no. 64.IV.4. Hereafter cited as Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
27 Ibid. p. 1.
that rising population figures result not only in famine and death but also erosion
of social structures.28
Development, however, doesn't locate in this differential a promise of closure, but
the announcement of its perpetuation and irresolution. The differential between
quantity and quality reproduce itself into another differential, between the
possibility and failure of all development approaches, leading to a perpetual
subtext of non-commitment.
Jacob Crane had announced this impossibility of foreseeable resolution in the
report of the mission to the tropics:
"if all present knowledge in the housing field were systematically examined and
applied, it would still not be possible at present for countries visited to bring the
housing and community development up to the desired... standards.. .In other
words...even while all useful experience is being drawn together, and while new
experience is developing, still [a] degree of compromise with desirable standards seems
inevitable." 29
Crane's report, more than anything, presents itself as premonition of the "manner
in which such [future] compromises [were to be] made..."30
The perpetuation of this relationship became most apparent in the 1964 "manual"
on self-help mentioned earlier, which began by citing Crane's twelve year old
report on the tropics:
28 For the preponderance of Malthusian assumptions in demographic studies in the
development organizations, see Eric Ross' excellent study, The Malthus Factor: Population,
Poverty, and Politics in Capitalist Development (London: Zed Books, 1998).
29 Tropical Housing Mission Report, 1951. p6.
30 Ibid.
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In 1952 the United Nations study on 'Housing in the Tropics' stated '...it must be
recognized that, even under the most favourable conditions, it may be a very long
time before sufficient progress has been made to permit the use of adequate
economic resources for such social goals as better housing and improved
community facilities.'"
To this it adds: "After more than a decade, the situation appears to be alarmingly
similar today."
In the face the Manichean demands of world housing, self-help is presented as a
contingent solution, piecemeal and incremental, that is initiated "on the basis
of.. .present.. .economy... without waiting for any great changes in [development]
methods [emphasis added]""
Shunning the promise of identifiable solutions, self-help emerges a discourse on
reevaluation and variation. Crane, in another article published in HTCP's short-run
bulletin on housing and planning asserted again: "No single formula is applicable
to all tropical situations, but with infinite modification and variation certain
principles can be widely adapted to tropical housing problems."" This continuous
comparison and evaluation is the primary claim of the self-help manual as well:
"Relying, therefore, on a review of past failures....this Manual on self-help housing
has been prepared as a part of the continuing study of housing for the low-income
groups. It is intended for the use of government services and private agencies that
are considering low-cost, self-help housing programmes. It states in technical and
3 Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964, p. iii.
32 Ibid. p. 11.
3 Jacob Crane, Huts and Houses in the Tropics, Unasylva, 3:3 (May-June 1949): p. 103.
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administrative terms the principles and techniques that have evolved from an
evaluation of many projects throughout the world.",4
Indeed the word "manual" here is a misnomer, for in accounting for falling
development edifices, crumbling economic theories, dilapidating administrative
strategies, the manual is forced to give up the claim to the most essential
characteristic of a manual: standardization, that operational fulcrum of officialdom
that keeps intact the relationship between the field and the office by outlining a
set of institutional procedures that serve as a backdrop when negotiating with
contextual contingencies. But here, in self-help logic, contextual contingencies are
given, in official language, the same weight as any methods that might, in
principle, be held constant. All procedures are set afloat and open to continuous
reevaluation. Here, all aspirations for a rule are suspended, what's advanced as an
administrative approach is only the principle of variation across time and space.
All that the manual promises is a "continuing study" and a perpetual "evaluation"
of its own principles as they meet varying circumstances and demands in different
contexts. The subtext that binds this tendency in reports on world housing across
two decades after the war can be summarized as follows: global urbanization is
inevitable, and it is impossible to conjure up financial or even conceptual
resources to address its Manichean pace and scale in the foreseeable future.
The fond shorthand in development rhetoric for this proclaimed impossibility of
development itself is "no magic formula." We are reminded that "it has to be
realized that no magicformula exists, and that the problem require continuous,
painstaking effort along many lines to produce the best [possible] current results
3 Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964. p. iii.
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[emphasis added]." 5 Report after report uses similar phrases, asserting the absence
of miracles, magic formulas and silver bullets. Anatole Solow, the chief of the
Inter-American Housing Center (CINVA), founded, on Crane's recommendation,
with the help of the UN Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA) in Bogota,
announced to the 1955 graduating class of Latin American planners' not to "naively
expect miracles."36 It is as if only by magic and miracles could the "world housing
crisis" identified by international agencies find a probable cause and a solution.
The repudiations of standardizable solutions go on to undermine even the role of
the expert as an intervening agent. "Most often it is believed that somewhere a
single expert or agency has developed a house of such high standards and at such
low cost that no further research would be needed. Now such magic housing
formula exists in the world today.""
The inverse of magic, naivet6, and miracles, is planning: "None of these solutions
[which solutions?].. .will take place automatically," Crane tells us. "This work must
*5 Ibid.
36 Anatole Solow, Message to Graduating Class of 1955 at the Inter-American Housing
Center (CINVA), December 1955. The document was given by Jacqueline Tyrwhitt as gift
to the Francis Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University in 1956. GSD
Vertical Files.
37 Tropics Mission Report, 1951, p6 . Later in the report, Crane and others expand on the
point: "The Mission found that many who are keenly interested in housing problems still
believe that a single expert or group of experts can now put on a demonstration in the
nature of a large or small project which will show conclusively they way to solve all the
problems. As already been pointed out, this is a fallacy; no total solutions are now known
for the problems of low income housing and community development, even in most of
the highly developed countries. What can and should be done, is to take the next steps
toward finding the best that can be done now in raising standards within presently
available resources." p. 42.
be planned and programmed..."38 Planning in development emerges as a promise
of its own reproduction.
In these denouncements, we begin to see the emergence of a mode of social
intervention that operates via a curious displacement of the relationship between
the expert and the subjects of expertise. The local technocrats demand
standardizable solutions. The experts see their role as delaying the fulfillment of
that goal. This perpetual delay is seen as a reflection of the "local" socio-cultural
conditions themselves. The New Delhi seminar report asserted:
Progress in housing types and standards is a continuum. It is necessary to guard
against a sudden break which involves a wide discrepancy between old and new.
Although it is essential to advance in the light of new knowledge and techniques,
prevailing economic and social conditions will influence the pace [emphasis
added].3 9
The manual on self-help also presented the idea of delaying socio-economic
change as a requirement of local conditions:
[T]he principles and methods of self-help housing...must be applied in accordance
with local pattems of custom and culture. Local leaders, technicians and families,
in turn, must apply these principles and methods in light of modern usage and of
their own knowledge of community life, climate, geography, building materials
and social values."
38 Ibid p.11.
" The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi,
1954. op. cit. p. 29.
40 Manual on Self-help Housing, 1964. pp. 4-5. Quoting, The United Nations Development
Decade Proposalsfor Action, UN Sales no. 62.II.B.2, UN Archives, New York. p. 59.
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The "local"-composed of sub-categories of "leaders, technicians and families"-
becomes a euphemism for a strategy of non-commitment and variation.
Reading these pronouncements, we cannot but wonder, what is considered
"magic" in the variegating world of planning? At an exceptional moment in the
report on housing conditions in the tropics, Crane reveals the presumed answer,
the "magic formula" in fact demanded by the local technocrats from the mission
experts:
Everywhere the Mission was told that the great impediment is lack of money: 'We
know what and where and how to build. All we need is the money.' Statements to
this extent were frequently made by spokesmen of governmental and non-
governmental agencies at all levels, - national, provincial and local [emphasis
added].
Why is the request for more money dismissed as nafve and premature? Why are
perpetual planning and partial organization weighted more over infusion of money
into the Third World? Why are local demands acknowledged and dismissed in the
same breath? The suggestion that money can produce socio-economic change is
considered to be based on nothing short of magic because of the presumed
location of the Third World in the global political economy. The dismissal turns
on the distinction between "long-term" needs as opposed to the "short-term" goals.
Putting more money in the Third World economy, it is alleged, would only satisfy
immediate goals without changing its socio-economic conditions. The terrain of
"local culture" and its attendant categories of "local leader, technicians, and
families," embody a proposal for an alternative political economy that is supposed
" Tropics Mission Report, 1951, p. 19.
to turn, however slowly, magic into reality. The expert's abdication of the claim to
universal knowledge reflects the systematic re-appropriation of the local in another
frame. This relativistic frame, based on the claim of representing the conditions on
the ground, is only more transparent than a self-proclaimed top-down model of
universal knowledge and expertise.
Before approaching the question of political economy of the categories of the
local circulated in the self-help projects, let us pause for a moment and focus our
lens on a different register: the economic negotiation of the immediate postwar era
and the resulting emergence of a new system of monetary controls and trade
regimes. Here too, the Third World is relegated to the boundaries of the global
political economy around the question of money. This assertion enables the
displacement of the bilateral structure of subjugation of colonized economies onto
a dissembled structure of multilateral controls in the postwar era. The repudiation
of the requests for money from the Third World in self-help projects both
produces and reflects the contours of this broader politico-economic geography.
2.3 The Location of Money
The change in value of the money which has to be transformed into capital cannot
take place in the money itself since in its function as means ofpurchase and
payment it does no more than realize [realisieren] the price of the commodity it buys
or pays for, which, when it sticks to its own peculiar form, itpetrifies into a mass of
value of constant magnitude.
Karl Marx, Capital, volume 141.
You may turn and toss an ounce of gold in any way you like and it will never
weigh ten ounces. But here in the process of circulation one ounce practically does
weigh ten ounces.
42 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1. (London: Penguin Books), p. 270.
Karl Marx 3
2.3.1 The Invisible (post) War Chest
The question of money is particularly pertinent given the fact that with the arrival
of the Marshall Plan in 1947, thirteen billion dollars were funneled into the
European economy, financing the dollar deficit between 1948 and 1951." This
historical fact can be dismissed with a simple argument: the Marshall plan was
intended to correct the trade deficit between the US and its continental trading
partners, a problem which if left untreated would have affected the entire world
economy. The colonized world was not part of this sphere and therefore had no
leverage in negotiating trade and financial arrangements."
Yet, if we look closely, the postwar financial and trade systems were subsidized
through the particular position of the colonized and the decolonizing world in
global economic arrangements.
Britain emerged from the war with a weakened political and financial position
across the globe, a situation exacerbated by strong national movements in colonial
territories. It had relied on the US to help fund the war, which had left it with
4 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya
(New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 108.
* The amount went up to seventeen billion by 1952. See, Michael, Hogan, The Marshall
Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
* This subtext underwrites the absence of colonized sphere in many studies of postwar
trade and financial systems. See for example: W. Andy Knight, ed., Adapting the United
Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Blanchard
Jean-Marc, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman, eds., Power and the Purse: Economic
Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London: F. Cass, 2000).
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severe debt and a trade deficit.46 Yet despite these difficulties it was regarded by
Henry Morgenthau (1891-1967), the US Secretary of the Treasury, and Harry
Dexter White (1892-1948), Director of Monetary Research at the US Treasury and
joint author with John Maynard Keynes (1892-1948) of the Bretton Woods system,
as a potential economic rival in the postwar era. This perception was based on
Britain's financial and trade relations with colonial territories which gave it a
monopoly over determining postwar trade access to the decolonizing world.
During the war, the British had tried to protect its overseas assets and trade
arrangements and the US tried to gain a share in them. American help during the
war had been based on slow and painful negotiation of access to these resources.
As Robert Skidelsky has argued, "the British believed that the USA was trying to
'strip them bare,' the Americans that the British were distinctly understating their
opulence." 47 These trade relations were seen as Britain's coveted "war chest" and a
promise of financial security after the war.
2.3.2 "Imperial Preference"
In the 1930's the Bank of England strongly favored the policy of maintaining
"sterling areas" of trade, politico-economic jurisdiction-composed largely of
Britain's dominions, protectorates, and colonies-which traded in sterling alone.
Under this system, the colonies where given access to the British market to sell
their natural materials on the condition that they would either receive payment in
46 See, Randall Hinshaw, Lloyd A. Metzler, "World Prosperity and the British Balance of
Payments," in Review of Economics and Statistics, 27: 4 (Nov., 1945): pp. 156-170.
* Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom (1937-1946), vol. 3 (New
York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 102. Robert Skidelsky is the author of a new three volume
biography of Keynes, which extend the scope of previous studies on Keynes life by
including a detail history of postwar financial negotiations. Skildelsky too, however, fails
to account for the role of colonized and the decolonizing world in this picture.
the form of British exports, or use their credit to trade within the sterling area. This
policy, dubbed the "imperial preference," had blocked US trade access to areas
under British control and had been a major source of contention between the two
countries during the 1930s.8
It was the incremental opening up of the sterling area to American trade that
underwrote American loans and later grants for resolving the British balance of
payments crisis. 9 In 1933 Britain had defaulted on its American war debt (related
to the First World War) which had resulted in the passage of the Debt Default Act
of 1934 forbidding loans to any country "delinquent in its war obligations." This
condition was reproduced in a series of Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1937
that also restricted sales of arms, war materials, and loans to Britain. Yet in 1940,
48 See, Catherine Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
49 As Britain resisted American access to its market areas, the US treasury and State
advisors devised other plans to counter the possibility of British economic resurgence after
the war. The US international financial policy was an integral part its foreign policy to
secure political power in the postwar global arena. In this equation, US foreign aid was
initially not directed to Western Europe, but primarily to the Soviet Union, Japan and
Eastern Europe. Harry Dexter White (1892-1948), Director of monetary research at the US
Treasury and joint author with John Maynard Keynes (1892-1948) of the Bretton Woods
system, had envisaged a huge Marshall Aid program for the Soviet Union in 1945-6.
White's goal was to establish a degree of political and economic control over Soviet
economy by attaching it to the "restored" gold standard and though the instrument of
large American loans. See, James M. Boughton, Why White, Not Keynes?: Inventing the
Postwar International Monetary System, IMF Working Paper WP/02/52. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department, 2002.
White's sensitivity to political dimensions of financial planning, however, hastened his
downfall when he was accused of being a Soviet spy in McCarthy investigations. See, R.
Bruce Craig, Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2004).
The initial postwar Stabilization Funds for East Europe and the massive amount of aid and
reconstruction effort for Japan proposed by White were part of a broad policy of global
economic hegemony, counter-pressure directed at the Soviets. See, Aaron Forsberg,
America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War context offapan's Postwar Economic
Revival, 1950-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
with American public opinion still strongly against American involvement in the
war, Britain was able to secure loans for war materials as tensions rose in Europe.
At first, Britain had used the export surpluses of sterling area countries, kept in
London, to draw two billion dollars for construction of military equipment factories
in the US (which included a hefty $880 million payment in July, 1940, for the
construction of aircraft factories)."0 With rising expenditure, American exporters
expressed "doubts about [Britain's] ability to pay all the bills she was running up."51
The US government officials like Morgenthau, however, were of the opinion that
the "British will always find means of paying if they cannot get out of it."52
Part of this belief stemmed from American eyes on British assets in the colonial
world. Roosevelt, on Morgenthau's advice, asked Churchill to send a cruiser to
South Africa, still a British colonial possession, to ship e42 million to Washington.
As Skidelsky notes, this proposal led Keynes to "remark that the Americans
believed the British owned their empire 'lock, stock, and barrel'."" The major
share of confidence in Britain's ability to pay, however, stemmed from its sterling
area trade relations. The opulence of the fading Empire resided in the abstract.
Immediately after the war, the Bank of England wanted to pursue the policy of
Imperial Preference. The Bank favored the view that Britain's economic problems
lay on the "supply" and not the "demand" side. Hubert Henderson (1890-1952),
the British Treasury Advisor, representing the Bank's view, argued that Britain
* Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, p. 94.
51 Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, p. 96.
52 Ibid., p. 102.
" Ibid.
should guard as much of its colonial assets as possible and use them to find its
way out of its deficit in the postwar era." According to Keynes, Henderson and the
Bank had a false view of Britain's trade assets and their role in the future of the
global economy.
For Keynes the policy of a closed-off sterling area was unsustainable in the
expanding world trading system. A staunch imperialist himself, Keynes' opposition
did not stem from sympathy for decolonizing movements. Rather, it stemmed from
his belief that the Bank's argument to maintain the sterling area in the postwar era
betrayed a "barbaric" understanding of money, circulation, and capitalist relations.
Backing sterling area trade and the policy of Imperial Preference, Keynes argued,
stemmed from a linear and reductive view of the economic cycle in which money
represented gold and gold, economic value. From this perspective, money and
capital were the same and capital was supposedly increased by buying cheap and
selling dear. This led Keynes to conclude that
[i]t [was] sheer madness to think the Empire can create a cave where we take in
one another's washing and ignore the rest of the world!.. .The countries we sell to
are not necessarily the countries from which we buy, and if we begin unilateral
trading we return to barter, the survival of the fittest and more war."
The Bank's approach, in principle was a return, according to Keynes, to the
"practices of the seventeenth century goldsmiths (which we are still following in
the international field) and forgoing the vast expansion of production which
5 Ibid. 201.
* Ibid, p. 331.
banking principles have made possible."56 By focusing on accumulation of gold
reserves and greater supply-side controls, the Bank's overt economic nationalism
ignored the entire cycle of the production and creation of demand.
2.3.3 Complex Money
The "cave" practices of sterling banking of bilateral trade and payment clearing,
Keynes asserted, combined money circulation and trading cycle which he had
kept separate in his proposals for multilateral system of exchange rates and
balance of payments controls. For Keynes, money itself didn't possess any value
but only constituted a representative moment in a complex and open-ended chain
(we will look at the complexity of this chain as it appears in the context of self-
help projects later in the chapter).7 Keynes' insight resided in realizing that money
only had meaning in relation to the complete and repeatable cycle of circulation,
from production to consumption, supply to demand.
For Keynes, money didn't equal trade. Accordingly, Britain, he argued, should not
attempt to align its money cycle with its trade circle. This perspective, however,
Keynes insisted, didn't mean that Britain should abandon its sterling area
advantage. It would be "madness," Keynes insisted, to not use Britain's position to
negotiate its emergence into a broader trading realm in a manner that secured it
against competitive disadvantage. Britain needed to re-establish "equilibrium," he
argued, before it could maintain it. In the immediate postwar era, Britain should,
Keynes held, maintain its quasi-monopsonist buying power in foodstuff and raw
56 ibid. p. 247.
" Marx had identified this moment as the "negative relation [of money] to circulation," for
"cut off from all relations to [circulation] it would not be money, but merely a simple
natural object."
materials to maintain a preferential policy for its "manufactures exports" in sterling
area markets.
Yet, Keynes argued, as Britain eroded its war time export deficits and built up
foreign exchange reserves, it should simultaneously work towards establishing an
"ideal" system of international monetary controls. This system would put in place
formulaic agreements regarding multilateral adjustments in exchange rates
whenever any country began to develop a trade surplus or deficit beyond a certain
range, undermining discretionary variation and forced devaluations that
characterized the economic crisis of the 1930's. With this system in place among
major creditor nations, if Britain slowly opened up its trade realms to "dollar
areas," on the basis of bilateral trade agreements, it would ensure that it would
benefit from all the advantages of increased trade volume without suffering from
any of its defects. With a system of balance in place, Britain could still maintain it
superior position in relation to the sterling areas countries, as they did not gain
any relative advantage by exporting to the "dollar area," while Britain benefited
from the increase in trade magnitude and expansion of sterling markets. 8 The
system, Keynes argued, allowed politics to co-exist with economics. It combined
the geo-political realities of bilateral trading, with a mutually benefiting system of
multilateral monetary controls.
58 The sterling areas countries were able to extend the scope of their trade, but this did not
harm Britain or any creditor nation since the relative advantage between their currencies
was insured. For example, if the US opened its market to a sterling country in exchange
for securing preferential status for its exports, the dollar to sterling rate would be
formulaically adjusted before the US developed a comparative trade surplus beyond a
certain percentage. Unlike the rigidity of the gold standard, this security-net of mutual
adjustment provided Britain with the option to adjust its currency to either eliminate US
trade surplus or negotiate bilateral reduction in tariff in other areas with the US.
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In light of later historical developments, it would however, be more accurate to
see in this combination a system of perpetuating the separation between trading
and monetary control, between money and politics. It is in this gap between
money and trade, between economic and politics, we would argue, that capitalism
locates the possibility of capital's emergence.
2.3.4 Politics of Partial Economics
Robert Skidelsky has argued that Keynes himself acknowledged that the Bretton
Woods agreement was only possible because it was a consensus, although partial,
on the postwar monetary system, not trade regulations. The process of trade
liberalization as well as tariff controls continued on an asymmetric basis. This
exclusion of the question of the trade imbalance with the decolonizing world is
evident in the fact that the International Trade Organization (ITO), the third
component of the Bretton Woods systems (in addition to the World Bank and the
IMF), designed to correct trade imbalances over the long run, never materialized.
Passed in Havana, the charter for ITO, known as the Havana Charter, was
considered by the US Congress as a threat to its control over US trade policy. As a
result, a separate General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by
the US and twenty three other countries in 1947. As Chakravarthi Raghavan has
argued,
"[o]ne of the myths surrounding GATT is that its seven trade rounds brought about
the liberalisation of trade and the expansion of world economy since 1945. It will
perhaps be more correct to say that the post-war expansion of the world
economy, the so-called Golden Age of the industrial world, has been the result of
the operation of a number of macro-economic processes including the application
of Keynesian economic and state intervention to promote expansion. The
expansion of trade was an effect, rather than the cause, of world economic
expansion.59
Keynes seems to have had this metaleptic operation in sight when he insisted on
the separation of trade and monetary controls in the Bretton Woods system. For,
as Skidelsky argues, Keynes was very much aware, and comfortable with, the idea
of partiality of the Bretton woods agreement as a tentative agreement on monetary
control, without the establishment of ITO and an agreement on trade. The
dimension of trade was to be managed at a different level of politics.
From this perspective, the separation of GATT from the Bretton Woods, and the
latter's slow dissimulation, did more to advance the Keynesian model of politico-
economic management than if it had been implemented as proposed. As it turned
out, many previous colonies turned away from the meager concessions offered
through sterling area trade, and pursued policies of import substitution (most
notably, India). This allowed them in the immediate postwar years to trade on a
bilateral basis while controlling inflation in the domestic market. These
developments on a global scale, however, exaggerated the problem of trade
imbalances beyond the limits of Keynesian controls and led to the abolishment of
the Bretton Woods monetary controls in 1971, and the subsequent entrenchment
of trade controls and tariffs though GATT, the most notorious of which would be
the so-called Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1990.
" Chakravarthi Raghavan's excellent study, Recolonization: GA77, the Uruguay Round &
the Third World (Zed Books, London; and Third World Network, Penang, 1990), takes into
the opaque and secretive world of Gunboat Diplomacy that characterize GATT
agreements. pp. 49-50.
Could the deferral of the political dimension of trade in Keynesian economics be
seen as a model of managing the indefinable yet necessary loose calculus of the
non-economic? Can we see in the metalepsis of effect and cause identified by
Raghavan in GATT negotiations an economy of disavowal at work?
If we consider these possibilities, then the Third World technocrats' request for
more money is not simply a negation-a request for money outside the circuits of
circulation-as the self-help experts would have it. Rather it constitutes a negation
of a negation, an interruption in the logic of disavowal that informs the political
dimension of (non)-economic management. The demand for more money actually
forms the demand for access to the circuits of money as a complex phenomenon.
It is not surprising that self-help experts dismissed this request as being based on a
belief in magic, relegating it to an understanding of capitalism at its boundaries.
If the Bank of England's reluctance to forgo the structure of Imperial Preference
and sterling area economics betrayed a "barbaric" notion of money as a unified
concept, then it also betrayed a unified concept of crisis-management, a concept
which required a declaration of Imperial Preference and authority to displace the
cost of war to the colonized territories. In the dissembled world of the Bretton
Woods and GATT systems, the cost of war as well as of peace is written on a
dissembled register of deferment and disavowal.
From the very beginning of the Bretton woods negotiation in 1941 to its signing in
1944, Keynes had insisted on the moral right of Britain to demand from the US the
cost of the war as a gift, not as a loan. Pointing to Britain's heavy capital
investments in the US defense industry during the war, assets which were later
"sold" to the US without a price, Keynes insisted that this was a question of
"Justice." The US should pay for the war that Britain had fought and paid for on its
behalf. In the dissembled economy of disavowal, in the loose calculus of demand
and management of the non-economic, the question of Justice can only be asked
asymmetrically on one side of the transparent, yet present, international division of
finance capital.
2.4 The Location of Self-Help
The appearance of self-help as a model of social and economic "development" in
the Third World immediately after the war is critical. It resonated and appealed to
the importance attributed to the creation and management of socio-cultural
demand. Self-help's appeal and currency in the economic circuits stemmed from
its emphasis on locating economic growth as a phenomenon necessarily tied to
socio-cultural transformation.
The management of the non-economic manifests itself in self-help projects as a
question of relating quantity to quality. The question of quantity, of funding, must
be deferred to raise the issue of quality, the socio-economic conditions
surrounding money that makes money into capital. The expert's dismissal of the
local official's demand is lodged in this relationship, one whose intricacies escape
the local official and burden the expert. The local official wants more money,
quantity alone, elusive to its relationship with the complex web of qualitative
interruptions that absorb money in the calculus of accompanying social relations
defining capitalist society as a whole. The development expert is not just
concerned with reproducing quantity, in the form of houses or money, but with
encouraging the emergence of a capitalist society which restores quality, by
preserving attributes of human dignity, etc. The demand for quantity may be
deferred. Development must postpone its own fulfillment, for the circle of quality
to emerge; for the Third World to produce and reproduce its own money and
houses. This distinction separates "us" from "them" in Crane's shunning of the
"local" demand for money.
Janet Abu-Lughod, in an early essay on writings on the city, argued that despite
the emphasis on "complicating the lines of causality by substituting a circular for a
linear model," the classical tradition of urban ecology at the at the so-called
Chicago School (most notably Ernest Burgess, Robert Ezra Park, and later Louis
Wirth), sought "universality not only in causes but [also] in consequences." Abu-
Lughod speculates that "had the original influence been Weber's, or even
Durkheim's.. .[c]ultural, institutional, and historical variations would doubtless have
received the fuller attention."'" Weber or Durkheim's qualitative "morphological
predilections," however, did find their way into development sociology.
A prominent example of the emphasis on issue of quality is the work of Elizabath
Hoyt (1893-1980), the famous sociologist, economist, and development consultant,
who though herself taught at Iowa State University, was closely associated with,
and instrumental in shaping, the series of publications on development sociology
coming out of the University of Chicago in the nineteen fifties. In a paper titled,
"Want Development, Hoyt differentiated between two curious terms, "want" and
60 See, Janet Abu-Lughod, The City is Dead-Long Live the City (Berkeley: Center for
Planning and Development Research, University of California, Berkeley, 1969), p. 7, and
n. 8.
"impulse."" Want results, Hoyt argued, when things becomes intrinsic to the
"quality" of life itself, to the very condition of its reproduction. Impulse on the
other hand, stems from the need for momentary gratification. Want is long-term.
Impulse cannot be sustained. The question for development focused on the
emergence of want in the Third World. For Hoyt and her associates at the
University of Chicago, development of wants was critical to the implementation of
Keynesian economic in the Third World, for an economy based on impulses
cannot predict trends, leaving capitalist relations without the rudder of policy
controls. For Hoyt and other sociologists and economists who found themselves at
various joint conferences and seminars with architects, planners and administrators
of self-help programs, Third World development was a question of developing a
mature theory of qualitative "choice."62
61 Elizabeth Hoyt, "Want Development in Underdeveloped Areas," in TheJournal of
Political Economy, LIX:3 (June 1951): pp. 194-202.
62 One of these occasions would be the Ford Foundation Conference on Urban Planning &
Development, held at the foundation's headquarters in New York on October 10-11, 1956.
The conference brought together "thirty-six specialists in problems of urbanization." These
included, Frederick J. Adams and Robert Mitchell, and Lloyd Rodwin from the Dept. of
City and Regional Planning at MIT; Charles Ascher, at the Institute of Public Administration
in New York; Catherine Bauer, at Dept of City and Regional Planning at the University of
California, Berkeley; Kingley Davis, at the Advance Institute of Social Science at Stanford
University; Philip Hauser, at the Dept of Sociology, University of Chicago; John Hyde, at
the School of Architecture, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Albert Mayer, architect and
independent consultant in New York; Martin Meyerson, consultant and Vice President of
the Philadelphia based ACTION group; McKim Norton at the Regional Plan Association in
New York; Perry Norton, Executive Director of the American Institute of Planners in
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Dennis O'Harrow at the American Society of Planning Officials;
Harvey Perloff at the Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C.; Ralph Pomerance,
consultant and architect in New York; Hugh Pomeroy, Director of the Westchester County
Dept. of Planning, New York; Anatole Solow at the Pan American Union in Washington,
D.C.; Raymond Vernon, consultant and Director of the New York Metropolitan Region
Study, Regional Planning Association, New York; Ernest Weissmann, Chief of the UN
Section of Housing, Town and Country Planning; Coleman Woodbury at Dept. of City
Planning at Yale University. In addition to numerous representative of the Overseas
Development Program of the Ford Foundation; other officials of the Foundation include:
Douglas Ensminger, Ford Foundation Representative in India; Kenneth Iverson, Ford
Hoyt's thesis is incredibly informative, not so much with regard to the socio-
economic makeup of the areas of her interest-which, she still preferred to call,
the "Orient," at moments in the text (betraying, might we say, a nostalgia for the
discourse of Imperial Preference?)-but as a reflection of the social economy of
development economics itself. Staying true to Marx's insights, for development
theorists like Hoyt, economic value could not be separated from cultural values.
Capital is located at the interaction of the economic and non-economic.
Development seeks to harness this undefined realm.
The position of cultural value as a necessary foil to economic production slips the
latter into the elusive realm of that political-economic concept whose seething
traces formed the core of Marx's four volumes of Capital: value. As a theory of
socio-economic reform, development locates itself at the intersection of
(economic) value and (cultural) values. Development planning is the name, and
the game, of setting this interaction into play.
The irresolvable metaphorics of development economics betray the impossibility
of defining this complex relation. All the self-help planning reports we have
encountered are forced to use an an irresolute language when it actually comes to
lay out the methodology of implementing their stated goals: we must "encourage"
"stimulate" "steer" economic growth, the creation of economic value in line with
cultural values. Development as a sustainable phenomenon must locate itself
beyond the economic. Yet, it is this relationship it fails to define. Or perhaps more
accurately, refuses to define. For it is precisely in keeping open the relationship
Foundation Representative in the Near East; Francis Sutton of the Foundation's Behavioral
Science Program; and Paul Ylvisaker of the Foundation's Public Affairs Program.
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between the economic and the cultural that an argument for the makeablility of
society can be made as well as deferred.
Self-help is intentionally low-tech, not just because it costs less to make such
houses, but because it seeks to meet the socio-cultural at its present moment, and
identify in it the possibilities of choice that can generate want and value, rather
than impulses and money. It is this calculus immediacy and delay that compelled
Crane to declare that the "village improvement programme [should] be initiated on
the basis of the present rural economy, without waiting for any great changes in
agricultural methods.""
The two major anchors of this sphere are "tradition" and "modernity" and the
subject treading between them is the "migrant." To understand how this interstitial
space is mapped in the development discourse through the idea of self-help, and
how it relates to the postwar geo-economic moment, we return to Jacob Crane
who is credited with coining the term "self-help."
2.4.1 Forming Subject, Deforming Agency: Puerto Rico
Mapping the historical emergence of self-help schemes in the development
discourse will take us first to the US and then to Puerto Rico. The term, "self-help,"
is attributed to Jacob Crane, the famous American housing activist, planner, and
the Assistant to the Administrator of the US Housing and Home Finance Agency.
During his tenure at the Agency, Crane had become well-know for being
instrumental, together with other major figures of pre-war US planning, such as
Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams, in the passing of such legislations as the
63 Tropical Housing Mission Report, 1951, op. cit., p.11.
1943 Housing Act that resulted in the abolishment of segregation in subsidized
- 64housing.
The self-help program was first conceived of in the US to extend the subsidized
resources of the agency beyond urban areas, particularly to the rural American
South. It was thought that if government provided the infrastructural elements,
such as roads, sewerage and electricity, while the beneficiaries carried out most of
the construction work themselves under proper technical supervision, the subsidy
program would have the widest and the quickest impact in rural areas where
higher poverty and unemployment rates, low-density, and decentralized
settlements made it virtually impossible to carry out large-scale standardized
housing program without exceptional costs.
Despite the high levels of unemployment catalogued in the rural south, the
presumption of available labor proved to be ill-founded. We will look at this
assumption in detail later in the section on self-help organization techniques. The
program's self-labor approach proved to be too time consuming to be compatible
with dispersed opportunities for informal employment and the busy American
work week of formal employment. Aside from a few demonstration projects and
pilot programs, the program failed to have the wider impact imagined by Crane
and others at the agency."5
64 Crane's involvement in the American housing reform bills is documented alongside with
that of Catherine Bauer in latter's biography by Peter Oberlander and Eva Newbrunher.
See, Houser (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999).
65 After the limited success of self-help schemes beyond a few demonstration projects, the
US HHFA, turned its attention back to the urban areas. From 1955 to 1960, it launched a
project known as the Flanner House, a "settlement house" in Indianapolis composed of
individual houses for the "urban Negro population." The inhabitants were trained in an on
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Yet, at the same time, the program gained immense international appeal. One of
the key reasons behind this renewal was Crane's appointment as a consultant with
US Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA). In the immediate postwar era, the
TCA programs focused primarily on Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1947,
Crane arrived in Puerto Rico as a TCA consultant for the island's Social Program
Division, a recently established planning body with a jurisdiction to both influence
legislation at the national level and implementation at the local. Here in the Social
Program of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Crane was joined by
Luis Rivera-Santos, the executive director of the Social Program, and Rafael Pico,
the chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board."
The island appeared particularly appropriate for self-help's demographic demands.
It was small enough to be defined as a self-contained region. Though it was
supported by a primarily agrarian economy, it was also considered amongst the
densest countries of the world, with a population density of 645 persons per mile.
This demographic makeup, and a relatively small densely populated rural sector
sight workshop under seven "experienced craftsmen" and four "organizers." Despite the
initial investment, the project demanded 5600 hours of the owners' time per house for the
first 237 houses and kept running-up overhead construction and supervision fees. This led
to the eventual contracting of a large number of the remaining houses. Charles Abrams
describes the failure of the program in his book, Man's Strugglefor Shelter in an
Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MA: The Joint Center for Urban Studies, MIT and Harvard,
1964), p. 170.
66 Jacob Leslie Crane Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collection, Carl A. Kroch
Library, Cornell University, Series 1, Box 1, Folders, 3-4. Hereafter cited as Jacob Crane
Papers, Cornell University.
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appeared to bypass the shortcomings of rarefied population that self-help schemes
had faced in the US."
The apparent uniformity of population distribution, however, was carefully
designed and had a long history of population resettlement schemes behind it. It
was an extensive administrative network of local bodies governing this distributed
population that made Puerto Rico an appropriate case-study for self-help schemes.
As early as 1921, a land reform body, called the Homestead Commission, was
established by the American Colonial government. The commission provided small
farms and lots to rural peasantry as a way of controlling population movement and
ensuring labor supply for sugarcane production. In 1945, the activities of the
commission were turned over to the Land Authority, an interim planning body
during the years of increasing demands for self-determination. After the accession
of Partial Self-Government in 1947, the Land Authority was incorporated into the
Department of Agriculture and land regulation procedures were given over to the
Social Programs Administration as part of an extensive reorganization of the rural
population to increase sugarcane production on large corporate farms. The Social
Programs Administration provided rural lots varying from a quarter to three acres,
and established the Farmer Housing Association. By early 1950s, 30,000 families
were settled in 194 rural communities, with the goal of resettling another 30,000 by
the middle of the decade. What emerged was a network of village settlements,
each with 100 to 500 families that gave the island its unique characteristics of a
67 The suitability of the Puerto Rican demographic makeup is also emphasized by Rafael
Corrada in The Place of Self-help and Mutual Aid in the Total Housing Program,
International Federation for Housing and Planning: Proceedings of the 1960 World
Planning and Housing Congress, San Juan, May 28 -June 3, 1960, p. 87-88; Also see,
Vizquez Calcerrada, "Housing in Puerto Rico Under the Mutual Aid and Self-help
Program," in Ibid.
uniform demographic distribution. The Administration also ran a family-farm
resettlement program with larger lot of twenty acres."
This extensive resettlement program, however, was not designed to provide a
means of self-employment. Rather, it was meant as a temporary means of
subsistence for labor between the harvests. In official language, however, this
systematic production of labor reserves for seasonal employment is framed as a
preliminary step towards the making of a modern citizenry. Rivera-Santos asserted
that with their subsistence needs taken care of, the farmer was free to
sell his labor in the open marker without the limitation of dependency which
characterized his life as a squatter (agregados). This feeling of freedom is a
psychological restoration of man for his struggles. There is a rebirth of the powers
and potentialities of a real citizen [emphasis added]69
Rivera-Santos's remarks, made at the West Indies Conference on Housing in 1947,
identify the particular employment of psychological individualism in nationalist
and developmental rhetoric.7' The framing of the laborer as an emerging subject of
modernization marks the potential rather than a realization of modern citizenship.
The not-yet individual, not yet fully engrossed in modern socio-economic
relations, identifies an intermediary sphere of unrealized potential. This partiality is
68 These details are listed by Rivera-Santos himself in a "working paper" titled, "Housing
Programmes in Puerto Rico with Special Emphasis on Aided Self-Help Activities,"
submitted to the panel of experts at the United Nations Seminar on Housing and
Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January - 17
February 1954. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1, UN Archives, New York. The paper is a
revised version of a presentation at the West Indies conference on Housing, 1947
sponsored by US Technical Cooperation Administration.
69 Ibid. p. 5.
0 Luis Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico with Special Emphasis on Aided Self-help activities," Proceeding of West India
Conference on Housing, 1947, UN Archives, New York.
a recurrent theme in development rhetoric. This framing of labor as an untapped
site of potential modernization frames self-help and development as a problem not
just of economics but one necessarily of social reform.
Joining Santos and Pico at the West Indies Conference, Crane, in his presentation
titled "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," argued:
In order to best serve the shelter needs and aspirations of the people, the housing
programme must take into account the attitudes of the people themselves. It must be
remembered that the values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from local
culture and are deeply imbedded in the minds of the people [emphasis added] 71
In this domain, "desire" and "attitude" form essential psychological vectors of
modernization. We will look at how individual desire, family, and community form
particular scales of psychological coding of economic value later in this chapter.
Here it is important to note that framing is dependent on the coding of tradition
as a collective and partially modern source of development. The individual as a
potential citizen and a unit of the community constitutes the site where economic
development is recast as social responsibility and is displaced outside a purely
economic calculus into the realm of social reform. The psychological coordinates
of not-yet-laborer locate the individual as a potential subject of modernization
within traditional society. The idea of joint family as a state preceding the
emergence of families and individuals, yet bearing their developmental imprint, is
71Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West India Conference
on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers by Crane
distributed as corollary material at the conference: "Huts and Houses in the Tropics;" "The
Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family Housebuilding
- 'Aided Self-Help Housing;" and "Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico (Brochure)," United
States Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of the Administrator; "Aided Self-help
Shelter Improvement in Tropical Puerto Rico," (Washington, D.C.: The Agency, 1950).
one of the necessary theoretical fictions constituting this interstitial, not-yet-modern
sphere."
As Rivera-Santos argued, this displacement is essential to the functioning of
development:
An aided self-help and mutual aid program requires understanding of problems
and a desire to do something about them. The most important asset is not the cash
on hand - though that is important - but the decision and the will to help
themselves. This is the reason why education for the development of proper
attitudes is of crucial importance in such programs.
Our first experience points out clearly that the development of a proper attitude is
the only reliable basis for the continuous effort necessary in a housing project and
is the only permanent basis for any other general community improvement
program [emphasis added]. 73
The coding of proper attitude and responsibility for modernization, however, is
itself a coding of the subject of development rather than evidence of agency. Here,
Mahmood Mamdani and Talal Asad's criticisms of certain works in African Studies
which, in their quest to restore agency to the colonized subject, disregard all
historical constraints, is invaluable for differentiating between the realms of subject
72 The breaking up of the "joint family" into nuclear families appears as the customary
explanation of rapid urbanization and social change in the Third World in a host of the
UN reports. The 1960 UN Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New
and Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia explained social change related to urbanization as
follows: "After migrating, the poorer classes stay on in towns even though they do not
find secure employment, because for them there is not much disparity in living conditions
between rural and urban areas. The decline of joint family responsibility has rendered
them as insecure in the rural areas as they are in the town though the precariousness of
city." See, Report of the Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New and
Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia, New York: The United Nations, 1960. UN Document
ST/TAO/M/18, UN Sales publication no. 62.II.H.1.
' Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico." op. cit., p. 7.
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and agency. Even slavery, Mamdani argues, is dismissed as not necessarily a
condition to prevent the emergence of an "African-oriented culture."74 Talal Asad
has aptly responded to this tendency by remarking, that lelven the inmates of a
concentration camp are able, in this sense to live by their own cultural logic. But
one may be forgiven for doubting that they are therefore 'making their own
history'."7  We must keep in mind that Pico and Rivera Santos' invocation of
citizenship and responsibility is the unfolding of a top-down model of a
dissembled loan structure.
It is important to note here that all these resettlement projects are not presented as
strategies for ensuing radical breaks from the existing socio-cultural conditions, but
as strategies of partial rearrangement and intervention. The "freeing" of labor is not
described as emancipation from tradition, but as finding the ingredients of
modernity in it. In the self-help context, tradition is not considered modern, or
celebrated from the preservationist and nativist perspective of cultural relativism.
Rather it is to be transformed, but according to its own inherently modern
structure. Seen from the perspective of development institutions, "tradition," as a
partly modern sphere, forms the most critical ingredient of modernization.
2.4.2 Community.. .Action!
Tradition as the retrospective source of modernization indeed forms one of the
conditions of development. Rivera-Santos' statement identified the site of this
partly-modern sphere in the nationalist/development rhetoric: community. It is
74 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 10.
" Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion, Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and
Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1993), p. 4. Quoted in Mamdani, ibid.
important to note that the term "community" rarely appears in the development
discourse without the terms "action," "planning," "development," or, as is the case
in Rivera-Santos' statement, "improvement," following it.
Rivera-Santos and Pico soon began a "Community Action Plan," in which the
network of rural settlements were presented as a basis for a broad "cooperative
education," "group action" and "self-improvement" program.76 In these
formulations, community is not presented as a pre-existing traditional realm, rather
as the possibility of a seamless transition between tradition and modernization. It
identifies an arena which, with proper guidance, could find the contours of
modernity within tradition. Community in development discourse is the possibility
of immanent emergence of modernization. The idea of community development
presents a particularly digestible image of tradition at the root of modernity:
The aided self-help housing program, as part of a broader community
improvement program, is based on the proposition that democracy begins in the
community. One of its purposes has been to discover methods and techniques
whereby communities can be stimulated to help themselves through cooperation
and group action...[E]ach individual affected must come better to understand his
problems if he is to take part in evolving and execution of simple plans for the
solution of those problems. Only as he assumes that part and that responsibility
can we hope to create a permanent basis for our democratic order. It is the
indeclinable responsibility of those who are in [a] position to do so, to help create
a permanent basis for our democratic order. It is the indeclinable responsibility of
76 Here, a complex set of connections, from Crane to Catherine Bauer to Richard
Alexander-Richard Neutra's partner in his Los Angeles firm-would bring Neutra to
Puerto Rico to design a host of village and community centers that formed the focus of
the Community Action Plan.
those who are in position to do so, to help create the proper climate for this
growth in citizenship to take place."
Here we must remind ourselves of the long history of European community
improvement discourse, particularly in France, as charted by Paul Rabinow's
seminal study, The French Modern, to understand the particularities of the framing
of community development in the development discourse.8 As Rabinow has
argued, for Le Play, family appeared as the fundamental unit of social relations
after the individual, serving as its essential "milieu."79 In the hand of Francis Galton
seeking to systemize the notion of identity and identification through the science
of fingerprinting in late nineteenth century, England, family appears as a basic unit
of modern statistical systems. For Emile Cheysson in France, distancing himself
from the new methods of statistical organization presented by Galton in England,
family was not "one of the possible set of differentially distributed, structural
variation...revealing an underlying unity... [in] the field of differences in which
individual traits were distributed.""0 For Cheysson, family formed a unique "type,"
lodged in the social reality of each cultural setting, representing the "guiding
norms against which social agglomeration could be evaluated and organized."8 1 As
Rabinow points out, the distinction between a quantitative and a qualitative
approach to reading the social and devising methodologies of its management, is
7 Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico." op. cit., p. 7.
78 Paul Rabinow, The French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
79ibid. p. 172.
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lost in the next generation of sociological approaches that came after the First
World War.
What is important to note for our purposes is that despite the differences in the
approaches to understanding the social, both the British and the continental
models are mobilized by an underlying current: moving social reform away from
moralism to welfare. In the development arena, despite the influence of Western
approaches to social reform, the vector of social change pointed in the reverse
direction: away from welfare and into a discourse on moralism. Individual, family,
and community, while they are treated as units of formal organization of the
social, also are realms that must necessarily escape the formal definition of
economic and social planning and re-possess the extra-formal, moral, dimension
of communal and individual realization and responsibility. As the promise and
potential of modernization, community can bear the weight of being presented as
the untinted potential origin of modernization, modernization that can unfold
without repeating the moral crisis brought by the exploitative market mechanism
in the West. Family, individual, and community are markers of an alternative
project of modernization. To preserve its own possibility as an ethical project,
development must continuously construct its object and subject at the threshold of
modernity. It must delay its own fulfillment, and keep the vector of modernization
pointing toward the identification of a potentially modern and uncorrupted realm
of tradition.
2.4.3 "Minimum Urbanization"
The focus on the potency of tradition as the site of individual and collective
responsibility becomes apparent in the first self-help program designed by the
Puerto Rico Planning Board after Crane's arrival. The program, called Minimum
Urbanization, sought to provide the incoming urban population with only
minimum services that could serve as the necessary stepping stone in encouraging
the inhabitants to construct the remaining facilities through their own effort, in a
sense, constituting the socio-economic sphere of modernization between tradition
and modernity in the process. 82 "The lots distributed," Rivera Santos explained,
will [only] have access to minimum services and facilities e.g. water supply (not
inside the house) and the necessary construction work to guarantee a healthy
environment. No dwelling or streets will be provided to start with. The families are
expected to move into the new lots with whatever house they can."
Shifting away from colonial rural resettlement projects, in the "minimum
urbanization" approach, the inhabitants arrived first, modernity was expected to
arrive later. Proper planning and organization was deemed to guarantee this
sequence:
Of course, the new subdivisions will be carefully planned as the most progressive
and modern developments. Community services and facilities are expected to be
provided following aided self-help methods after the families have moved to their
new lots. The program is conceived on the basis of a broad community
improvement program though mutual aid on self-help and general community
participation in the solution of their problems."
82 Jacob Crane Papers, Cornell University. Series 1, Box 1, Folder 3-4.
83 Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of
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84 Ibid.
77
This framing is critical to the working of development. The lack of funding
appears as an advantage in harnessing want rather then impulse development by
"encouraging" the hidden potential of the individual in the community.
From the very beginning, it was clear to Pico and Rivera-Santos that any other
broad project of social reform was beyond the budgetary strength of the
government. "We have come to realize an unquestionable fact," Rivera-Santos
asserted, "In spite of the different housing programs and economic improvement,
we have not been able to cope effectively with the quality of our housing, housing
shortage, and the growth of slums.""
At the time of Crane's arrival, the Administration was under pressure to expand its
housing program while cutting down the costs. The project of minimum
urbanization solved neither of the requirements. While presented as the solution to
the Puerto Rico Planning Board's financial limitation, the Puerto Rican self-help
projects were underwritten by US private financing as part of a broader program
of corporate investment in the territory. While Puerto Rico is repeatedly cited as
the model case study of a successful self-help national program, it represented, as
Charles Abrams would later acknowledge, a special case in terms of its
relationship to the United States. Unlike any other "underdeveloped country, it
exercised a wide policy of tax exemption, mainland financing schemes, mainland
builders, and unrestricted immigration to the United States."" Home financing was
85 Ibid.
86
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undertaken partly though savings and loans associations whose "assets," it was
claimed, increased with the purported rise in incomes. Yet what is seldom
mentioned in the housing reports on Puerto Rico is how the mortgages advanced
by these associations were insured by the US Federal Housing Authority and
offered by US mainland or island lending institutions. The Puerto Rico government
sold tax-exempt housing bonds in the US market to subsidize these mortgages. In
addition, most of the inhabitants were those who could afford housing costing
over $9000 in 1963. These subsidies played a significant role in the "success" of
the Puerto Rural Housing programs vaunted by Crane, Pico and Rivera-Santos. The
Puerto Rico Planning Board report, issued under Pico's supervision, claimed that
the agency was successfully "enabling" the construction of an average of 3000
houses per year in 1958. Even though most of the houses, built with reinforced
concrete, were small in size, only 18 X 18 feet and consisted of only one room
which was designed to be divided later into a living-dining and two bedrooms, the
costs were still well over the initially imagined limits of self-financing (FIG. 2).
Yet these exceptions are glossed over, dispelled and displaced, as Puerto Rico is
presented as an example of self-help program's self-sustaining potential across the
globe. There the US subsidy was not forthcoming. The unsubsidized loan
programs were to be sustained by the "savings" alone. Holding Puerto Rico as an
example, the 1954 New Delhi Seminar on Community Development would made
this point clear: "The main source of funds for housing should be private savings
and policies should be developed with this requirement in view."87 This assertion
87 The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi,
1954. op. cit. p. 15.
formed the cornerstone of development economics. "This is indeed the principle,"
Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel-Laureate and development economist later remarked, "by
which an underdeveloped country can hope to 'lift itself by its own bootstraps'."88
These policies of "encouraging" savings though, we will later see in the section on
the "organization" of self-help projects, only amounted to the incorporation of
urban migrants as flexible labor reserves managed through a top-down loan
system that extended from international organizations to national governments to
local municipalities.
The possibility of this system, we have argued here, is itself subsidized by the
framing of "tradition" as a source of modernization, responsibility, and
understanding. This other subsidy works to erase the exceptions of Puerto Rico
self-help programs to establish a development norm.
2.4.4 Displacing Precedence
The notion of tradition as the potential sphere of modernization serves a particular
role in settling the question of Western precedence-the First World claiming itself
as a precedent for the Third. On the one hand, the idea of community is a framing
of tradition in terms of the basic modern social unit of the individual. On the
other, community is a re-writing of modernity in terms of certain collective ethics
that are seen to have been lost in laissez-faire individualism of the market. Playing
this duality, self-help proposals escape the limitation of outside imposition and
8 Myrdal here is quoting W.W. Rostow, the professor of international relations at MIT and
Advisor to L.B. Johnson, from the his famous book, Stages of Growth. See, Gunnar Myrdal,
"From Rich Lands and Poor," in An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944). Quoted in The Essential Gunnar Myrdal, Orjan
Appelqvist and Stellan Andersson, eds. (New York: The New Press, 2005), p. 225.
Western precedence in national contexts. The Western nations can learn from the
"balanced" modernization of self-help development in the Third World as the latter
from the expert's guidance. Crane is in Puerto Rico not simply to reproduce the
American model, but to help Puerto Rico discover one for itself. A direct claim of
precedence would have highlighted the question of funding and subsidy that
underwrote the American and Puerto Rican examples.
Local officials like Rivera Santos and Pico were adamant that self-help was to be
implemented with particular attention to the socio-cultural parameters of Puerto
Rico. Five year later in 1954, when Pico, Rivera-Santos and Crane found
themselves at the UN Seminar on Community Improvement in New Delhi, they felt
the need to clarify the question of precedence once again:
Much has been said in recent years about adapting western techniques to the
needs of the less developed areas of the world. But the particular circumstances
and requirements of many less developed countries have forced [them] to invent
rational approaches which depart from the policies and practices of the
industrialized countries. 9
The roots of this rational approach reside in the proto-rational sphere of tradition.
The positioning of tradition at the foundations of modernity is not simply an
instance of applying cultural sheen on economic principles. Development
identifies, indeed depends upon identifying, the interaction between the economic
and the extra-economic. It asserts that each particular cultural setting bears within
it a set of modernization principles. America and Puerto Rico are related to each
other as two particular models of harnessing that possibility. One does not serve
89 The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi,
1954. op. cit. p. ix.
as a model for the other but only as informant, or to use Gayatri Spivak's famous
term, alibi. The framing of tradition as the potential source of modernization
affords the much repeated argument that the United States can learn just as much
from the Puerto Rican experiments as the latter from the American examples.
Development cuts across the definition of tradition and modernity as separate and
sequential spheres and sets up a certain symmetry, an overlap, between the two.
This isomorphism, however, hides a discontinuous text, in which alibis and
exchanges draw focus away from the asymmetries underlying the comparisons.
The absence of subsidiaries and funding is one, the imbalance in the terms of
international trade and the question of access to world markets are others. The
idea of development as self-help is able to by-pass these questions altogether.
2.4.5 Gendering Help
All of these discontinuities are underwritten in terms of gender as well. While the
category of squatter labor, as the not-yet modern subject of this inversion is held
in abeyance, to sustain the possibility of development, another sphere is
simultaneously incorporated into the modernization project, the not-yet labor of
women. This incorporation, however, is silent and doesn't bear the mark of even a
partial recognition. Its presence can only be discerned from gender exclusive
profiles of community development programs such as the one laid out by Rivera-
Santos:
One of [the] purposes [of the program] has been to discover methods and
techniques whereby communities can be stimulated to help themselves through
cooperative and group action. It has proceeded with the conviction that each
individual affected must come to better understand his problems if he is to take
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part in evolving and executing simple plans for the solutions of those problems
[emphasis added]. 90
The term, "stimulated," here betrays the gendered profiles of tradition and
community as they are (partially) incorporated into the circuits of national and
international capital. The moral "responsibility" of modernization is borne
asymmetrically in the traditional realm, an asymmetry that is betrayed by the
gender-specific pronouns representing the subject of pending modernization. We
will examine the mechanisms of this selective recognition as well as the aporias
facing the strategies of recognizing women's labor in the development theater in
the section on self-help organization. Yet, we must note here that it is the invisible
category of "woman" that brings the different genres of the discourse together.9
Community development programs frequently draw upon the idea of the freedom
of labor, which forms a prominent theme in various postwar national theaters.
Independence is upheld as an unquestioned good that frees labor to enter wage
employment on its own accord. Yet if we keep in mind the long history of the
organization of the subsistence sphere as different forms of "free" labor (informal,
reserved, seasonal), the post-independence framing of free labor under self-help
programs appears as its displacement on yet another gender exclusive register.
2.5 Uses of Value
No discourse is possible... without the unity of something being taken for granted.
90 Ibid., p. 7.
91 The category of "woman" can be seen to operate as a differend, to use Jean Frangois
Lyotad's famous term representing the improbable operative rule that can bring together
different genres of a discourse without inflicting a "wrong [on] (at least) one of them." See
Jean Frangois Lyotad, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minnesota: The University of
Minnesota Press, 1988), p. xi.
Gayatri Spivak, In Other Worlds
If "marginality" is being constituted as an area of investigation, this is only because
relations ofpower have established it as a possible object; and conversely, ifpower is
able to take it as a target, this is because techniques of knowledge were capable of
switching it on. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies ofpower, there is
no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of
their difference...
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality"3
2.5.1 A Linear Abbreviation of a Circularity
The intertwined relationship between tradition and modernization blurs the
supposed separation between culture and economics. Let us now turn to how the
limits of political economy are blurred in the writing of Karl Marx through the
relationship of use and exchange value, two moments in the capitalist chain that
supposedly point to the sphere of tradition and capitalism respectively. This
digression is important because it allows us to identify how the relationship
between tradition and modernization articulated in early development schemes,
such as those in Puerto Rico, sustain a system of unacknowledged appropriation
of value critical to the logic of development.
Marx's dialectical thinking doesn't allow for a separation between use and
exchange-value, a sequential before and after in the process of commodification.
Gayatri Spivak has noted that the idea of use-value appears in Marx, not as an
apriori origin, but only in a supplementary relationship to the circuit of exchange
92 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds (New York: Routledge), p. 76.
9 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, pp. 98-99.
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relations.14 Use-value is not simply subtracted from the commodity to reveal its
exchange-value. Rather, it can only make itself visible when set in relation to
exchange-value.
Marx does equate value with exchange-value in the opening pages of the first
volume of Capital, but that equation forever remains, to use a Derridian term,
seething in the chain of parasitic relations:" "When, at the beginning of this
chapter, we said in the customary manner that a commodity is both a use-value
and an exchange-value," Marx tells us, "this was, strictly speaking, wrong...
A commodity is a use-value or object of utility, and a "value." It appears as this
double thing [dies Doppelte] that is, as soon as its value possesses its own form of
appearance [Erscheinungsforml, which is distinct from its natural form, and is that
of exchange-value, and the commodity never possesses this considered in
isolation, but only when it is in a value or exchange relation with a second
commodity of a different kind. Once we know this, our manner of speaking does
not harm; it serves, rather, as an abbreviation [emphasis added].96
A commodity appears as double things, marked by use and value, only after it is
set in exchange relations. Yet the "after" here is only an explanatory instrument. It
must be remembered that for the commodity to enter exchange relations, that
distinction, between use-value and value, must already be operative. In other
9 Gayatri Spivak, in her reading of Derrida's Economimesis has elaborated in detail on this
point. Derrida's reading of the political economy of Kant's third Critique, Spivak argues, is
marked by an understanding of use and exchange-value as distinct mutually exclusive
spheres. My description of inter-relationship of the two concepts in Marx is drawn from
Spivak's corrective to Derrida. See Gayatri Spivak, "Limits and Openings of Marx in
Derrida," in Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 97-119.
See Derrida's reading in Economimesis, trans., Richard Klein, Diacritics, 2:2 (Summer
1981).
9 Jacque Derrida, Limited Inc. pp. 99-100.
96 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books), p. 152. Hereafter noted in text as C
(volume number).
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words, the distinction between use-value and value is a circularity. Value appears
when use-value is subtracted. But the possibility of use-value appears only with
the emergence of value set in comparative relations of exchange-value. Spivak has
describe these simultaneous irresolutions as follows: "Use makes 'value' vanish, yet
without the moment of consumption of the commodity as use-value the value
would not be 'real'-ized., 7
Let us lay out this irresolvable chain as a linear abbreviation of a circularity: 1.
"value" appears when use-value is subtracted. 2. But use-value is only
comprehended when value has taken on a distinct form, (as exchange value,
through a comparative process with other commodities of a different kind.). 3. But
exchange value is only established when value's form has been established as
separate from use-value, which takes us again to the "first" step.
Use-value has conventionally been taken to represent that quality according to
which things are exchanged or utilized in a pre-capitalist society. The appearance
of local culture in culturalist critiques above is characterized primarily by this
divisive model of political economy. Marx's designation of a realm outside of
circuits of exchange with the term, "use-value," however, denies all
" Spivak, "Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida," in Outside in the Teaching Machine,
p. 106. Spivak has described this duality as a "parasitic" relationship where the "part-
whole relationship is...turned inside out." This inversion, which Spivak relates to Derrida's
"invagination," the "parasitic part (exchange-value) is also the species term of the whole,
thus allowing use-value the normative inside place of the host as well as banishing it as
that which must be subtracted so that Value can be defined." Ibid. p. 106.
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characterizations of an orginary moment of capitalist political economy and is
marked by an irresolvable duality at every moment.9"
This qualitative exchange betrays its footprint in the quantitative exchange after
the fact, when capitalism sets use-value and value in play. Marx's dialectical
thinking does not allow for the mapping of a beginning and end of capitalism but
presents us with an ever seething process of involution, an open-ended chain of
transformation. This conception of the political economy is able to account for the
dimension in which capitalism is continuously appropriating value by stepping
outside the purely economic coding. For Marx, the teleological progression from
use-value to value, and from value to exchange-value is a necessary
methodological abbreviation to explain a concept that defies teleological
modeling. These details were missed in the dogmatic imposition of Marx's idea on
societies outside of the European context by Socialism, and are certainly set aside
by cultural humanist readings of global capitalism seeking to distance themselves
from Marx.
2.5.2 Labor: The Great "Manoeuvre"
Marx's insightfulness lay in identifying this open-ended chain of value formation to
be at work at the moment when labor presents itself as a commodity to the
98 Spivak argues that this irresolution is present in Marx's characterization of even the
supposed origin of special-life, the human being-in-nature. Use-value appears in a
qualitative exchange with nature, which is inherent to the very condition of possibility of
human-being in nature. Marx complicated the idea of nature as origin when he argued:
"Labor, then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labor, a condition of existence of
human beings, which is independent of all social forms, an eternal natural necessity for
the mediation of the metabolism between human beings and nature, and thus human life
itself." (C1, 133). Quoted in Spivak, ibid., p. 105.
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capitalist. At the beginning of the chapter on "Value-Form" in the first volume of
Capital, Marx takes pains to point out the irresolute duality between use and value
as it manifests itself in the relation between labor and capital. Labor too appears as
a commodity written in the differential of use-value and exchange-value. On the
one hand, Marx argues, it has the "sensuous characteristics" of being "the labour of
the joiner, the mason, or the spinner, or any other particular kind of productive
labour." On the other hand, it simultaneously appears as an abstract activity
related to the abstract exchange relations of commodities:
With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the
useful character of the kind of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in
turn entails the disappearance of the different, concrete forms of labour. They can
no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of
labour, human labour in the abstract. (Cl, 128).
The capitalist, in signing a contract with labor, doesn't buy any particular kind of
labor, but rather wants to purchase the abstract quality of labor embodied in it. In
other words, the laborer sells his/her labor to the capitalist. What the capitalist
buys, however, is not labor, the ability of a particular laborer to make a particular
thing, but the general ability to work, any work, embodied by labor, the "human
labour in abstract," conventionally called "labor-power."
Useful labor, labor related to a particular object, doesn't have any value in
exchange relations and cannot be compensated accordingly. Only labor-power, as
the abstract measure of average labor in a particular social setup bears this
potential. This abstraction of labor-power takes place on a dual level: First, on the
shared level of labor as a physiological attribute: "On the one hand, all labor is an
expenditure of human labor-power in the physiological sense, and in this property
of being the same human or abstract human labor that it forms the value of
commodities." (CI, 137). Secondly, as a rational denominator:
"While.. .with reference to use-value, the labour contained in a commodity counts
only qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only quantitatively, once it has
been reduced to human labour pure and simple. In the former case it was a matter
of the 'how' and 'what' of labour, in the latter of the 'how much', of the temporal
duration of labour." (CI, 137).
It is in this abstract form, that labor can take on value in exchange relations.
This abstraction, however, doesn't separate labor-power altogether from the
particular form of concrete labor, its useful form. Marx remind us that "[e]quality in
the full sense between different kinds of labor can only consist in an abstraction
from their real inequality, in their reduction to the common character that they
possess as the expenditure of human labor-power, abstract labor" (Cl, 166).
Just as value cannot completely separate itself from "its form of appearance" in
case of other commodities, the abstract-labor cannot be altogether separated from
useful-labor. On the one hand, labor-power can only emerge as an abstraction
from useful-labor when conceptualized in the relational field of commodity
exchange. On the other hand, useful-labor makes its appearance as a theoretical
fiction after abstract labor-power is established as a concept in capitalist relations.
Its subtraction allows for labor-power to emerge. Useful labor cannot be taken as
an originary moment in the emergence of labor-power. There is no "local" sphere
outside the relations of power and exchange in Marx.
Foucault had warned us of the futility of assuming the "local" as a sphere
disconnected from broader disciplinary apparatuses:
No "local center," "no pattern of transformation" could function if through a series
of successive linkages, it were not eventually written into an over-all strategy...The
[disciplinary] apparatus, precisely to the extent that it [is] insular and
heteromorphous with respect to the other great "manoeuvres"..."
2.5.3 Driving Surplus
How does the inseparability of use-value and exchange-value inform the question
of exploitation, the great "manoeuvre" of capitalism? To approach this question, let
us now trace the role played by this differential in the emergence of another
important concept in Marx's analyses: surplus-value. Labor-power measures a
particular quality of human-labor: its super-adequation to itself. Here is the famous
sentence from the first volume of Capital that describes this quality: "[Labor-power]
distinguishes itself, form the ordinary crowd of commodities in that its use creates
value, and a greater value than it costs itself." (Cl, 342).
For Marx,
In order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, [the capitalist
must] find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose
use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual
consumption is there itself an objectification [Vergegenstandlichung] of labour,
hence a creation of value. The [capitalist] does find such a special commodity on
the market: the capacity for labour [Arbeitsverm6gen, in other words labour-power
[Arbeitskarft]. We mean by labour-power, or labour-capacity, the aggregate of
those mental and physical [attributes] existing in the physical form, the living
personality, of a human-being, capabilities which he set in motion wherever he
produces a use-value of any kind (Cl, 270).
The capitalist is interested in forever extending surplus-value. According to Marx,
there are two avenues available to the capitalist for this purpose: increase in
* Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, p. 99.
absolute and relative surplus-value. Absolute surplus-value is the amount of labor
performed by the worker after s/he has compensated for the use-value of labor-
power, dubbed "necessary-labor," the socially determined cost of "regeneration" of
labor. Any amount of work done over the cost of that regeneration, over
necessary-labor, is surplus-value for the capitalist.100 Since it is in the interest of
capitalism to preserve the long-term regeneration of labor-power, it can only
increase surplus-value by increasing the amount of labor performed over that
necessary labor (instead of reducing the costs of necessary labor by paying the
worker less than s/he needs for sustenance). Yet the work day cannot be infinitely
increased. Marx's detailed analyses of the historical debates on the length of the
working day point to this limit.
The second avenue to increase surplus-value is by increasing relative surplus-
value. In this scenario, the length of the working day is taken as constant at the
beginning. The only ways to increase surplus-value is either to decrease necessary-
labor, the use-value of labor, or to increase productivity. The former follows, Marx
argues, a declining curve. The cost of necessary labor decreases as capitalism
incorporates more and more productive activities related to supporting necessary
' Marx describes this differential as follows: "That half a working day is necessary to keep
the worker alive for 24 hours does not in any way prevent him from working a whole
day. Thus the value of labour power, and valorization in the labour-process, are two
different magnitudes. It is this value-difference that the capitalist had his eye on when he
was purchasing labour-power" (Cl, 300).
labor-food, clothes, housing, etc.," But as more and more supporting activities
enter the productive cycle the rate of increase of surplus-value declines.1 2
Similarly the increased productivity through technological innovation also points to
a saturation point (C1, 643-54). The lowering of necessary labor and increasing of
productive efficiency necessarily demands increased incorporation of the worker
into consumerist capitalism. This incorporation, however, decreases the rate of
increase of surplus-value.
These limits to relative surplus-value introduce a contradictory trajectory in
capitalism: to increase absolute surplus-value, by incorporating new areas into
capitalism, or by excluding them from circuits of consumer capitalism through
poor labor laws and environmental conditions across the international division of
labor. In the development arena, the drive for increasing absolute surplus-labor
can be seen to manifest itself in the tendency for partial or perpetually delayed
incorporation in the name of tradition in circuits of capitalist production through
strategies such as self-help.
101 For Marx, this was possible by seizing "upon those branches of industry whose
products determine the value of labour-power, and consequently either belong to the
category of normal means of subsistence, or are capable of replacing them." C1, 432.
102 Marx defined the two spheres and their attending methodologies of increasing surplus-
values as follows: "The prolongation of the working date beyond the point at which the
worker would have produced an exact equivalent for the value of his labour-power, and
the appropriation of that surplus labour by capital - this is the process which constitutes
the production of absolute surplus-value. It forms the general foundation of the capitalist
system, and the starting-point for the production of relative surplus-value. The latter
presupposes that the working day is already divided into two parts, necessary labour and
surplus labour, the necessary labour is shortened by methods for producing the equivalent
of the wage labour in a shorter time." C1, 645.
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2.5.4 "Behind the Back of the Producers"
For Marx, the irresolute relationship between use and exchange-value points to the
diffused boundaries of capitalist exploitation. These diffused boundaries are
apparent in Marx's framing of the process though which the cost of necessary
labor, its use-value for the capitalist, is determined in capitalist relations:
In contrast.. .with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value of
labour-power, contains a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given
country at a given period, the average amount of the means of subsistence
necessary for the worker is a known datum [emphasis added] (C1, 275).
Not incidentally, the name of this diffused, shifting, and extra-economic "historical
and moral" datum is tradition:
The various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple
labour as their unit of measurement are established by a socialprocess that goes on
behind the backs of the producer, these proportions therefore appear to the
producers to have been handed down by tradition [emphasis mine] (C1, 135).103
Tradition is a short-hand for a differential process between the social and
economic that determines the most critical element of capitalist relations: the level
of necessary labor, that crucial datum that determines the level of surplus-labor
and magnitude of all exchange relations. Yet, this process "goes on behind the
back of the producers," and cannot be determined from within the realm of
exchange relations alone. The seat of value in capitalist relations resides in a
process of unacknowledged appropriation of the value-differential between use
and exchange-value of labor. It is critical that this process remains
103 Once again, Marx's irresolute dialectics do not allow tradition to appear as a unified
phenomenon outside of capitalist relations. The quantity of necessary labor only appears
to the producers to have been handed to them by tradition. This texuality is critical to
Marx's understanding of limits of capitalism.
unacknowledged, and "appear to the producers to have been handed down by
tradition."
For Antonio Negri, use-value of labor also constitutes a curious presence in Marx's
critique of political economy. Yet, Negri doesn't take the irreducible presence of
use-value as a sign of an irreducible differential between exchange and non-
exchange relations. Rather, for Negri, use-value represents an "outside" that
allowed Marx to establish necessary labor as the unit of measurement of value.
Negri holds that use-value represented an aporia in Marxist analyses, an aporia
born out of Marx's failure to cast the material, qualitative, elements interrupting
capitalism into a synchronic, analytic mold. For Negri, this failure holds the key,
however, of leading Marx beyond Marx,1 14 the Marx of classical economic theory
and linear progression of capital from use to exchange-value. By identifying the
key element of the value chain to be outside the disciplinary regime of capital,
Marx's aporia, Negri argues, lets us identify a tendency in "capital" to subsume all
use-value within exchange relations. For Negri, this is the sphere of total and real-
subsumption.10 '
The separation of use-value and exchange value projected into Marx's analyses by
Negri, however, cannot acknowledge the presence of the surplus army of women
laborers, incorporated into the production cycle, yet maintained outside of
consumerist relations, across the international division of labor identified by critics
104 This is the title of Negri's seminal book, Marx Beyond Marx, trans., H. Cleaver, M.
Ryan and M. Viano (New York: Autonomedia, 1991, first edition, 1979).
105 The idea of real subsumption is elaborated by Negri in "Value and Affect," Boundary 2,
26:2 (Summer 1999).
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such as June Nash, and Maria Patricia Fernindez-Kelly.10 6 This interruption
necessarily leads us to acknowledge the difference between the tendencies of
capital and that of capitalism ignored by Negri's otherwise insightful readings.
Here, Deleuze and Guattari's framing of desire in Anti-Oedipus as a non-economic
coding of value through spectacularly interruptive and discontinuous circuits of
socialization is invaluable (we will return to the notion of affective coding of value
in the next section). Kalpana Bardhan points to this discontinuous text when she
reminds us that patriarchal and feudal social structures are "perfectly consistent"
with the requirements of capitalist market production:
In a stratified society, discrimination of wages and jobs/occupation by caste and
sex Is not a feudal remnant but perfectly consistent with the play of market
forces... If the wage-and-access differentials follow the lines of traditional privilege,
then attention gets conveniently deflected from the adaptive dexterity of capitalist
exploitation processes to the stubborness of feudal values, when it is actually a
symbiotic relationship between the two.10'
Bardhan's caution constitutes a challenge to culturalist critics for whom market
relations and traditional social structures form polar opposites in the circuits of
global capital. It is the superimposition of these two spheres that we see at work
in the self-help projects. In the perpetuation of tradition as a potential sphere of
106 June Nash, and Maria Patricia Fernindez-Kelly, eds., Women, Men, and the
International Division of Labor (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press,
1983). For the separation between productive and consumerist cycles in capitalism, also
see Bill Warren's Imperialism: Pioneers of Capitalism (London, New York: Verso, 1980).
107 Kalpana Bardhan, "Women's Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition and Change
in India," in South Asia Bulletin, 6:1 (1986): pp. 3-16. The above quote is on p.5. Quoted
in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Women in Difference," in Outside in the Teaching
Machine (New York: Routledge), p. 86.
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modernization, we witness the alignment of Marx's "historical and moral datum"
with the text of global economic production.
2.6 The Self-help Agenda: The Movement of Risk
2.6.1 Project(ing) Self-help:
Puerto Rico's demonstration projects had a global impact on models of housing for
"low-income groups." Its most repeated elements were not the house designs
themselves-which were supposed to change according to "local requirements"-
but the surrounding administrative, legislative and financial system (the hidden
subsidies from US institutions not withstanding). This expansive influence resulted
from self-help's capacity to absorb and reflect the broader development belief that
underdevelopment results from the lack of savings, investment and industrial
production. This developmental cycle was suppressed, development economists
argued, by the vast majority of the Third World "poor" being outside capitalist
relations." Self-help satisfied all the elements of the bill. It saved public
expenditure, prompted savings from the "poor" that were simultaneously invested
into the development of a formal housing and land market, and encouraged
formation of a building and finance industry.
108 The most prominent of these theorists was perhaps Walter Rostow, an MIT professor of
International Relations and an advisor to Lyndon Johnson and John F. Kennedy's
governments. We will look at Rostow's theories in detail in later chapters of the
dissertation. See, his The Process ofEconomic Growth (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952),
and The Stages ofEconomic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). For a
critique of development model of savings, investment, industrial production, see, Arturo
Escobar, "The Space of Development," in Encountering Development: The Making and
Unmaking of the Third World, op cit., pp. 55-101; For an early critique of mechanistically
separating different economic aspects under the three partite model of development, see
Antonio Garcia, For a critique of the loan structure based on the savings, investment,
industrialization from a contemporary perspective, see Cheryl Payer, Lent and Lost:
Foreign Credit and Third World Development (London: Zed Books, 1991).
In this section, we'll see that self-help delivered more than it promised. On the
one hand, it provided an alibi for subsidized public land supply for economic
groups who were the more coveted clients of private financing, thereby further
reducing available resources of those outside this sphere. Seen from this larger
perspective, self-help appears to provide a mechanism to manage the need and
the risk of encountering the "poor" as a category in development. On the other
hand, self-help provided a justification for moving the processes of shaping public
administration and planning legislation outside the realm of national political
institutions and tied them with the prerogative of international development and
loan agencies, such as the UN, USAID, IMF and the World Bank. It is in this
dislocation that we see the development experts finding the possibility of their role
and expertise.
We will begin by identifying the various institutions that made up the global self-
help field. In this sphere, we'll look at an implicit strategy of risk management that
used self-help to increase the scope and scale of land development and financial
markets. We'll then use this point of entry to explore in further detail how the
setting up of an administrative and legislative sphere around the self-help agenda
in particular national contexts satisfied the politico-economic requirements of a
broader international loan structure and sustained the particular mode of operation
of development experts.
2.6.2 Credit Lines
Self-help programs formed an integral part of the initial loan packages offered by
US development organizations such as the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA, later absorbed into the US Department of Housing and Urban
Development, HUD), the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA). These agencies required that Third World
governments adopt self-help as the primary national housing policy to receive
their grants, loans, and expert assistance (FIG. 3). The model for this precondition
was Puerto Rico's self-help program funded by the US. "To a large extent,"
declared a report of the Office of International Affairs at HUD, "most of the
overseas organized aided self-help housing programs developed or supported by
U.S. foreign aid organizations have been either modeled after or inspired by the
Puerto Rican experience."log In the 1950's, it was standard training procedure for
technicians recruited in international housing projects to visit the early "land and
utility" projects in Puerto Rico such as "minimum urbanization."
The other major factor in self-help's global preponderance as a national policy
approach was the parallel emphasis laid on it by the UN Social Affairs Division.
The UN though, reflecting its diplomatic colors, only "recommended" self-help in
its experts' mission reports. The net effect of these recommendations, however,
was quite the same as the more direct demand of US organizations to implement
self-help as precondition for loans. For, many international loan organizations,
such as the IMF and the World Bank, weighed UN recommendations in judging a
country's qualification to receive credit.
09 Special Report on Techniques of Aided Self-help Housing: Some Examples of U.S. and
Overseas Experience, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of
International Affairs (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p.5. The
report was authored by Ervan Bueneman, a former US-AID technician who had led many
Agency missions to Latin America, as well as UN and various European and multinational
housing development agencies' projects across the globe, before becoming the Director of
the Foundation of Cooperative Housing's Northeast Regional Office.
Both of these lines of dissemination, the US foreign aid organization and the UN,
were instrumental in establishing various housing and planning centers across the
world that played host to countless housing experts. The most prominent of these
centers was the Inter-American Center of Housing and Planning (CINVA) in
Bogota, Colombia, established by the Organization of American States under Harry
Truman's Point Four Program. The center held self-help as its primary housing
approach and ran a prominent aided self-help training center for housing officials
across Latin America. Later, the center was a regular recipient of funds from the
Alliance for Progress under the Kennedy administration. Similar institutes were set
up in Guatemala and Nicaragua, called the Inter-American Cooperative Housing
Institute and the Institute of Housing (INVU), respectively. The latter was set up
with the help of the United States Operations Mission." These and other similar
institutes (in Brazil, Ecuador and Costa Rica) were set up to provide future crops
of trained housing personnel to substitute for US experts.
The UN also pursued the policy of setting up institutes and scholarship programs
to establish the self-help doctrine. In 1953, the UN Social Affairs Division,
sponsored extensive studies by Israel's Ministry of Labor on the use of "stabilized
earth" as part of its plan to establish a regional housing and planning center in
Israel. Subsequent contentions in the Middle East, however, prevented the
realization of this proposal. Yet, similar regional institutes were later set up in
Indonesia and Japan.
"0 The Operations Mission was regularly sent by the US State Department to countries
requesting credit to lay out policy and administration "conditions" needed to be in place
in order to receive US treasury, and by proxy, IMF loans.
The US international housing program initially followed the lines of Cold War
contestations. Its preliminary ventures remained focused in Latin America, the
Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. This field expanded in the 60s to include East
Africa and the Middle East to counter rising Soviet influence in the region. In Latin
America, the initial projects were in Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua."' In the
Caribbean, US housing experts advised on projects in Barbados, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago with the Caribbean Commission. In the Middle East, similar
projects were advanced in Turkey and Egypt. In Southeast Asia, projects were
introduced in Indonesia, Korea, Burma, and Taiwan. As the US interest shifted to
Africa in the 1960s, a host of demonstration projects and training course were
inaugurated in Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mali, Zambia, and Liberia."2
" In Latin America, the initial projects included, the "German Riesco" project in Chile,
"Chacra La Palma," "San Gregorio," and "Clara Estrella," in Guatemala, and "Colonia
Managua" in Nicaragua.
"2 Through out the 1950s and the 1960s, HUD published an "Ideas and Methods
Exchange" Series (IMEs, as they came to called) on behalf of the USAID which contained
description of aided self-help projects sponsored by the US agencies across the globe.
These included:
IME # 1. India, November, 1952.
2. Caribbean andJamaica, December, 1952.
3. Puerto Rico, 1953.
5. Burma, March, 1953.
7. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, April, 1953.
8. Egypt, Caribbean, Puerto Rico, May, 1953.
9. Land and Utilities, May 1953.
11. Indonesia, September, 1953.
12. Savingsfor Aided Self-Help Housing, Kenya, November, 1953.
13. Jamaica, Taiwan, January, 1954.
14. Alaska, Ceylon, January, 1954.
15. A Restatement of Self-Help In Housing Improvement In Puerto Rico, 1954.
16. Trinidad and Tobago, July, 1954.
17. Barbados, August, 1954.
18. Aided Self-Help in Housing Improvement, January, 1954. Revised 1967.
19. Martinique, October, 1954.
21. Land and Utilities, Honk Kong, January, 1955.
23. Land and Utilities, Puerto Rico, 1955.
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The UN field of activity was much more disseminated from the very beginning,
covering almost the entire decolonizing world. In the 1950s alone, the UN sent
missions to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Nicaragua in Latin America, and to Haiti,
Puerto Rico, West Indies, and Jamaica in the Caribbean. Projects in the Middle East
included Egypt, Jordon, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Libya, Iraq and Turkey. In
South and West Asia, missions were sent to India, Iran, Pakistan, and Ceylon (Sri
Lanka). Countries receiving missions in Southeast Asia included the Philippines,
Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya (Malaysia).
Even though the trajectory of UN projects differed from that of US aid projects-
which followed the contours of the congressional funding and US foreign policy-
they were hard to distinguish from the latter in terms of either the nature of the
projects or the set of people recruited to carry them out. The UN experts were
often recruited by the HHFA, with the posts advertised regularly in the HHFA's
international bulletin, and were often HHFA (and later HUD) staffers. Jacob Crane
and Charles Abrams' presence on both UN and HHFA projects exemplifies this
relationship.
24. Financing Aided Self-Help Housing, May, 1955.
37. Manual on Design of Low Cost Aided Self-Help Housing, 1957.
46. Urban Aided Self-Help Housing, Puerto Rico, 1957.
50. The Development of An Aided Self-Help Program, Guatemala.
58. Colonia Managua, 1962.
63. Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity, 1966.
64. Proposed Minimum Standards, 1970.
65. Village Housing in Africa.
68. Planning Sites and Services Programs, 1971.
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2.6.3 Saving Risk
The collective sphere of USAID and UN missions betrays the presumed necessity
and the risk of encountering the "poor" as a development category. Risk is not a
foreign concept to the self-help discourse. It was Charles Abrams who
characterized the rapid urbanization in the Third World as the greatest risk faced
by the future of capitalism.2
This risk is both political and economic. The incorporation of dislocated Third
World urban populations into global capitalist structure is seen as an insurance
against their economic insecurity and potential political volatility. Yet this
enterprise is not without its own risks. The political and economic risks appear to
be pitted against each other. The socio-economic makeup of the urbanization
population represents a financial risk to any loans provided for development
projects by the international financial institutions. This risk is further accentuated
by the fact that national governments cannot provide any collateral guarantees for
loans.
This dual political and economic risk is managed by pursuing an apparently
contradictory approach: launching a host of self-help schemes, demonstration
projects, and building research programs for the "low-income groups" which
appear to be always beyond the targeted economic range. This approach is
underscored by proposals for land delivery and financing for higher-income
economic territories.
2 See Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, op. cit., p. 23.
We see this sentiment expressed from the very first UN reports to later the World Bank
Urbanization Sector Working Papers. See Banks' Urbanization Sector Working Paper,
June, 1972; Housing Sector Policy Paper, May, 1972.
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This contradiction, however, is continuously tolerated under the dogma that the
development cycle would take root somewhere in the middle of two economic
ranges, the desired sphere of impact and the actual beneficiaries of the self-help
policy. While self-help techniques would bring down the cost of the projects, the
policy of developing a broader land market, sphere of industrialization, and
financial institutions would raise the effective demand (the ability to pay for the
demand) of those outside the current range of the projects. To the extent that the
two vectors never meet, it does not betray the failure of development but rather its
ability to manage the risk of socio-economic intervention. It is our contention in
this section that the self-help doctrine serves as an alibi to keep open the gap,
rather than to close it. To the extent that the targeted groups are incorporated into
the processes of industrial development, this incorporation is always tangential
and partial.
One of the critical signposts of the text of risk management is the coding of "poor"
as a collective subject that can pull themselves out of poverty with proper
guidance. This coding is betrayed by the curious collateral that is established to
justify the self-help regime: responsibility.
The immediacy of political and economic risk is countered by defining "poor" as a
social mass that can be turned financially "responsible" through proper
organization and guidance. Harold Robinson, the former Chief of the Housing and
Urban Development branch of USAID Latin America Bureau and the author of the
official HUD history of self-help, emphasized that "[t]he social values of aided self-
help, particularly the mutual type, are not to be deprecated. Self-help imparts a
sense of participation and responsibility that is lacking in low-income rental
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housing or in housing bestowed by the state."114 HUD and AID programs favored
mutual self-help projects, we are told, because of the "social cooperation that
accompanies that form."115 Also, when self-help programs were set up in East
Africa (Southern Rhodesia and Zambia), the primary goal was the "training [ofi
urban workers" in a way that "encourage[d] homeownership, with an increase in
communal stability and responsibility.""' Similarly, when the Inter-American Bank
began its loan program, "[a]mong the advantages of self-help housing initially
recognized.. .were the social values of families cooperating with others in creating
housing with their own hands."11' If we recall, the promise of imparting a sense of
"responsibility" in the participants was also identified by Rivera-Santos as key to
the future development in Puerto Rico.
In the broader discourse of international loan agencies, this social responsibility
represents the promise to save for collateral. When US AID loans were advanced
in Tanzania in the early 1950s, two primary agendas for the program were,
"[m]obilizing self-help housing efforts" and, through self-help, "[m]obilizing savings
for capital formation in housing." It was Ernest Weissmann who made this
relationship clear at a Ford Foundation conference in 1964, when he asserted that
Housing is.. .deeply involved in the process of saving and investment. It is a type
of capital formation that both encourages and strengthens long-term patterns of
114 Harold Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Office of the International Affairs (Washington, D.C.:
U.S Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.
115 Ibid. p. 5.
116 Ibid. p 20.
117 Ibid. p. 22.
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savings. People will save for better housing who would not maker savings
otherwise available for capital formation."'
It was precisely this relationship between capital formation and the self-help
process where the latter defered the risk of the former, that Ervan Bueneman, a
long time US-AID consultant stressed in his report on self-help:
Improved housing provides both tangible current benefits and hope for a better
future, which can provide motivation to the people to promote capital formation
by contributing their labor, and by mobilizing savings which otherwise would not
grow into investment. Housing programs, based on self-help and mutual aid,
assisted by some outlay of cash from the public sector, will contribute to general
development by imparting new skills and promoting savings and capital formation,
while giving a personal meaning to economic progress [emphasis added].19
By defining "poor" as a viable financial category, a system of public land supply
could be put into place. To the extent that the ultimate benefactors of this system
would be higher-income groups and private developers would remain invisible in
the development rhetoric under the fiction of responsibility, labor, and savings.
2.6.4 Land and Seed
Under the USAID and International Development Bank loan agreements, the
recipient governments were compelled to develop a system of land development
and mortgage financing. The self-help projects were to provide a "demonstration"
of this larger set-up. A considerable part of the loans was earmarked as "seed"
capital for setting up mortgage institutions in the individual countries. HUD official
118 Weissmann, Ford Conference, p. 11.
119 Ervan Bueneman, Special Report on Techniques of Self-Help Housing: Some Examples of
U.S and Overseas Experience, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of the International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office,
1973), p. 15.
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stressed that this "'Seed' capital [was] needed for [a] new system of induced
savings." It was declared that
[s]uch loans were made available to saving and loan associations in twelve Latin
American countries at concessional.. .rates and terms in order to cover the initial
start-up costs, permit the creation of reserves, and contribute toward early lending
on the theory that lending begets savings."
The combination of seed capital and responsible clients was to rule out the
question of long-term government subsidies as initial investments were recovered
and expanded. As early as 1948, Guatemala had established saving and loans
banks with USAID assistance. By 1961, these banks were supplanted with a
mortgage insurance agency, Fomento Hipotecas Aseguradas, named and modeled
after the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in the US. Similar savings and loans
associations were put in place in additional countries. From the perspective of
HUD, the system was working from the very beginning. Even though the
"[m]atching hosts country contributions were generally grants" a HUD reports
asserted, "no one raised the cry for subsidy."'
The "cry for subsidy," however, is preemptively silenced by the argument,
"lending begets savings." The financing of self-help is never presented as a
problem of welfare economics, but of increasing the market of private finance. It
was acknowledged from the onset in no uncertain terms that the aided self help
was designed to extend the reach of private financial institutions into an income
stratum to which they otherwise did not have access:
120 Harold Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, op cit., p 13.
121 Ibid.
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The need is for continuous sources or private financing... Since private banking
institutions will not lend at the income level contemplated by most self-help
housing projects, the.. .savings of the potential beneficiaries of aided self-help
housing must be tapped."2
Outside the realm of the demonstration project, however, the savings that were
being "tapped" were of higher income groups, the clientele desired by private
financial and loan institutions. From the very beginning, we see self-help projects
missing their mark and justifying allocation of government subsidies and
development of public land for private financial services for middle-income
clientele.
2.6.5 Development by Proxy
Guatemala, again, is a clear example of this trend. In all the projects that were
initially funded by UN and US loans we see a drift toward higher payments than
initially proposed. In 1956, USAID advanced a 3.8 million grant which was
matched by a 3.4 million grant from the Guatemalan government, to build 2,826
housing in 10 projects. Following the Puerto Rico model, the projects were
designed with extensive labor requirements for the participants. Divided into
groups of 30 to 50, the participants were required to contribute at least 20 hours a
week, mostly in the evenings and over weekends, over a period of four to six
months. Even in these demonstration projects, the supposed cost-saving measures
began to prove insufficient. To counter the possible cry for subsidies, a stringent
interview process for the next wave of houses was put in place that only accepted
applicants within the appropriate income range. Additional requirements to save a
certain amount of money during the construction period for future mortgage
122 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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payments were also implemented. American housing advisors on the project also
proposed to introduce varying financial terms to include broader income groups.
Even before the completion of the initial projects, however, up to 50% of the
mortgages were in arrears in their payments over a month and 20% for over three
months with 86 cases in court.
To counter the rate of default, the next phase of the Government Financed
Housing Program (ICIV) focused on government workers such as railroad
employees and teachers. By 1961, the terrain of self-help had shifted. The saving
and loans associations, of which there were now three in Guatemala, targeted
"middle income groups." The Bank of Guatemala declared proudly that saving
increased from 9.2 million in 1956 to 23.5 million in 1962. USAID programs
themselves acknowledged that "A.I.D Housing Advisors were instrumental in
initiating [these] move[s] in an effort to attract additional private capital investment
in medium-cost housing construction."
This approach resulted in the development of public infrastructure and land for
private developers. In Guatemala, for example, leading among these was the
American developer, William Luce, whose several hundred houses built on
"inexpensive land" were reported in HUD international country series. "These
houses were part of larger project, called 'El Milagro,"' we are told, "which will
eventually contain 5,000 dwelling units." Even though the houses, "with cement
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tile floor, a corrugated asbestos cement roof," were considered "primitive" by HUD
reports, they nevertheless carried substantially higher mortgages.12 3
As HUD publications would acknowledge, the focus on development of private
markets under the self-help agenda was part of US foreign policy. In 1961, John F.
Kennedy affirmed this policy in his message to Congress on the activation of the
Act of Bogoti when he stated that "the most promising means of improving mass
housing is through aided self-help projects." This belief was supported by AID
dollar loans, in addition to those made by the Inter-American Development Bank
to Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.1 4 "One of the four
express purposes of the Fund," HUD publications acknowledge, "was low-interest
loans to governments for...self-help housing and...institutions providing long term
finance and engaged in mobilizing domestic resources for this purpose."25
It is not surprising then that from the outset, the US advisors focused on increasing
the margin of return on the loans. The promise of an expanding system of savings
led US AID experts in Latin America to even double the interest rates after a few
years in Guatemala (from 2% to 4%) and introduce varying mortgage terms, to
"insure a more economic return on the original [government] investment." US and
123 HUD report acknowledged the primary clients of these private endeavors: "Mr. Luce has
developed tracts of land and built a considerable number of houses for middle and higher
income groups in the capital city." William Luce was soon joined by Paul Burkhard,
another American builder and financier from California that sought to put together a more
ambitious project of combing several US and Guatemalan developers to create equity
funds "for the purpose of making loans of construct large scale middle income housing
projects." Housing in Guatemala: Country Report Series, Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), Office of International Affairs (Washington, D.C, 1967), p. 15.
124 Harold Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, op cit., p 17.
125 Ibid., p. 22.
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Guatemala agreed to establish "a revolving fund, making it possible to build
additional houses from the proceeds and with modest contributions over the next
ten years (1960 to 1970) bringing the program to a point where it would be
entirely self-supporting." 126
These programs, however, still operate under the banner of self-help. The
supposed saving in costs through participants' labor was to "increase... equity by
the value of his labor.""1 7 Turning land into capital through self-help labor was still
presented in official dogma as the very "bootstraps" through which the Third
World was supposed to pick itself up and enter global capitalism. Yet, as we have
seen, these programs actually targeted higher economic groups."' A cursory look
at the HUD literature at the time reveals the optimism regarding the savings and
market potential of the higher-income poor. This economic group, it was declared,
after all had an effective demand (the ability to pay for the economic demand) of
at least half the total housing markets in the Third World."9
2.6.6 Conditioning Power
The policy of using self-help and other low-income housing programs as an alibi
for indirect public support of emerging financial markets in private housing for the
middle and higher income groups would prove to miss the most lucrative major
126 Ibid. p. 13. It was stressed that the "income generated from the project was to funnel
into a revolving fund so that the project would not result in a 'one-shot' effort." Ibid. p.19.
12' Harold Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, op cit., p 22.
128 In 1957, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), later absorbed into USAID,
stated in its Manual Order, that "use of self-help [both] reduced cost[s] and increased
productivity." Self-help presented, another complementary Manual argued, "excellent
opportunities in the development of human resources..." Ibid., p 16.
"2 Housing in Guatemala: Country Report Series, op cit., p. 9.
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capital market of the Third World: the "poor" as a credit market itself. This market
would be central to the next wave of "sites and services" and "core" housing
schemes and the accompanying aid programs, such as those of the World Bank,
projects which, arguably, constitute the back bone of contemporary for-profit
micro-credit banks. The initial programs of the 1950s, funded by the World Bank's
precursor, the International Bank of Development and Reconstruction (IDB), and
US AID, and managed through HHFA and UN experts, however, were instrumental
in setting the fundamental terms of these later developments. The "meager
resources of the potential beneficiaries of aided-self housing [that needed to] be
tapped," sustained a broader system of capital markets of which they were an
essential but marginal component. The most fundamental effect of aided self-help
projects, we would argue, was the alignment of different national planning
legislations and administrative mechanisms to serve the regional interest of
international credit institutions. This relationship was explicitly acknowledged by
US and UN self-help experts. The planning and administrative mechanisms
proposed by self-help experts provided socio-economic justifications for the
demands of international lending institutions. Let us briefly turn to the policy of
the major loan institutions in the 1950s before we look at the policies of self-help
experts themselves.
The IMF, as an international lending institution had been fairly dormant during the
Marshall Plan years (1947-1951). In the first half of the 1950's, however, the IMF
began dispensing considerable funds to Third World countries. With this turn, we
see a new doctrine of "conditionality" attached to the loans also beginning to take
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hold."' This dimension was a result of Washington's rising influence over the
Bretton Woods institutions. At its inception, the Fund was established primarily to
satisfy the demands of two major global powers, the US and UK, personified, as
we saw earlier, in the figures of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White,
respectively. Britain's primary concern was to devise an international mechanism
though which Britain could finance its postwar recovery without limiting
"conditions" set by the creditors. Keynes' goal was to establish an international
clearing union, an international central bank of sorts, with an international
currency, called bancor, for countries with deficit. Access to financing within the
broad flexible limits was to be automatic and repayments would have followed
only after external imbalance had been reversed.
The US, seeing itself as the primary creditor of the postwar era, on the other hand,
wanted precisely the possibility of such conditions written into the original treaty.
Financing, White insisted should be conditional rather than automatic. As
Benjamin Cohen has stated, the final form of the Bretton Wood institutions was a
result of the compromise between Keynes' and White's positions, but "the
compromise contained less of the Keynes and more of the White plans.""' Britain,
however, did not have to suffer the consequences of the compromise with the
massive Marshall Plan aid pouring into postwar Europe. Yet, the conditionality
doctrine was resurrected when the IMF began dispensing loans to the Third
World.
130 For a history of IMF lending policies, see Benjamin J. Cohen, "Balance-of-Payments
Financing: Evolution of a Regime," in International Organization, 36:2 (Spring, 1982): pp.
457-478.
131 Ibid. Cohen is here quoting Sidney E. Rolfe from Gold and World Power (New York:
Harper & Row, 1966), p. 78.
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The reasons for conditionality were justified as follows: When a country develops
a balance of payments deficit (a shortage of foreign exchange or internationally
exchangeable currency required for trade) it has two options. It can either
"finance" its deficit by borrowing foreign exchange from an external source, or it
can "adjust" its current trading practices and spending programs that, directly or
indirectly, use foreign exchange. Adjustments have more drastic political effects as
it immediately passes the costs of the deficit on to the population. Governments
are therefore always more inclined to delay adjustments and finance their deficits
through more loans. The IMF, as a creditor agency, could not allow continuation
of financing without requiring adjustment measure that guarantee recovery of its
loans. Therefore it was obliged to attach adjustment conditions to its loans.
For economic sociologists such as Teivo Teivainen and Richard Swedberg this
economic explanation represents the "politics of economic neutrality."3 2 IMF
economic demands for a particular policy behavior, Teivainen argues, mark the
"politically crucial point of intersection between the globalizing system of
governance and the working of disciplinary power."13 Given the openly declared,
"one dollar, one vote," approach of the IMF, Teivainen argument points to the
forever open yet intrinsic relationship between the political and economic policies
in the international loans arena. In the initial IMF years, the primary economic
instrument of political pressure was the "standby loan" which required certain
12 Teivo Teivainen, Enter Economism, Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the
Damage to Democracy (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), p. 41; R. Richard
Swedberg "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank, Journal
of Peace Research, 23 (4): 377-389. Also see, Swedberg's Economics and
Sociology: Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists,
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
"3 Ibid.
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conditions to be met before the funds were dispensed. "The exact demands,"
according to Teivainin, "were normally kept secret, and the wording of the stand-
by agreements was not published.""' The borrowing state had to send a letter of
intent to the IMF agreeing on a "stabilization programme." As Manuel Pastor has
noted in the context of early IMF loans to Latin America, the program typically
required strengthening of the "private sector," funding of highways and irrigation
projects benefiting export and commercial interests, cutting government price
subsidies and tariff restrictions, granting concessions to US companies and direct
investment, and discouraging public borrowing.3
Indeed, as Jon Kofas' historical analysis of IMF loans in Ecuador has shown, these
requirements directly followed directives of the State Department, which saw IMF
conditions as an tool not only to advance US corporate interests but also to sustain
business and oligarchic parties in particular countries that could suppress the rise
of "communist elements" in the region.' The consecutive Ecuadorian governments
of Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra (1952-1956), and Camilo Ponce Enriquez (1956-60)
had to face the threat of being overturned by the military or closely follow the
"advice" of US Operations Mission (USOM) sent to Ecuador to lay out the required
"adjustments" for receiving the IMF stand-by loans. Later governments had to
134 Ibid.
135 Manuel Pastor, The International Monetary Fund and Latin America: Economic
Stabilization and Class Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Also see Pastor's
Inflation, Stabilization, and Debt: Macroeconomic Experiments in Peru and Bolivia
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
"3 Jon V. Kofas, "The IMF, the World Bank, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Ecuador, 1956-
1966," in Latin American Perspectives 28:5 (Sep., 2001): pp. 50-83.
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abide by similar requirements to receive Kennedy's Alliance for Progress funds in
the 1960's.
These initial IMF and State Department conditions resulted in a dual policy: on the
one hand, encouraging financing of deficit, and on the other hand, imposing
periodic adjustment conditions. This duality perpetuated a cycle of mounting debt
and an increasingly stringent array of concomitant conditions.137 This crisis was
exacerbated with the abolition of the gold standard in 1970 and massive
availability of so-called petro-dollars in Western Banks that Third World
governments sought as an alternative source of financing.
Yet, as Benjamin Cohen has argued, the turn to private financing was only a
change in appearance, not in kind, in the dialectic of crisis and control. The
private institutions, eager to lend the accumulating capital from oil-exporting
countries, did not have the legal or political muscle that guaranteed loan recovery
for the IMF and the World Bank. To manage their risk, the private banks turned to
the implementation of IMF and World Bank conditions as a prerequisite for
receiving credit. This reciprocity restored the diminishing authority of the Bank
and the Fund while increased the risk and interest for borrowing governments.
The result was a cycle of mounting debt and an increasingly wider array of
conditions which led to the so-called debt crisis of the 1980's, once again ushering
137 Ecuador had a loan of US $42 million from 1820 to 1950. By the end of the 1950s, the
foreign debt was US $94 million. By end of 1970 it had increased to $241 million and it
stood at US $6.1 billion at the eve of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982. Also, between
1952 and 1961, 40 percent of the foreign loans where used just for debt financing.
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in a new wave of conditions and loans, the most notorious of which were the
Structure Adjustment Programs of the World Bank.138
2.6.7 Planning Control, Designing Development
The "intersection between the globalizing system of governance and the working
of disciplinary power" identified by Swedberg and Teivainen in the "politics of
economic neutrality," however cannot be accounted for without bringing into the
fold of the argument the structure of national planning and public administration
bodies set up under the various adjustment programs. More than any immediate
economic policy changes demanded from a national government under the
"politics of economic neutrality," the most critical were the changes instituted in
the re-structuring of national planning and public administration bodies. It is here
that we see architects and planners playing a critical role. In Latin America, as
elsewhere, UN and HHFA housing and planning consultants were instrumental in
setting up executive planning and administration bodies in particular ministries
that bypassed processes of democratic decision-making in land reform and
planning (as well as in the setting up of financial institutions) and were subject to
quick international directives. The primary vocation of these institutes was
research, training, publication, and advisory services that displaced the language of
politics into technical terms.
138 Indeed "conditions" on loans were seen as the most effective and "neutral" way to
advance US foreign policy and trade interests. The World Bank's former president, Eugene
Black, acknowledged in 1962 the political agenda behind the seemingly neutrality of
economic conditions: "We ask a lot of question and attach a lot of conditions to our loans.
I need hardly say that we would never get away with this if we did not bend every effort
to render the language of economics as morally antiseptic as the language the weather
forecaster uses in giving tomorrow's prediction. We look on ourselves as technicians or
artisans." Quoted in Teivo Teivainen, Enter Economism, Exit Politics, op cit., p. 42.
Originally cited in R. Richard Swedberg "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF
and the World Bank," op cit., p. 388.
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The planning and housing institutions mentioned previously formed only one
aspect of this broader project. We see in this architecture of public administration
and policy-making the emergence of permanent yet flexible mechanisms of
passing on the cost of adjustments. Self-help scheme-and the direct and indirect
projects of land development, tenure allocation, and financial infrastructure around
them-carried out through the various newly established planning and housing
institutions constituted a major part of these administrative and policy initiatives.
The self-help agenda was particularly conducive to the intersection of various
national and international policy directives, fulfilling not only their politico-
economic requirements but also providing the necessary socio-cultural translations.
The projects produced under the new planning, housing, and public
administration bodies-be it the demonstration self-help housing schemes,
building-research programs, land tenure schemes to organize rural labor, or
development of large-scale real estate financial markets-translated international
and national politico-economic agendas into the mundane language of public
administration and policy making. This more transparent dimension of the politics
of development neutrality is ignored if we keep our focus only on the gunboat
economics of State Department policies and the IMF and World Bank loans.
Setting up planning institutions in particular countries and coordinating their
policies on a regional scale formed the primary focus of USAID and UN experts."'
In November 1954, the UN Housing Chief, Ernest Weissmann, called a joint
139 This coordination demanded active involvement on two fronts: The shaping of housing
and planning legislations and the propagation of a regime of self-help pilot programs and
demonstration projects. The latter not only framed development as an ongoing technical
enterprise but also held the "lower income" groups as primary alibi for a regime of socio-
economics projects whose focus was elsewhere.
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meeting of various UN and non-UN organizations, concerned with economic,
industrial, financial, housing and planning development in Latin America, to
address the question of coordinating their project goals. On the economic and
financial side, these included the UN Economic Commission for Latin American
(ECLA), and the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C. The housing, planning,
and technical assistance aspects were represented by the UN Social Affairs Division
(SOA, which housed the Housing, Town, and Country Planning Section, HTCP,
headed by Weissmann), the Inter-American Housing Center, also called Center
Interamericano de Vivienda (CINVA), in Bogoti, Colombia, and the UN Technical
Assistance Administration (UNTAA). 140
The meeting had a two fold agenda: to set up independent planning institutes at
the highest government levels with legislative powers based on the model of
CINVA, and to set up a system of training, publication, and advisory exchanges
4 Meeting of UN/OAS Working Group on Cooperation and Coordination of Technical
Assistance Activities in the Field of Housing, Building and Physical Planning in Latin
America, 16", 17 November 1954. Meeting Minutes, File no. TAA 173/19/011, Rag 2/173 -
Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
The meeting was held in UN headquarters in New York on 16th, 17i* November 1954 and
attended, among others, by Anatole Solow, Chief, Division of Housing and Planning,
Depart of the Economic and Social Affairs, Pan American Union, Washington D.C;
Leonard Currie, Director, Inter-American Housing Center, Bogoti, Colombia; A. Oropoza-
Castillo, Chief of the office of Latin America Programme Division, UN TAA; Ernest
Weissmann, Chief of the UN HTCP; W. Malinowski, Chief Regional Commission Section,
UN ECLA.
What is important to note in this event is the status of architecture and planning within
the broader development discourse. It is taken for granted, assumed before hand, that
architecture and planning form not only the mechanisms of delivering tangible benefits of
development, but also constitute the very conditions of possibility of economic and social
transformation. This is indeed a major achievement of HTCP under Weissmann's direction,
something that stands out in contrast to the contemporary status of housing and planning
in economic and social planning realms. Yet this status is achieved at a price. Architecture
and planning are no longer defined as finished formed or mechanism of its delivery.
Rather, they are positioned as a para-economic, social, and psychological gamefare, for
lack of a better term, that allow these fields to reinforce each other toward desired ends.
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mediated though the UN and other international technical agencies to coordinate
their policies. "It is recommended," the attendees argued,
that a meeting of the heads of national housing agencies be convened by the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the earliest possible date...; that the
United Nations should be invited to cooperate with and participate in this meeting,
and that the meeting should also consider inter alia the manner in which CINVA's
programme of training, publications, research and advisory services could be most
effectively coordinated with those of other international technical and technical
assistance bodies.
The arrangement was intended to coordinate not only current planning, land
development, and housing projects but also the ability to accommodate into law
future transformations and agendas. Continued regional coordination was the
keystone of this arrangement:
The individual countries' technical assistance requests should be brought into
balance with such assistance that can be more effectively rendered...on a regional
or sub-regional basis. The experience already gathered in individual missions
appears to fall into a pattern of regional significance and consistent efforts to
establish a pool of technical knowledge could, therefore, benefit all Latin American
countries [emphasis added]. 14 2
This regional coordination was to be achieved through intermittent dispatches of
long-term and short-term missions:
The specialist headquarter staffs of CINVA, the Pan American Union and the
United Nations should be utilized when available for short term exploratory and
survey missions before longer term missions are dispatched. The same permanent
staffs should also be used for the follow-up and advice or implementation of the
141 Ibid., p. 3.
142 Ibid.
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recommendations formulated by longer term missions as well as for seminars and
round table discussions for the benefit of national authorities dealing with housing,
physical planning and building and with economic and social development in
general."'
The establishment of a regional network of institutions was to be based on a
regional network of parallel legislations, financial institutions, and industrial
ventures. The UN and its allied agencies, it was stressed, should also focus on the
"[e]nactment of national and local housing and planning legislation and the
establishment of agencies required for the implementation of housing and
community improvement programmes in urban and rural areas," the development
of "building and building materials industries of sufficient capacity and high
productivity and [on establishing sources ofi financing from [both] domestic and
external sources."1 44
The meeting's agenda of developing a multi-fork strategy to develop a regional
network of coordinated legislations, building industry, housing and planning
bodies, and financial institutions was an approach the UN housing and planning
experts had already been pursuing across Latin America. A year ago in November
1953, Weissmann had traveled to Ecuador, where in a series of high level
meetings, including several with the cabinet, Weissmann, had been able to finalize
with the Ecuadorian officials the design of a UN TAA-approved centralized
"4 Ibid. p. 4.
144 Ibid. pp. 4-5. The most critical aspect of forging a relationship between architecture and
finance was to be, one the one hand, the "Enactment of national and local housing and
planning legislation and the establishment of agencies required for the implementation of
housing and community improvement programmes in urban and rural areas." And on the
other, the "Establishment and/or strengthening of research, education and training
facilities for all phases of planning and execution of housing and community
improvement programmes."
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housing and planning organization directly under the legislative authority of the
president (FIG. 4)"14
Yet, when the TAA-proposed housing and planning legislation was finally signed
into law during the summer of 1954, Weissmann thought it did not have the
degree of centralization of power UN TAA considered necessary. In a letter to
Warren Cornwell, the UN consultant in Ecuador at the time, Weissmann made his
disappointment clear:
On my return from home-leave I learned that the Government of Ecuador has now
established the Housing Agency, and I want to congratulate you for the assiduous
work you have done in this connection. I should, however, not want to hide my
disappointment at finding that the [housing and planning] Institute's function are
not as comprehensive as we had envisaged them in our discussion at Quito.146
Weissmann remained hopeful that the UN, through Cornwell's presence, would
still be able to influence the direction of Ecuadorian policy. "Let us hope,"
Weissmann directed Cornwall, "that you will be able to overcome these initial
shortcomings by recommending and helping to formulate supplementary
legislation and appropriate by-laws."147 For Weissmann and the UN, a housing
agency was ineffective if it did not possess independent legislative powers. "You
will recall that in our discussion last fall [November, 1953]," he reminded Cornwall,
"we stressed the importance of giving to the Housing Agency executivepowers
14 "Memorandum, of the visit of Mr. Ernest Weissmann, Chief of the Town and Country
Planning Section of the Social Affairs Department, United Nations, (12 to 16 November
1953)," File no. TAA 173/19/011 x10, Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New
York.
146 Ernest Weissmann to Warren Cornwell, 23 August, 1954, File no. SOA 173/19/011. Rag
2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
147 ibid.
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enabling it to intervene directly in the production and financing of low-cost
housing.... [emphasis added]."148
Weissmann's sentiment was shared by others at the UN headquarters. J. B.
Richardot, the Acting-Chief of the Office for Latin America at the TAA, argued
when discussing with Weissmann's division the particulars of the Ecuadorian law
mentioned in Cornwall Monthly Progress Report for June-July 1954, that the
curtailing of the new Ecuadorian housing and planning agency's powers stemmed
from the limited view of architecture and planning subscribed to by the experts
themselves:
We do not understand why the participation of the [Quito] University has been
limited to engineering and architecture. There appears to be a tendency to
overemphasize the engineering or architectural aspect of the problem, and not to
give proper importance to economic and social implications of housing."9
To expand the scope of planning and architecture, Richardot stressed, Cornwell
should direct his efforts in the future to establishing a direct link between the
existing industrial policy institute and the new housing center:
The Instituto de Fomento a la Producci6n is equally important as it is the agency
through which the housing people will be able to finance and orient industrial
developments toward the building material industry, and coordinate industrial
developments with housing for workers."'
148 Ibid.
"9 J. B. Richardot to G. Duran, Acting-Director, Division of Social Welfare, SOA, 29 July
1954. File no. SOA 173/19/011, Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
150 Ibid.
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What Richardot wanted was architecture to extend its scale and forge connections
on a regional basis that reflected the broader socio-economic development
approach adopted by international agencies: "Due attention has not been paid to
the consideration of physical planning on a regional level with that on a local
level. What is more, it is not clear if any regional planning is contemplated.""'
Cornwall had proposed a manual on standardization of self-help housing
construction in rural areas in the Guayaquil coastal region. For the UN
headquarters such standardizations were not productive if they did not take into
account the broader development agenda, i.e architecture and planning's
relationship to the promotion of industrialization and financing in the private
sector desired by international development institutions. Self-help's location in this
matrix was to extend the scope of the international loans, even if it meant
continually lowering the "standards" of housing construction. The UN headquarters
had proposed earlier in 1953, Richardot reminded Cornwell,
the reduction of standards for housing in Tungurahau to be financed with the U.S
Export-Bank loan..., advising that the possibility should be explored of applying
self-help methods or designing expanding house as means for lowering initial
costs...152
If the scope of loans were expanded by lowering the cost of public expenditure
though self-help, then that increased sphere of influence could bring into the fold
of development another enterprise: the private sector related to land development.
It was Oropeza Castillo, the Chief of the Office for Latin America at the Program
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Division of the UN Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) (whom Richardot
was temporarily standing in for), who, in a letter to Cornwall before going on
leave, had identified the missing link between the housing and planning legislation
and the international loan structure-the missing link that prevented the new
Ecuadorian housing agency from achieving the desired dimension of planning: the
power to combine "private and public agencies, utilizing and encouraging those
that exist and supplementing agencies where required to achieve comprehensive
development. 53
Here we see the chain of subsidizing connections coded in the proposals for
regional coordination under the fetishistically repeated term, "comprehensive
development," come full circle: Self-help acting as an alibi to coordinate legislation
and administration structures on a regional basis that had, as Weissman put it,
"executive powers" to respond to the conditioning agenda of international finance
organizations.
Such an executive planning structure was successfully put in place in Costa Rica,
the country of Cornwall's next assignment. But the credit for setting up that
environment goes to the UN expert in residence before Cornwall's arrival in the
country in the summer of 1955: Antonio Cruz Kayanan, the Planning Director of
Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment for San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is
Kayanan's work, and personal history, though which we begin to see the
fundamental characteristics of a coordinated legislative and administrative network,
153 Oropeza Castillo to Warren Cornwall, June 2, 1954. File no. TAA 173/19/011. Attached
memo, p. 2, Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
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one whose emergence can be traced back to the first UN and US AID experiments
in Puerto Rico.
2.6.8 Networking Comprehension:
Kayanan's personal history reflects the interconnectedness of various
administration networks in the postwar era. Born in the Philippines, Kayanan had
been a professor and Chief Planner of the National Urban Planning Commission of
the Philippines in the 1940s. He had studied at the School of Public Health at
Harvard and had received a Masters of City Planning degree at MIT in 1942. At
Harvard and MIT, Kayanan had studied with Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams,
both of whom were Jacob Crane's close associates in the housing reform
movement under way in the US. When Crane headed the first UN Housing Mission
to the Tropics in 1950-51, which included, among other countries, a survey of
housing conditions in the Philippines, he invited Kayanan to join him as mission's
secretary. After the stint with the UN, Kayanan went on to join the World Bank
(then the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) on an
Economic Survey Mission to Iraq, writing a report on community planning and
housing. After Iraq, Kayanan joined the UN Social Affairs Division under Ernest
Weissmann in the UN headquarter in New York in 1951. Crane was also present at
the headquarters at the time. Crane, as mentioned earlier, had been instrumental in
establishing the first US sponsored self-help scheme in Puerto Rico. Through
Crane, Kayanan became acquainted with Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto
Rico Planning Board. Kayanan's previous experience on the World Bank and UN
missions secured him the position of Planning consultant to Puerto Rico Planning
Board in 1952, a position that was made permanent later when he was appointed
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the Planning Director of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment of the
Municipal Housing Authority of San Juan.
In 1955, Weissmann appointed Kayanan as the UN consultant to Costa Rica to
advise on the Basic Planning Law for the country. Here, Kayanan expanded the
model of regional and financial planning that Crane had recommended for Puerto
Rico. Keeping with the UN TAA approach of regional coordination, the central
feature of the new law proposed by Kayanan was the centralization of legislative
power in planning. Following the Puerto Rico model, Kayanan proposed a
planning agency directly under the president, free from the influence of political
branches of the government. "The planning agency," Kayanan stressed, "should be
of high quality, close to the administration, separate from other government
offices, and impartial. It membership shall be a mixture of top government officials
and well-respected citizens, large enough to be representative and yet not too
large to be cumbersome.""' Other members of the planning commission consisted
of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Works, the President of the
League of Municipalities, and another member to be jointly appointed by the
commission. The commission was to be supplemented by an advisory council and
a planning directorate. The former, constituted of a host of ministries and private
industrial interest groups. The planning directorate, whose primary staff constituted
15 The appearance of Puerto Rico in Costa Rica's Planning Law points to a key element of
development planning: the precedence for the Third World development projects are not
drawn from the First, but from elsewhere in the Third World itself. The expert's authority
does not reside in a claim to superior, universal, and Western models of knowledge.
Instead it is claimed on the basis of having identified cases of successful development
experiment in the Third World itself, experiments that can be repeated elsewhere.
Development establishes itself as universal discourse by repeating the particular.
"5 Kayanan, Proposed Elements of a Basic Planning Law for Costa Rica, San Jos6, Costa
Rica, 30 March 1955, p. 4. Rag 2/173 - Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.
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a Division of Urbanism, formed a technical body under the Planning Council (FIG.
5).156
The division between public and private positions, consistent with the UN
regionalizing policy, was meant to "strike a pleasant balance between government
and private interests."5 7 This balance, as it would become apparent, however, was
skewed. The third element in the design was the unmentioned international
interest, marked in the organization chart by the position of the consultant to be
received by the planning directorate. This consultant, carefully placed between the
directorate and the council, would have the power to intervene with the decisions
of both. In this arrangement, the advisory council, closely associated with the
planning commission, would be able to pass directives to particular ministries
without intervention from legislative bodies. This design allowed legislative
changes in the shortest possible amount of time without the delays caused by the
legislative process.
This arrangement was designed with the express purpose of correlating land
development policies with regional economic policy suggestions of international
organizations. When Kayanan was hired for the position by the UN, Arthur
Goldshmidt, the Director of the Programme Division of the UN TAA, stressed that
the UN required him to correlate his suggestions in Costa Rica with the UN
planning directives for other countries in the region. To do so Kayanan was to
seek help from the Escuela Superior de Administraci6n Pablica America Central
156 Ibid. Organization Chart of the "Proposed Planning Organization for Costa Rica."
157 Ibid. p. 5.
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(ESAPAC), the UN sponsored Advanced School of Public Administration for
Central America. "In carrying out your assignment," Goldshmidt stressed in the
statement of Kayanan's mission responsibilities, "we should like you to work
closely with....Director [of] ESAPAC and with experts employed by the United
Nations fields under the Central American Integration Programme."
ESAPAC, established in 1954, was jointly maintained by five countries (Guatemala,
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) and the United Nations Technical
Assistance Administration, and ran five-month training programs for "high-level
government officials" who after being ESAPAC students were deemed to "return to
their countries with a broadened base of understanding and desire to work
together.""15 The ESAPAC program, reflected the curricular requirements of
emerging public administration programs in the US, composed of formal lectures,
field trips, projects involving comparative analyses of budgetary processes and
allocations, and organization of Public Works departments. The end goal was to
fill the "statistical gaps" that were deemed as preventing "sound analysis of the
structure of the Central American economies."160
158 ibid.
"5 ESAPAC's originary goals under its first director, Enrique Tejara-Paris (who was
Kayanan's contact at the center), were described in the "Other Activities" section in The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 gun., 1955), pp. 617-622, p. 617.
160 Ibid. "Typical professional groups studies and works projects have included a detailed
comparative analyses of the budget process in each of the Central American countries; a
study for model organization of a national public works department; a study to determine
statistics needed for sound analysis of the structure of Central American economies; a
study on the proper location of the planning function in national government structure."
Ibid. p. 617.
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The US-sponsored Central American Integration Programme mentioned by
Goldshmidt in outlining Kayanan's "mission responsibilities," was a precursor to
the Central American Common Market program of the sixties. The latter, pushed
by both US and European donor countries, was designed to collectively reduce
tariffs and open national economies to foreign investments under the banner of
"removal of obstacles to trade."161
What role does self-help play in this design? Self-help's particular rhetoric of social
welfare and logic of reduced government spending was particularly apposite to
serve as an alibi for building correlations between the public and private, and
national and international spheres. One of the first steps taken by Kayanan on
arrival in Costa Rica was to contact the ESAPAC director, Enrique Tejara-Paris, and
propose "a pilot scheme for an aided self-help housing development in a section
of the town [Desamparadon] where expansion looks so natural and appropriate."
The latter characteristics, "natural and appropriate," were a euphemism for a
strategy of developing a land market.
The pilot self-help project was directed as a criticism of the housing schemes
undertaken by the Costa Rican Housing Agency (INVU) at the time without an
161 Designed to increase trade, the consolidation of trade policies, however, worked
against the interest of the Central American nations. Instead of mounting a collective body
of negotiation, each country competed with others to lower obligations for foreign
investments. The trend has arguably lead to in a series of contemporary regional
integration programs. In the 90's, Central American Treaty on Investment and Trade in
Services demanded coordination of not only customs and agriculture policies, but also
financial integration through "measures to modernize and coordinate legislation on banks
and financial institutions and establishment of regional stock market" as part of the foreign
trade requirements. For collective trade agreements in the 90's between Central Latin
American countries and the European Union see, Rolando A. Guevara Alvarado, "Central
America: Integrating into the Future," in The Integration Process in Central America and
the Role of the European Union, proceedings of the Central America Regional Integration
and Institutional Reform, held in Brussels on 3 March 2003.
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overall strategy of land classification. Attempting to impress Kayanan, his hosts
took him to Santa Eduvigiv, a cooperative housing scheme recently funded by
INVU. "Although it is quite an improvement over the usual type of... housing in
this country," Kayanan stated in this monthly progress report to the UN
headquarters,
nevertheless I found it rather mediocre in its site layout and coverage standards.
The most pressing problem of this cooperative, and others like it, is [not just] the
inadequacy of funds and [but] the current difficulties in obtainingfavorable loans
to continue and expand its activities [emphasis added]. 6 2
For Kayanan, the limited resources of the housing agency stemmed directly from
the role assigned to planning itself that prevented the INVU officials from
extending the scope of their projects. "I am afraid that the real nature of planning,"
Kayanan wrote to Oropeza Castillo at the UN headquarters,
is not fully understood here even among some of those who are supposed to be
responsible for it. In the basic law which created [INVU], planning was attached to
housing as a secondary.. .function. I think I understand the situation, for it may
have been legislative strategy to launch planning in Costa Rica by attaching it to
the more dramatic and accepted housing function. It is hoped, that after a
reasonable time, planning will be able to justify its necessity and importance and
henceforth establish and maintain itself as an independent, comprehensive and
continuing function of the Government of this Republic [emphasis added].i6 3
1 Kayanan to Oropeza-Castillo, January 15, 1955, "Letter no. X3 (Second Progress
Report.,)" p. 5. File no. TAA 173/14/07. Rag 2/173 - Box 57. United Nations Archives,
New York. Kayanan also offered a similar criticism for a "Multi-family housing" project in
San Jose, and challenged "the appropriateness of such as expensive development as seen
from the point of view of providing the most housing for as many people within a limited
appropriation." Ibid. p. 7.
163 Kayanan to Oropeza-Castillo, December 14, 1954, "Letter no. 12." File no. TAA
173/14/07. Rag 2/173 - Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.
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By attaching planning as an appendage to architecture, the INVU officials missed
the true potential of planning: its ability to construct formal relations between land
development and broader economic policy under the banner of comprehensive
planning. For Kayanan, the self-help agenda was the most efficient way of
bringing about this translation because it edited architecture to its essential
function in development: the identification of self-sustaining characteristics of new
formal markets in land without all the "wasteful" construction resulting from the
belief in the "drama" of finished form that characterized the conventional housing
schemes run by the government. The primary means of efficiently translating
informal relations in land into formal markets was the pre-project questionnaire:
It may be advisable to undertake a survey of the people which are proposed to be
rehoused by distributing a simplified questionaire [sic] which will furnish, among
others, the following information: size of the family, age groups of member,
income, cost or rental of dwelling, type and condition of houses, preference for
ownership or rental dwelling, amount willing to pay for dwelling or its rental,
willingness to build own house or transfer present structure, lot size preferred, etc.
I shall be willing, if required, to assist in the preparation of such a questionaire
[sic]."'
In self-help, architecture happens before the houses are built. The key element of
this design is mapping the statistical profile of the willing inhabitants. This
economically feasible profile becomes the representative profile of the "actual
needs" of the people themselves, a move critical to managing the risk of
establishing a regional financial and legislative sphere. This sleight of hand is
betrayed in Kayanan's letter to Eduardo Jenkins Dobles, a planner at INVU.
Writing under the regional authority of the ESAPAC letterhead, Kayanan stressed
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the importance of establishing the socio-economic profile of the willing subject of
development planning:
In order to develop a community which will be adequate in size and character to
meet the actual needs of its future residents, it will be necessary now to gather
and analyze basic social and economic information concerning the people who
should be and are willing to be displaced from existing residential pockets... Please
note that I have included "willingness" to move as a factor in the success of any
dislocation of people. This is quite important for the continuing welfare of the
community in which they propose to live.165
This curious conflation of the logical and the willing subject of development, those
"who should be and are willing to be displaced," betrays how one is made to stand
in for the other in self-help schemes and the larger structure of formalization they
seek to establish (we will look at the structural necessity of the desire for
development shortly). Those who should be displaced are not necessarily those
who are willing to be displaced and vice versa. The supposed willingness of the
self-help participants also becomes an alibi for outlining their future "needs":
Planning is the process of anticipating future needs and guiding development so
that the right thing may be in the right place at the right time. In the case of public
administration, planning should serve as an important aid in the making of wise
and mutually consistent decisions through a workable teamwork of the
Government and the people. This planning should not only contribute to advances
in the standard of living of the people and their welfare, but also effect true
economy in the use of public funds for accepted purpose of the government. This
planning should be comprehensive and not piecemeal [emphasis added]. 66
165 Ibid.
166Kayanan, Proposed Elements of a Basic Planning Law for Costa Rica, op cit., p. 13.
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The conflation of policy and need forms the basis of claiming a partnership
between the government and the people, and preemptively absorbing political
demands into the frame of comprehensive planning. As midwife of this continuing
displacement, architecture as self-help emerges as a new mode of social reform
that approaches the para-formality of planning. It is this form that Kayanan, and
the UN, wanted to generalize as the mode of development itself: a sphere between
implementation and planning where a broader set of agendas can find the proof
of their validity in the procured consent of the subject of development.'
2.6.9 Bananas
Kayanan's focus was on aligning the public agenda with private interests in the
urban sphere. It was Warren Cornwall who provided the model for extending the
UN regionalizing agenda of private sector development into the rural sphere.
While Cornwall had not been successful in centralizing the Department of National
Planning and Housing within the Ministry of Public Works in Ecuador, he was
nevertheless quite successful in launching a broad rural housing program that, as
he himself boasted in a "personal" letter to Oropeza-Castillo (Chief of UNTAA Latin
167 Warren Cornwall had also drawn on the profile of willing subject and the idea of the
needs of the people in Ecuador. Even though Cornwall was not able to situate the self-
help proposal in a regional frame, he had been able to align the self-help policy with the
presumed "needs" of the people, even when they were not "willing." On June 1952, seven
weeks after Comwell's arrival in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian government began construction
on a low-cost housing project in the city of Emeraldas. Cornwall proposed the relocation
of inhabitants of the area into new houses through a self-help scheme on an adjacent
piece of land. The Inhabitant of the slums, unsure of the Government's commitment to
the project and allocation of tenure, wanted to remain close to the construction site to not
loose their claim to residency. "This was," Comwell wrote in his monthly report to the UN
Headquarters, "contrary the advice of the UN Housing Expert [himselfl who had
advocated the use of adjacent vacant land for the new permanent housing, but the people
are emotionally tied to the land and he was democratically over-rulled [sic] by the citizen
s' [sic] committee representing the neighborhood." Warren Cornwall, Monthly Progress
Report for June 1952, July, 6, 1952. p. 2. File no. TAA 173/19/011 - 5. Rag 2/173 - Box 69.
United Nations Archives, New York..
133
American Office), advanced the agenda and "economic activities of the World
Bank of Reconstruction."168
This apposite project was called, Casaspor Bananas (Houses for Bananas), and
"proposed [a] barter arrangements for the exchange of pre-fabricated houses from
Sweden for surplus bananas from Ecuador."169 The program was part of the
broader proposal for rural resettlement, called Viviendas Para Trabajadores
Agricolas (Houses for Farm Laborers), in the Guayaquil region, Ecuador's primary
banana producing region, where prefabricated houses were to be used in
combination with self-help standardized construction units in large farm estates.170
Bananas for Houses became the representative face of the program in the press.
Cornwall himself launched a public relations campaign by publishing brochures
168 Cornwall to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief of Latin American Office, UNTAA, May 26, 1954.
File no. TAA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
(Ecuador 647a). Cornwall's other achievements in this regard included the establishment
of continuing UN fellowships associated with the new housing agency. Before
Weissmann's arrival, Cornwell had set up a UN fellowship committee that had sent thirty
three applicants to New York headquarters for training in 1952. The UN fellows were to
be absorbed in the new housing agency upon their return from New York. UN had also
launched similar fellowship programs in Costa Rica and Colombia. Comwall also set up
the criteria for appointment for the agency's key posts. These criteria resulted in the
successful appointment of the first director of the housing institute, Leopoldo Moreno
Loor, a graduate of Central University in Quito and a professor at the School of
Architecture there, who, Comwall declared, had "spent one year in London studying
under Sir Patrick Abercrombie." Warren Cornwall, Monthly Progress Report (Ecuador):
December 1953-January 1954, File no. TAA 173/19/011, UN Archives New York. (Ecuador
675b). Cornwell also recommended Charles Abrams and Rafael Pico as official UN
advisors for future planning and housing legislations in Ecuador. Warren Cornwall to
Oropeza-Castillo, Chief of Latin American Office, UNTAA, February 2, 1954. File no. TAA
173/19/011. Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
169 G. Duran, Acting Director, UN Division of Social Affairs, to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief,
Office for Latin America, UNTAA, July 22, 1954, discussing Corwall's Monthly Report for
May 1954. File no. SOA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New
York. A few years later HUD expert, J. R. Dodge, also proposed a self-help project in
Ecuador based on standardized construction. See J. R. Dodge, A Proposed Aided Self-Help
Program for Urban Areas in Ecuador, (Washington, D.C.: 1960).
170 Ibid.
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and pamphlets on the scheme (FIG. 6). Soon, Cornwall announced that additional
foreign firms in Spain, Finland, and Germany were eager to open similar
negotiations with the Ecuadorian government on the idea of barter exchange."'
The most significant of these extended housing and planning programs. In 1954,
when Cornwell wrote to the UN, the World Bank and IMF was pursuing a
stringent policy of economic adjustment, requiring the Velasco Ibarra government
to cut back on public spending and programs, tighten monetary control, and
develop export and private sectors. Following the IMF initiative, the UN TAA was
also inclined to cut back its aid to Ecuador if similar approaches were not taken in
the housing and planning domain.172 For Cornwall, the idea of barter exchange and
self-help proposed in Bananas for Houses solved the dilemma of advancing the
development agenda at the cost of valuable foreign exchange.
What, however, was framed as a rather unorthodox housing proposal had its
footing in a series of orthodox land reform and economic policies that favored
landed elite and commercial interest in the domestic context, and the IMF and
World Bank agenda of conditional incorporation into the global economy in the
international context. Both the latter institutions had sanctioned stand-by for
Ecuador on the condition that it promote import substitution and cut back its
foreign exchange and government spending. Cornwell's barter agreements were in
line with these requirements. The program was also greatly favored by the
' Warren Cornwall, Monthly Progress Report (Ecuador): February 1954, File no. TAA
173/19/011, Rag 2/173 - Box 69. UN Archives, New York.
172 Ibid. "Undoubtedly from you better vantage point, Cornwall wrote to Oropeza-Castillo,
"a number of possibilities will occur, but as I see it from here are now two principle
alternatives; viz (A.) more aid or (B.) no more aid." The "no of possibilities" referred to by
Cornwall will turn out to be more aid, but on certain "conditions."
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commercial and coastal agrarian elites because it helped suppress rising demands
for land reform through a language of social welfare, while favoring expansion of
the export sector and tying labor with large farm holdings. For the IMF and the
World Bank, the program's reliance on barter clearing and the self-help
methodology helped draw attention away from an embarrassing fact: IMF was
financing the construction of a large port in Guayaquil for banana exports while
the "banana boom" of the early fifties was rapidly subsiding in the face of the
declining terms of trade and limited market for Ecuador's raw exports, a trend
betrayed by the very fact that there was a "surplus" of bananas to be exchanged
for houses.
Cornwall's housing proposal was critical in drawing attention away from these
developments because it shifted the focus back to the promise of developing
internal private sectors rather than improving terms of trade. As such, it appealed
to the fundamental development postulate that the Third World should come up
with its own capital for development projects. Bananas for Houses, though
unusual in the expansive public relations campaign around it, represents a typical
instance when housing and planning, through a language of social welfare and
development, were able to provide the critical alibi for the "adjustments" dictated
by international financial institutions such the IMF and the World Bank even as
they became outdated.'
1 IMF emphasis on import substitution would end up critically reducing the prospects of
diversifying Ecuador's economy, increase sectorial disequilibrium, and furthering its
reliance on foreign capital.
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2.6.10 Politics of Law
Schemes such as Bananasfor Houses were an outcome of, not an exception to,
the policy of legislative nimbleness, centralization, and coordination that were
being pursued by the UN and US development agencies. The agenda of regional
coordination turns the question of land development in the Third World into a
technical and legislative problem, rather than a political one. A host of political
questions surrounding urban and rural land and tenure reform are preemptively
silenced with this move: Do terms of tenure allocation privilege certain income
and social groups over others? How do these allocations curtail and grant
resources along, and within, gender domains when they define household, family,
head of the household in legal terms? What effects would the establishment of
regional land markets have when countries bidding for credit enter into a bidding
war to grant donor countries greater and greater asymmetric access to local
markets?
Instead of seeing land legislation and development as political processes that must
aim at recognizing the various dimensions and actors related to the question of
access to land and financing, development treats the absence of law and technique
as the source of all political problems. For scholars of land legislation in Africa
such as Ambreena Manji, this association of land tenure and development with law
and technology has resulted in a systematic exclusion of groups raising political
considerations from policy discussions. 174 This metalepsis, replacing cause for
effect, draws attention away from the unavoidably political dimension of problems
174 Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa (London and New York: Zed
Books, 2006).
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of access to resources at various levels, from asymmetric access to land and
property along gender and class lines, to asymmetric access to international trade
along geo-political ones. Self-help turns the political question of resource
allocation into a technical and legal problem.17
The countless aerial photographs of self-help schemes in development reports,
juxtaposing the "organization" of the new with the "disorganization" of the old, are
a testament to this text (FIG. 7). Beyond the few rows of neatly arranged self-help
houses lies the untenured terrain of public land. The standardized construction
and design, beyond even the economic reach of the few model inhabitants, betray
the process of an ongoing development of this terrain. 17' The moral agenda of
organization of slums into model houses serves the financial agenda of creating a
centralized building and legislative system that is tied to the instrument of the loan.
2.6.11 Power of Comparison
Let us now turn to another critical dimension of this coordinating enterprise: the
structure of the expert's power. The continuous repositioning of planning in the
regional frame is central to the possibility of the expert's power as well. Cornwall
175 It was declared at the meeting of the heads of various UN divisions organized by
Weissmann: "[P]hysical planning," it was declared, "reconciles requirements of economic
development and human welfare and avoids the haphazard growth of slums
accompanying intensive urbanization." The Meeting of UN/OAS Working Group on
Cooperation and Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities in the Field of Housing,
Building and Physical Planning in Latin America, 16h, 17h November 1954. op cit.
176 In this move we witness a turn away from the logic of colonial reform that employed
disciplines such as anthropology as the justifying texts for projects of purposeful social
change. In project of development instead call forth a regime of technique, education, and
administration as their medium as well justification. One of the primary requirements for
regional coordination outlined in the meeting of the heads of various UN bodies
mentioned earlier was: "Establishment and/or strengthening of research, education and
training facilities for all phases of planning and execution of housing and community
improvement programmes." Ibid.
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and Kayanan's monthly progress reports betray the sweeping powers drawn from
the emphasis on regional planning in the day to day dealing with national officials.
Here we see how the short stay of the expert in a particular country is only a
window into the dimension of long-term regional, comprehensive planning and
thus cannot be legitimately challenged from any context framed as local.
Kayanan's mode of operation is particularly instructive in this regard. In the course
of six months Kayanan stopped existing projects to revise construction details and
site plans, went on field trips to evaluate the sites selected by INVU officials for
new housing schemes, proposed new legislation and attended meetings with the
President and the cabinet. These daily interruptions were not always appreciated
and were often carried out despite the displeasure of the local technicians. The
ultimate rapprochement for any resistance from the national officials was the
framing of their opinions as shortsightedness in UN reports. Kayanan did just that
when the "various mistakes" he pointed out in a large housing development,
called the Hatillo Neighborhood Unit Project, carried out by INVU near San Jose,
were not immediately accepted by the INVU team.177 Writing to Richardot (Acting
Chief of the Latin American Programme Division at the UN TAA in New York),
Kayanan made a point of stressing that when he identified these "errors" to the
"Board of Directors, the staff, and the architects, who were responsible for the
project,... [the meeting, unfortunately, almost assumed the appearance of a
debate." "Altho [sic]," Kaynan complained, "
177 The large project consisted of 590 dwelling units over 23 hecters of land south of San
Jos6.
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I stated at the start and repeatedly mentioned that... [e]rrors were singled out [by
me, Kayanan] on the basis of my actual practical experience in this particular field
- not so much to criticize as to demonstrate more clearly the functional principles
involved and thereby show the necessity of remedying these errors while there
was still time to do so. As far as I can see, the Hatillo Project is still being
constructed, unfortunately, in accordance with the old plans. Sets of the actual,
revised and alternate plans and analyses of this Project will be included among the
Annexes in my Final Report.
Kayanan's claim to a broader comparative frame to dismiss the objections of
national technicians is not unique, but is paradigmatic of the mode of operation of
UN and US consultants. The emphasis on the need for a broader regional
correlation between economic and legislative structures of countries "advised" by
the UN and US experts cannot be separated from the structure of expertise itself, a
structure that is reflected in the expert's long consultative itinerary. We would
argue that the expert, by definition, cannot be local. An expert is an expert only
inasmuch as he can put the local into the regional or the global context, inasmuch
as he can compare. The necessary condition of expertise is reflected in the many
failed applications of the "local" technicians for the title of the UN expert. Let us
look at three examples of failed and successful appointments to identify the critical
operational principles of international expertise.
2.6.12 The Impossible Local Expert 1: Brazil
In June of 1951, Ernest Weissmann approached Stephen Arneson, an architect and
planner who had had a substantial career in Latin America with projects in Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Panama, Panama Canal Zone, Venezuela, Burma and Haiti
178 Kayanan to J. B. Richardot, Acting Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme Division,
UN TAA, March 12, 1955, "Letter No. X4 (Third Progress Report)," File no. TAA 173/14/07,
Rag 2/173 - Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.
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and had worked for a brief period with the HHFA. Weissman's invitation was
directed precisely at the comparative dimension emerging from this consultative
itinerary.
Shortly before Weissmann sought out Arneson, Anatole Solow, the Chief of the
Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan American Union in Washington,
D.C., had recommended an Argentinean planner, Hugo Efrain Pelliza for the job.
When Pelliza had finished his course at CINVA in Bogota, Solow stressed, he was
"rated highest among all applicants who submitted the applications" and has a
"special interest in rural housing.""9 The director of CINVA, Currie, had already
recommended Pelliza for a UN mission position to Bolivia.
Despite these recommendations, however, Weissmann did not share Solow's
excitement for Pelliza and responded with a letter that concluded with the line:
"As you [Solow] must know, it is not our [UN] policy to borrow from Peter to pay
Paul."'8 Weissmann's statement cannot be interpreted as discrimination along
racial or nationalist lines, since many of the consultants employed by the UN,
including Kayanan, were of Third World origins. Rather, it points to the curious
necessity that the expert must not be associated with any particular national
context. Such association allowed the expert's opinions to be perceived in a
political light and diminished the aura and authority associated with belonging to
an international sphere.
179 Anatole A. Solow to Ernest Weissmann, August 11, 1955. File no. SOA 173/7/02, Rag
2/173 - Box 35. United Nations Archives, New York. After CINVA, Pelliza had also
worked for the City Planning Board of Cardoba.
180 Ernest Weissmann to Anatole A. Solow, August 26, 1955, File no. SOA 173/7/02, Rag
2/173 - Box 35. United Nations Archives, New York.
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These were indeed the reasons forwarded by Cornwell to Oropeza-Castillo (Chief
of the Office for Latin America, UN TAA) when, at the end of his assignment, the
Costa Rican government requested an extension of the mission. "All indications are
that the Minister of Public Works will soon ask TAA for another extension of my
time here for an additional year," Cornwall told Oropeza-Castillo, "I am [however]
in principle," he continued, "against technicians remaining too long in any one
country. The expert loses perspective and status and the country gains only
another civil servant [emphasis added]."181
The "perspective" Cornwell feared loosing was the ability to situate national
planning in a regional frame, a claim which constituted the very "status" of the
expert and kept him from turning into "only another civil servant." These
incidental exchanges at the margin of reports and surveys, the supposed real-
business of the missions, point us to the very conditions of the possibility of the
missions themselves. We witness in these exchanges a continuous management of
a series of risks by the expert, from that of maintaining his own profile and
authority, to sustaining the validity and authority of his advice, to managing the
very validity of the project and the terms of the loan. These various discursive,
legislative, and administrative strategies point to what Foucault has called
necessary conflation of the techniques of knowledge and strategies of power in
the functioning of a discourse.
181 Warren Corwall to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme
Division, UN TAA, May 26, 1954. Letter marked "Personal," File no. TAA 172/19/011,
Rag2/173 - Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.
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2.6.13 Politics of Risk
For national governments, self-help demonstration projects also formed a means to
manage the political and financial risks of their policy and programs. Multiple
national and international interests met in the self-help domain, producing many
instances when the UN experts did not hesitate to support particular national
political agendas inasmuch as they supported the UN emphasis on regional
legislative and financial coordination. These instances are always presented as
exceptions. Yet when seen as strategies for mutual hedging of risks, they appear
to be an essential component of development in national and international
theaters. Here we see how a short two-week demonstration project can serve the
broader function of advancing development agendas in different domains.
An interesting example of the conflation of national and international interest is
Robert Davison's short two-week mission to Guatemala City in June 1956 to "assist
the government in the field of urbanization." Davison had worked on several UN
and US AID projects and ran an independent consultancy firm in New York,
advertising himself as a "regional housing consultant." His visit to Guatemala was
part of larger itinerary, leading from Guatemala to Bolivia and Costa Rica in a
similar advisory role. 182
Davison's primary goal in Guatemala was to review the "pilot plan" on
determining the "zoning [criteria] of existing districts.. .types of construction... and
construction materials" by the Town Planning Department of the Municipal
182 In Bolivia, Davison was accompanied another expert, Rene Eyheralde from the Inter-
American Housing Center (CINVA) in Bogoti. DSCO1075
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Engineers.'18 In Guatemala City, Davison was invited to a cocktail party given by
the Cultural Attach6 of the American Embassy in honor of Paul Weiner, Jose Luis
Sert's partner in the Cuban projects, who, as Davison wrote back to the UN in
New York, "was giving lectures in Guatemala City under the auspices of the State
Department Point Four Program."184 Davison's meeting with Weiner led to an
introduction with the Director of Public Works and Mayor of the Guatemala City,
officials who were not directly related to Davison's immediate mission. Learning of
his itinerary, the city officials immediately sought Davison to attest that their recent
and notoriously "minimum" self-help projects were a realistic confrontation of
stupendous problems.
The next day Davison was taken on a tour of several of the housing projects
around the city. Seeing the stripped down projects to be consistent with the policy
of ensuing "responsibility" in the participants, realism in the administrators, and
regionalism in the government, Davison was forthcoming with his seal of
approval. "Upon my expressing admiration for his [the unnamed director of Public
works] realistic approach to the problem of housing the very low-income families"
Davison admitted to the UN Technical Assistance Administration in New York,
"[the director of Public works, who remains unnamed] asked me if I would give
him a written statement." The next day, Davison was invited to go with the Mayor
"on [another] junket to Antigua in honor of Paul Weiner. "[There] the mayor read
183 Byron S. Hollinshead, Director, UN TAA to Hugh L. Keenleyside, Director General, UN
TAA, August, 2, 1955. File no. TAA/550.643. Rag 3/173 - Box 98. United Nations Archives,
New York. In addition, Davison was also to advise the faculty of Engineering at San
Carlos University in Guatemala City.
184 Davison's letter to J.B. Richardot, Acting Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme
Division, UN TAA. February 17, 1956. File no. TAA 173/26/017. Rag 3/173 - Box 98.
United Nations Archives, New York.
144
my statement on their minimal housing," Davison continued, "and said it was most
timely and helpful as some people were criticizing their minimal housing as too
minimal."'85
The UN and Guatemalan officials' concerns of locating self-help housing
somewhere between "minimum" and "too minimum" betrays the shared interest,
as well as the political and financial risk of encountering the "poor" as a category
in developing regional land markets and financial institutions. For international
organizations and development experts, the primary strategy of managing this risk
is the continuous realignment of different national planning and legislative terrains.
It is in this alignment that development institutions as well as development experts
find their possibility and security.
2.6.14 The Impossible Local Expert 2: Egypt
The opposition between national and international interest inherent in the idea of
comprehensive planning reproduces itself in multiple interrelated concepts in the
development discourse. One of these was the opposition between quantity and
quality that we saw in Jacob Crane's repeated repudiation of the demand for
money (quantity) in the interest of establishing capitalist circulation (quality) in the
Third World. Another opposition is the opposing calculus of long-term and short-
term planning. The national government, it is often repeated in the development
reports, are pressed for short-term fixes and are unwilling to sacrifice immediate
gratification for long-term solutions.
185 Ibid. The public works officials also informed Davison of their intention to hold a
conference on the problem of sanitary facilities in areas of low water availability. Spotting
an opportunity to level the field of favors between national and international bodies,
Davison suggested to the Guatemalan officials to seek a WHO expert to advise them on
the conference.
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Though we have focused on Latin American so far, the expert's more of operation
emerging from the management of these oppositions is not limited to that context.
In 1955, Denis Winston, a planner at the Department of Town and Country
Planning at the University of Sydney, arrived in Cairo as a UN planning expert to
the Egyptian government. In his initial report to the UN, Winston's primary
criticism regarding the existing planning approach in Cairo and Alexandria was the
supposed inability of the Egyptian planners to carry out "comprehensive
planning." "The Egyptians," Winston declared in a confidential letter to the
Resident Representative of the UN in Egypt, "were not in the position to organize
a regional planning scheme."186
Winston's evaluation opened the doors for sending a number of planning experts
to the Middle East, prompting a visit from Ernest Weissmann as well Otto
Koenigsberger, and inaugurated plans from FAO and MIT to establish a building
center in Cairo with emphasis on regional planning. The inability of Third World
planners to carry out comprehensive planning-i.e. to step beyond the short-term
immediacy of their problems and place them in relations to the long-term trend of
global economic development-would also expand the scope of the London
based Regional Planning Center (ARPD), headed by Jacqueline Tyrwhitt during the
war. The Center's staff would be recommended to Ernest Weissmann by Otto
Koenigsberger, who himself headed the other imperial organ of colonial reform on
its way to turning into a major consulting house, the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine.
186 Denis Winston to the Office of the Resident Representative, December 30, 1955. File no.
TAA 173/20/021. Rag2/173 - Box 81. United Nations Archives, New York.
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From the perspective of the UN, the temporal and spatial myopia of the short-term
did not just besiege the Egyptian planners but characterized Third World planners
in general. Winston's assistant in Egypt was an Iranian planner, Abidi, a student of
Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams who held a PhD in planning from Colombia.
Abidi, Winston himself acknowledged in letters to the UN, carried out most of the
research and report writing associated with the mission. When, on the basis of
these contributions, however, Abidi tried to secure an independent consulting
position with the UN at the end of his tenure in Egypt, he was perceived to not
have the necessary experience for such an assignment.
It was Abidi, who was hired in the TAA headquarter in New York a month in
advance of Winston's arrival to read up on the history of planning in Egypt before
the mission. Yet Abidi's report is not published as a UN document, but only
subsumed in Winston's' reiteration as a "background document." Contesting his
due credit and the inexperience, or rather the inability, attributed to him, Abidi
traveled to London to meet Koenigsberger at the APBR. Though Koenigsberger
was himself on the way to Gold Coast with Charles Abrams on a UN mission, he
was sympathetic to Abidi's plea and agreed to write him a recommendation and
provide him with a training position at the ARPD. While these credentials earned
Abidi a short stint at the UN headquarters in New York ( and with substantial
salary), his travels were not able to match Winston's itinerary (visiting sites and
meeting other UN experts in Chandigarh, Beirut, and Damascus before arriving in
Cairo).
In the game of regional, or comprehensive, planning, the Third World planner can
never bluff. Though the Western expert is only in a particular country for the
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short-term, he is able to advise on the long-term. We would argue, he occupies a
different dimension of time, more abstract than the literal count of the duration of
his stay in a particular country. He collects the coordinates of this time on his hops
to the assignment (Chandigarh, Beirut, Damascus) that give a comparative
advantage over the local planner, and sets his advice in the abstract and qualitative
realm of the long-term. The time of expert opinion is not human-time, but rather,
to borrow from Marx, rational time, an averaged out comparative realm that
betrays to him the forces and crisis yet to reveal themselves to his local
counterparts.
2.7 Not-Yet-No-Longer Desire: The Affective Coding of Self-Help
How do self-help projects claim to create economic value? In its official dogma,
self-help is based on the assertion that the boundaries of economic activity can be
identified in time. Outside this realm is "extra" or "free" time. Self-help draws on
this untapped resource to create economic value. In the rural areas, this un-
expropriated temporal sphere is evidenced in rural idleness; in the urban areas, by
the time available outside of formal employment. By organizing consumers as
producers, this extra time can be utilized to create economic value.' Harold
Robinson, the former Chief of the Housing and Urban Development of the Latin
187 For architectural students, claiming their right of passage into the world of practice by
helping "poor" build their own houses, self-help participants appears as innocuous as Ikea
consumers, contributing their free time to reduce costs of production and assembly. Yet as
Immanuel Wallerstein has argued regarding self-assembled consumer good, the free time
is not free but only unacknowledged. We would argue that in the self-help domain this
unacknowledgment is a structural necessity. See Immanuel Wallerstein and Joan Smith
(eds.), Creating and Transforming Households: The Constraints of the World-economy
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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America Bureau at the Agency for International Development (US-AID), defended
the soundness of the initial self-help schemes on similar grounds:
"As the name implies, aided self-help is a method to utilize the many man-hours
that are available to the most areas in the form of unused leisure time - and to use
this enormous reserve of manpower together with some form of aid from the
community, others, so that man may, though his own efforts, using his own spare
time, improve his shelter to an extent that he never could - alone and unaided."'
As we have seen, however, this process is perpetually delayed in the name of a
pending socio-cultural transformation. This delay, we will argue, is both the
product and condition of a text of unacknowledged appropriation of value that
continuously cuts across the upheld boundaries of economic and non-economic
and its socio-cultural markers of modernity and tradition. This shadowy space of
appropriation permeates self-help's text of value. The definitions of household,
family structure, income and gender division of labor upheld in self-help projects
erase from view the realm of labor that subsidizes the self-help activity. This
subsidizing activity cannot be accounted for in the logic of the project, yet its
contours and duration are managed in this realm.
Like all projects of social change, development is continuously producing this
residual sphere. What is unique to development approaches such as self-help,
however, is the propensity to acknowledge this realm, only to shift it to new
realms. It is this shifting mode of operation that is we will now try to identify as a
structural necessity.
1 Robinson is here citing from the HUD published IME. Cited in Harold Robinson, Aided
Self-Help Housing: It History and Potential (Washington, D.C: US Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Office of the International Affairs, 1976), p. 3. Robinson was the
former Chief of the Housing and Urban Development of the Latin America Bureau at the
Agency for International Development (US-AID).
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The traces of this shadowy sphere are visible in the organizational procedures
preceding the beginning of a particular self-help project. By the 1960s, most of
the international institutions involved had laid out detailed procedures for
selection of inhabitants, administrative organization, training, land and legal
agreements. These guidelines were incorporated into a series of Manuals for Self-
Help, one of which we encountered earlier in the chapter.
These procedures constitute a strategy of risk management; one which is not
directed towards allaying the risk of the inhabitants, but the risk of the
contingency of the encounter in projects of social reform. The central socio-
economic unit of this system of risk management is the eligible family. The
framing of the family structure and roles of individual members in self-help
projects plays a critical role in setting up the lens through which donor
organizations and national governments allocate resources and carry out the
broader comprehensive planning agenda.
We briefly looked at the idea of the family in the context of community
development in Puerto Rico. There we argued that family in the development
discourse is seen as a marker of a broader sphere of hallowed traditional values
lost during Western modernization. The emphasis on delaying the pace of
modernization to enable the inhabitants of this sphere can inculcate their own
sense of modernization, serves as an alibi to postpone the political and
representational questions associated with the development process while passing
on its costs to those involved. We argued that family, and its concomitant sphere
of community, is an instance of unacknowledged production and appropriation of
value-form, the condition of the possibility of economic value in development.
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The idea of unacknowledged production and appropriation of value-form has
been the focus of many feminist critiques of development. These critiques,
however, have largely approached the idea of the hidden economy of women's
work as a source to sketch out alternatives to the socio-economic model of
capitalist production. What is ignored in this approach is that unacknowledged
work is not outside relationships of power. Women's labor in development is
related as differential to the visible circuits of capitalist production and doesn't
exist as an autonomous sphere. Attempts to bring it into "visibility" without
attention to coding of value differential only shifts this differential to new registers.
A prominent example of this trend is the work of Maria Mies.""9 For Mies,
development's privileging of the nuclear family structure and patriarchal
communities renders women's roles and responsibilities invisible in the
development discourse. Women's activities, Mies has famously argued, then form
an "underground economy" that supports the functioning of development projects
and hides their true costs. These moves result in systemic exploitation of women
and consolidation of patriarchal power. For Mies (as well as for a large body of
literature for which this perspective has become the staple feminist critique of
development), identifying women's unacknowledged role in capitalist production
can provide alternative social models to the one based on capitalist production,
consumption and profit.
189 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the
International Division of Labour (London: Zed Books, 1986).
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What is ignored in these redemptive proposals is that the very idea of an invisible
margin is already written into the coding of value-form. Here Foucault's warning
against imagining autonomous margins presents a challenge to Mies' critique:
One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of "marginality" that
would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were
it not the object of mechanisms of exclusion brought to bear by the economic or
ideological requirements of power. If "marginality" is being constituted as an area
of investigation, this is only because relations of power have established it as a
possible object; and conversely, if power is able to take it as a target, this is
because techniques of knowledge were capable of switching it on. Between
techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if
they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their
difference.. .Not to look for who has the power in the order of marginality.. .and
who is deprived of it.. .but to look rather for thepattern of modifications which the
relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process."'90
Foucault, reminds us that all distinctions between center and periphery are
explanatory abbreviations (a principle we saw at work in Marx), that the presence
of a possible margin outside capitalist relations can readily become a coding of
value. The presumption of a unified margin ignores how this coding is not static,
but always on the move across discontinuous and heterogeneous relations of
power. Without attention to how social and economic value is coded in circuits of
development, insisting on the acknowledgement of women's work as a collective
category reproduces the coding of value-form that these critiques seek to displace.
It is with attention to this coding of value differential on different levels of the
development discourse that we now turn to the idea of the nuclear family in self-
help programs.
" Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978), pp. 98-99.
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2.7.1 Family Affection:
Indeed, self-help defines family along patriarchal lines. The very idea of an
"eligible family," as it is presented in the many "manuals" on self-help by
international organizations, is a tautology. The ability to appear as a "family" is the
criteria for eligibility itself. To be eligible, the applicants have to appear in the
form of a nuclear, heterosexual, wage-earning household headed by a male
member.' The series of interviews, application forms, follow-up visits by social
workers, all force the applicants to present themselves in the official mold to be
selected for the project (FIG. 8).1" The appropriation of the extra-wage labor of
women as a collective subject, inasmuch as it doesn't appear in this socio-
economic web, however, is coded affectively, as work motivated by an emerging
desire for development. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of desire as a
generalized psychoanalytic mode of production of affective value on a sub-
individual level, the desire for development is the disciplinary coding of affective
value on a para-individual level. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we may call the
mapping of these trajectories as the text of affective coding of the development
"1 As the UN Self-Help Manual declares, the initial meeting and preliminary application is
followed by a series of interviews where the applicants fill out detailed questionnaires.
These questionnaires are intended "for the head of the family only," who is presumed to
be invariably male, a condition apparent in such couplets as: "Marital status:", "Wife's
name:" United Nations, Manual on Self-Help Housing, op cit., 1964. p. 16 .
192 Following initial presentations and filling out of application forms, a "staff
member... [meets with the] head of each family, at home and at work..." to ask further
questions and document the living condition of the applicants, particularly the number of
kin living in the household. Here the applicants must again present themselves as a
nucleated family. Deviations from the eligible household profile are seen as a sign of lack
of understanding of the self-help structure and reduce the applicants' chances of being
accepted in the program. "Nothing should be taken for granted.. .since a full response
could still indicate a lack of understanding of the project even after the.. .presentations of
the programme." Ibid. pp. 14-16.
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discourse. In the self-help discourse, the degree to which the participants possess
this desire is marked by the coordinates of their "attitude" toward development.
Attitude locates not just visibility but also invisibility in development, and thus
preemptively censors the emergence of any collective subject.
The question of the attitude of the applicants regularly appears in the
organizational procedures of self-help. It is considered critical to the economic
profile of the applicants. The UNManual on Selfhelp lists questions directed for
the applicant under the heading, "Attitudes, interests and participation of
applicants." Consequently, the tripartite criteria for judging an applicant's eligibility
is: "1) the ability of the families to contribute the necessary amount of self-help; 2)
The ability of the family to repay the costs of the project; 3) The need of the
families for this housing programme, based on their present living conditions and
on their attitude toward the relief of those conditions."193 Without proper attitude,
the economic and physical ability is moot.
Attitude, the extra-economic variable in the self-help equation, provides the most
accurate and reliable economic information. "Obviously," states the UN Self-Help
Manual stressing the centrality of measuring the attitude of the applicants,
the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it takes to build the
house, and repayments in cash depends upon the cost of the house and the
services. Not so obvious are the relationships between a person's needs and
attitudes. The skill of the interviewer in really discussing the project instead of just
asking superficial (or even misleading) questions, is important at this
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193 Ibid. p. 19.
stage.. .Attitudes can change from one moment to the next, and gauging these
changes is important. 194
On the one hand, determining the attitude of the applicant is the moment when
the self-help project-or more accurately, the self-help approach itself-is risked
on the skill of the interviewer to decipher the intentions of the participants (FIG.
9). On the other, however, it is also the moment when that risk is preempted on a
broader scale. The centrality attributed to the idea of attitude itself-the belief that
the applicant possesses an un-reckoned economic potential despite themselves-
passes the dissonance between expected results and available resources onto the
applicants themselves, claiming the extra-wage activities as un-reckoned economic
potential that can find its way into the economic calculus of development, if it
were not for the attitude of the participants. In as much as the self-help approach
itself professes delaying that incorporation, it sets up a system of value differential
that though it remains unacknowledged, forms an integral part a multifarious
system of value determination. It was Jacob Crane who argued for a delay in
development based on the existing attitudes of the people. In his presentation,
"Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment" at the West Indies Conference
194 Ibid. The time it takes to build the house, bears within it another time, the human time
required to make the abstract time of building appear. In its official declarations, self-help
assumes that the human time it draws on is equal to the abstract time of creation of
economic value ("Obviously, the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it
takes to build the house"). Yet, one is never subsumed in the other but related as a
differential. Self-help calls forth the applicants to appear as a "family," an abstract
sociological unit, while the discord of this framing with the actuality of the household's
existence, the movement between the rural and the urban, between wage, extra-wage,
and petty economic activities required for survival, is hidden, or rendered invisible.
Attitude is the coding though which that differential is sustained and value form coded. It
is the differential between the human time and abstract time which makes possible the
unacknowledged appropriation of value
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on Housing in 1947, Crane had presented attitude as both the promise of desire
and indication of resistance to it:
In order to best serves the shelter needs and aspirations of the people, the housing
programme must take into account the attitudes of the people themselves. It must
be remembered that the values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from
local culture and are deeply imbedded in the minds of the people. 1 9 5
In the United Nations Development Decade Proposals for Action, this pending and
delayed desire is described as "the unutilized talents of [the] people [that]
constitute the chief present waste and chief future hope of the developing
countries. Only a small fraction of these populations participate actively in national
life today."196
This dimension of value differential cannot find a place in the logic of the feminist
critiques mentioned above. This limitation stems from a linear narrative of the
labor-value-capital chain embedded in the idea of the underground economy of
women's work, a narrative also shared by the self-help approach in its official
declarations. In both the feminist approach and self-help rhetoric, non-wage labor
is posited as the originary moment of the capitalist chain. "[L]abour that goes into
the production of life," Mies has argued, "[is] productive labour in the broad sense
19 Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West Indies
Conference on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers
by Crane distributed as corollary material at the conference: Huts and Houses in the
Tropics; The Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family
Housebuilding - "Aided Self-Help Housing"; and Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico
(Brochure).
196 The United Nations Development Decade Proposalsfor Action (New York: United
Nations, 1962?), p. vii. United Nations publication, sales no.: 62.II.B.2.
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of producing use values for the satisfaction of human needs."197 The argument
unfolds around the question of recognizing the proper use-value of this labor as it
is saved from being considered "natural activity": "[T]his production of life is a
perennial precondition of all other historical forms of productive labour, including
that under conditions of capitalist accumulation, it [therefore] has to be defined as
work and not as unconscious 'natural' activity."198
For the self-help organizations, the economic value created during the self-help
project already compensates for the non-wage activity of the participants
("Obviously, the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it takes to
build the house.") Both perspectives, however, maintain the binary opposition
between cultural and economic spheres, wage and non-wage labor. This stress on
good - use-value fit, as it distances women's work from nature, constitutes another
idealization of free labor outside capitalism:
A feminist concept of labour has, therefore, to be oriented towards a different
concept of time, in which time is not segregated into portions of burdensome
labour and portions of supposed pleasure and leisure, but in which times of work
and times of rest and enjoyment are alternating and interspersed. If such a concept
and such an organization of time prevail, the length of the working-day is no
197 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, op cit., p. 47. Mies
repeatedly makes the same differentiation between use and exchange values. An instance
towards the end of the book sounds like justification for self-help projects themselves: "A
feminist concept of labour has to maintain that work retains its sense ofpurpose, its
character of being useful and necessary for the people who do it and those around them.
This also means that the products of this labour are useful and necessary, ad not just some
luxuries or superfluous trash as are most of the handicrafts made today by women in
'income generating activities' in Third World countries." Ibid. p. 218.
198 Ibid. p.47.
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longer relevant. Thus, a long working-day and even a lifetime full of work, will
not then be felt as a curse but as a source of human fulfillment and happiness. 199
The attention paid to the question of attitude in self-help, however, discloses a
different textuality of value that cuts across the separation between wage and non-
wage labor. Self-help programs are particularly telling in exposing the limitation
of the feminist perspective mentioned above, as it is precisely in the name of
facilitating the good use-value fit that we see the coding of affective value. This
dimension remains invisible in the feminist critiques of development that uphold
use-value as the originary moment, and not a continuously produced and
appropriated differential in exchange relations. The continuous affective coding of
extra-wage labor in development renders indeterminate this orginary fiction.
Following Marx, we argued earlier that use value is differentially related to
exchange value-pointing to the complicity of cultural and economic value
systems in capitalism-and cannot, except as explanatory abbreviation, be held as
an originary step. Socially necessary labor, if we recall, is the amount of labor
required for the worker to regenerate herself to remain optimally useful for capital
in terms of current price structure. Emphasis on attitude and desire in the terrain of
self-help and comprehensive planning betray that that price structure is not limited
to the logic of capital alone.
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari, argue that capital decodes and
deterritorializes the socius by releasing the abstract as such. Capitalism must
manage this crisis by continuous reterritorializations.2oo Among them is the
"9 Ibid., p. 217.
200 Gilles Deleuze and F6lix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Robert Hurley (New York: Viking Press, 1977).
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generalized psychoanalytic mode of production of affective value, a mode
spectacular in its discontinuities and complexity. Desire is the term designating this
mode at the sub-individual level, where value is coded in a series of affective and
social equivalences, before it gets fully coded in the economic system of
equivalences.20 1 Value is not created by superadequation of capital, but by the
superadequation of subject. This superadequation is not simply calibrated and
organized by the logic of capital. Desire defines superadequation in terms of a
dimension of affective necessary labor, beyond the limited concept of socially
necessary labor. Following Spivak, however, we have to keep in mind that if "a
view of affectively necessary labor (as possible within the present state of
socialized consumer capitalism) as labor as such is proposed without careful
attention to the international division of labor, its fate may be mere political avant-
gardism." 20 2
How then does attitude as a particular coding of desire in the development theater
betray the contours of the international division of labor?
2.7.2 Negative Affectivity:
For Marx, capital showed a tendency to subsume more and more areas related to
the reproduction of labor under its umbrella to lower the threshold of socially
necessary labor. Desire, as it was formulated by Deleuze and Guattari, was the
psychoanalytic value-form that also marked this increasing tendency of
subsumption. Attitude, as institutional coding of affect in development, however,
201
202 Gayatri Spivak, "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value," in In Other Worlds
(New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 162.
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betrays a different tendency of subsumption, one based on delay and an
interruption rather than increasing incorporation.
In the development theater, the affective value is coded negatively, in term of its
absence, or its promise. Labor is socialized in terms of its pending desire for
development. This negative coding allows the interruption of the absorption of
segments of Third World labor into circuits of consumer capital while making it
available to the circuits of usurer capital, the loan. This necessary tendency of
value production is missing from Negri's idea of zero work, and introduces a
breach in the spectacular realm of desire mapped out in Anti-Oedipus."'
As we have seen, development experts were careful to avoid the accusation that
they were imposing Western precedence in a foreign context, a criticism often
forthcoming from various national contexts. In this regard, development was
always presented as a call from the ground, reflecting the "aspirations" and
"desires" of the people themselves. Desire for development forms the condition of
the possibility of the expert's presence in the Third World. Attitude, as the measure
of that desire-its tendency to sway off course-assures the continuity of that
presence. Attitude marks the coordinates of that threatening desire at any moment
on the trajectory of development.
As mentioned earlier, in his presentation, "Improvement of Shelter and Home
Environment" at the West Indies Conference on Housing in 1947, Jacob Crane had
framed attitude as both the promise of desire and indication of resistance to it:
203 Antonio Negri "Value and Affect," Boundary 2, 26:2 (Summer 1999).
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In order to best serve the shelter needs and aspirations of the people, the housing
programme must take into account the attitudes of the people themselves. It must
be remembered that the values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from
local culture and are deeply embedded in the minds of the people.2
Attitude is desire coded negatively. Desire in the Third World holds both the
promise of, and threat to, development's success. Attitude measures that
contradictory tendency. This contradiction constitutes the founding possibility of
development intervention as well as the condition of its reproducibility.
2.7.3 Positive Desire:
This negative coding of development holds even when the affect in question is not
the interrupting attitude but its supposed opposite: an immediate and
overwhelming desire for development that cannot be absorbed by the foreseeable
economic and technological capabilities. The paradox persists even in this case:
development must delay its own emergence. Consider, for example the
forewarning of increasing urbanization given in the UNManual on SelfHelp
Housing. The opening paragraph of the manual begins with the picture of a
worsening situation that we are now familiar with:
The world's housing situation is causing great concern, not only because too many
in the developing areas are poorly housed, but also because the situation is
worsening. Despite world advances in science, technology and know-how, the
2" Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West India Conference
on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers by Crane
distributed as corollary material at the conference: Huts and Houses in the Tropics; The
Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family Housebuilding
- "Aided Self-Help Housing"; and Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico (Brochure).
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rates of population increase and of urbanization are accelerating faster than man's
ability to resolve the problems of overcrowding and excess migration.20
The paragraph closes, however, by identifying an emerging desire for
modernization as the driving force behind the crisis: "A surging desire by the
world's populations for higher and higher standards of living also adds to the
dynamic and flux of the situation."20 1
Just as attitude is an affective dimension of the economic calculus of self-help, this
surging desire is an affective dimension of a threatening economic demand.
Anatole A. Solow, Chief of the Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan
American Union in Washington D.C. and Crane's co-sponsor on many Latin
American missions, in his address to the graduating class of the Pan American
Center in December 1955, had located the shortcomings of development in the
increasing demand for development itself:
Let us look for a moment at the conditions prevailing in the countries to which
you [the graduates of the Inter-American Housing Center] are about to return. In
spite of constantly increasing efforts by the governments the housing situation is
getting worse rather than better. And this is quite understandable if you consider
the tremendous increase in population, the extraordinary expansion of cities and
the growing demand for better living conditions.207
It was Crane who in his tropics mission report had also identified the overflowing
economic and affective coding as two sides of the same global phenomenon:
205 United Nations, Manual on Self-Help Housing, op cit., 1964. p. 1.
206 ibid.
207 Anatole A. Solow, A Message to the Graduating Class of 1955 at the Inter-American
Housing Center (Washington D.C.: The Pan American Union, 1955), pp. 2-3.
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The desire for improved housing as one element of better living standards is being
expressed by urban workers now, and, as education and incomes increase among
farmers, they also will demand better housing and community development.. .Any
evidence of apathy toward home improvement is due much more to ignorance,
illness and fatigue than to lack of aspiration.20 s
Mirroring the text of delaying attitude and pending demand, the intertwined
coding of overwhelming desire and immediate demand also point to the same
aporia: an affective dimension of development that is always too much or too
little, always off its mark. This, however, is an aporia that works toward
introducing a perpetual and enabling delay in development.
2.7.4 Not-yet-no-longer:
Returning to the notion of attitude, we can perhaps now posit it as meta-term of
affective coding in development, measuring both pending and premature desire,
since each represents a different coding of the same tendency of delayed
development. It is this negative coding that differentiates the affecting coding of
value on different sides of the international division of labor. In the development
theater, all desire bears the mark of attitude, of pending desire. From this
perspective, attitude is, to borrow a term from Spivak, not-yet-no-longer desire,
not-yet-no-longer demand. Attitude locates the Third World as a sphere both fully
implicated in the mode of production narrative and yet distanced from it.
Development as a strategy of socio-economic intervention based on the logic of
perpetually delayed entry into consumerism finds its possibility within this system
of connectedness and disconnectedness. Attitude displaces self-help from the
sequential logic of conventional labor theory of value that sees labor increasingly
208 UN Tropics Mission Report, op cit., 1951, p6 .
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subsumed into the circuits of consumerism and locates it in a sphere where labor
is excluded from this tendency and its attending costs of increasing labor and
environmental protection. This interruption locates the desire for development as a
sphere located both outside the circuits of consumer capital yet implicated in the
circuits of capitalist production. Attitude represents the deliberately imprecise
measurements of a loose calculus, the hinge through which the text of economic
coding is connected to the text of affective surplus, a relationship which is forever
on the move and needs to be continuously calibrated.
2.7.5 (Under) Ground of Value:
Let us return to the question of the underground economy of women's labor in
development. How are we to locate the space of women's labor in this field value
coding? As we saw above, patriarchy itself emerges as a stratified and
discontinuous sphere in self-help, where the "head of the family" is subsumed
under the opinion of the group, the community leader, and so forth. Women's
silence and invisibility is inscribed in this discontinuous field and is itself
discontinuous and interrupted in the field of affective value.
If we are concerned with the question of agency (or its aporia in the realm of
collective action), then woman as subject has her agency censored in development
by the affective script of negative desire for modernization. In this context, raising
the question of visibility of women as a unified subject in development is
preemptively appropriated and echoes the agenda of the very forces that code her
as a desiring subject of modernity. Without attention to the text of affective coding
of value, women's visibility in development appears as an assumed good.
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The access to agency and public space, in this context, has to expose the script of
affective coding of value. As long as the battle lines have been drawn between
erasure and visibility in development, development institutions and feminist
critique function as clandestine cooperators. The question of unrecognized agency
in development must interrupt the question of how the subject is staged with the
text of how agency is scripted.
This complicity between external criticism of development and development
organizations' own readjustments is visible in the periodic self-critique of
development that reasserts the basic text of presumed unified desire on different
registers. It is not surprising that as early as 1975 the UN and its attending
institutions were keen on acknowledging the hidden economy of "women's work"
at the First UN Conference on Women in Mexico City. In the realm of self-help
projects, this revision appears in the form of "core" housing.
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3 Core: The Tyranny of the Individual
In this section we will look at a particular variant of the self-help approach called
"core" housing. The term was devised by Charles Abrams, the Chairman of the
Urban Planning Program at Colombia and the sometime Rent Commissioner for
the State of New York.209 Abrams, who was instrumental in passing major anti-
segregation housing laws in the US, consulted regularly for the UN and USAID in
the 1950s and 1960s. He was joined on many missions by another prominent
figure in the development planning arena, Otto Koenigsberger who, before
becoming the Director of the Department of Tropical Architecture at the
Architectural Association (AA) in London in the1950s, had spent considerable time
in India as the Chief Architect and Planner of the state of Mysore before the
country's independence in 1947." Koenigberger, together with others at the AA
2'09 Abrams' US career is described in detail by Scott Henderson in, Housing and the
Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000).
20 Abrams and Koenigsberger went on joint missions to the Gold Coast (Ghana), Pakistan,
Philippines, Singapore and Nigeria. The report for these missions were published by the
UN as follows: Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, prepared for the government of the
Gold Coast by Charles Abrams, Vladimir Bodiansky, Otto H.G. Koenigsberger (New
York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1956); A Housing Programfor
Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation, prepared for the Government of
Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, September 14, 1957 (New York:
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1957); A Housing Programfor the
Philippine Islands, by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations
Technical Assistance Administration, 1959).
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authored the famous Manual of Tropical Housing and Building that is to this day
a central feature of curriculums in architecture schools across the Third World.2 "
According to Abrams and Koenigsberger, core housing differed from previous self-
help approaches such as "aided self-help" and "mutual-aid" in significant ways. 12
Both of these approaches held onto a preconceived notion that a finished house
was required before occupation (FIG. 10, 11). In core housing, however, the
sponsoring agency developed lots and provided elemental services such as water,
sewage, and electricity connections so that sites were inhabitable before the
completion of houses. The inhabitants lived on the sites during the remaining
process of construction, putting up the walls, roof, and other enclosures as
resources and time permitted. Most of the time, the sponsoring agency only
provided loans for the roof, doors and windows, while holding the entire structure
as collateral. This reduced both the amount of the loan and the risk and for the
agency.
211 Otto H. Koenigsberger, Manual of Tropical Housing and Building (London: Longman,
1974-c1973).
2n2In "aided self-help," the future owners work on specific house they are to occupy. Their
labor, however, is limited according to their construction experience. To avoid translating
that inexperience into the house itself, the construction of an individual house inevitably
requires supervision, and hiring "skilled craftsmen," increasing administrative costs. In the
mutual-aid approach, the future occupants participate in the project as employed workers.
Only, instead of being paid on a daily basis, they are offered the product of their labor,
the finished houses, as compensation. During this employment, the workers are trained to
perform specific jobs, moving from house to house. As Abrams himself explained in his
seminal book on self-help housing, Man's Strugglefor Shelter in an Urbanizing World,
"The workers are usually not told which house they will own so they will not skimp or
loaf on other houses and take special care with their own." See, Charles Abrams, Man's
Strugglefor Shelter in an Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1964), p.
171.
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The idea of core housing takes the self-help idea to such an extreme that the
architect looses all claims to composing form. It is the inhabitant who "designs"
the house. Yet it is precisely by achieving this transparency that the core house is
able to present the inhabitant as a participant in development, while keeping
intact the framework of development, whether it is the qualification criteria for the
loan associated with the house or the broader social and economic policy
prescriptions. In this setting, the inhabitant of the core house appears as both the
cause and the effect of the developmental process - both its agent and its subject.
It is the open-endedness of core housing (reflective perhaps of the general open-
endedness of architecture as a discipline), its ability to appear as an index of
infinite concerns and to appear at the threshold of development, linking before
and after, modern and pre-modern, professional and common, that allows it to
carry out this inversion. Everyone needs to build shelter for themselves, or so we
are told by Abrams and Koenigsberger. Core housing has connected this activity to
the economic calculus of development, making the inhabitants, despite their
intensions, participants in the development process.
3.1 A House Without a Core:
There is, however, a certain contradiction inherent in the central argument made
by these contemporary schemes, one that was also present in Abrams and
Koenigsberger's original proposals. In core housing, as well as its contemporary
variants, the inhabitant is called forth to appear as a freely choosing, rational
individual when the social welfare, economic, and legal institutions that enable
and validate that role are missing in the context of development. The inhabitant of
the core house therefore must find the social and economic guarantee of her
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actions somewhere else, either in her "natural" ability as homo economicus, or in
the very traditional social structures that development seeks to replace. The
inhabitant thus must be positioned as both inside and outside the development
process.
This chapter argues that it is in presenting this position as a necessary point of
origin for development that core housing actually maintains the development
subject at the threshold of the modernization project. This partial
inclusion/exclusion serves to incorporate her into the circuits of the international
financial markets, while keeping her outside the structure of welfare, labor, and
environmental protection that is associated with the socialized growth of consumer
capitalism.
This emphasis on locating the inhabitant at the threshold of modernization makes
"core" appears as an ironic name for this approach to development. If we look at
the photographs of core housing projects in Abrams' own writings as well in
various UN manuals, we see that from the perspective of the Western architectural
tradition, these houses do not have a core! (FIG. 12). There is no neo-traditionalist
brick and stone hearth forming the infrastructural and spatial center and
harnessing the fundamental domestic activities of cooking, heating, and
congregation imagined by Frank Lloyd Wright and other organicists (FIG. 13).213
Nor is there an elemental utility core such the one found in the "environmental
213 The emphasis on the hearth and core as the elemental feature of "organic architecture"
was a staple argument of not only Wright's own writings but also of the description of his
work in canonical books of history of modern architecture. See, for example, Kenneth
Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History, chapter 3, "Frank Lloyd Wright and the
myth of the Prairie 1890-1916," (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), pp. 57-63; and,
William Curtis, Modern Architecture, since 1900, chapter 6, "The Architectural System of
Frank Lloyd Wright," (Englewood cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 75-90.
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bubble" for modern nomadic living presented in the writing of Reyner Banham
and the architectural consortium, Archigram (FIG. 14.). The core house in the
Third World only has a void at the center through which one can see to the other
side. It cannot harness the humanist gaze seeking to find in it the elemental
existence of Western society, be it the traditional model of the family gathered
around the hearth, or Banham's naked body representing the nomad of the future.
The only presence in the image of the core house is of the laboring inhabitant,
occupying the frame with a shovel in hand.
Yet the image of the laborer against the empty center of the core house doesn't
point to its inhabitant's exclusion from the discourse of individuation and family.
Rather, the presence of the Third World subject in the core house without a "core"
points to a different entry into the project of modernization, one written not in the
language of form, but rather in a process of formalization within the realm of
policy and legislation. The core house in the Third World does not have a "core"
because the minimum requirement for entry into the discourse of mortgage and
property ownership is not providing a functional enclosure, but the structuring of
an individuated claim to property ownership itself. In this regard, it is not the
house that the core establishes, instead it establishes the individual as a legal
entity. The core of the core house is the positing of the inhabitant as an individual
even before there is an enclosure to house him.2'
214 For a discussion of Banham's "standard-of-living package" see, Nigel Whiteley, Reyner
Banham: Historian of the Immediate Future (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), p.
209.
215 We use the pronoun here purposefully. For the individuated claim to property is indeed
based on the asymmetric entry of women in the development process. We will return to
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This reversal, if you will, betrays the critical difference between the location of
architecture in projects of socio-economic reform in "developed" and
"underdeveloped" contexts. The eighth CLAM conference in Hoddesdon in 1951,
the second after the war, was organized under the title, The Heart of the City. Here
the term "core" was deployed by Giedion and Sert, among others, to describe the
depleting urban centers of Western cities. Sert, in his opening speech at the
conference, described decentralization as a "social disease" threatening the heart of
the city, its core, and the "health" of the civic culture it represented: "An essential
feature of any true organism is the physical heart or nucleus, that we here call the
Core."216 We were reminded that "[t]he organized community meeting places could
establish a frame where a new civic life and a healthy civic spirit could develop."2 17
Reflecting Cold War anxieties about the future of capitalism, this social disease of
decentralization threatening the civic spirit of the modern city was seen to be
driven by selfish individualism and unrestrained market capitalism. In this respect,
CLAM members shared with prominent American theorists of the New Deal the
belief that the unhindered pursuit of individual interests in an unregulated market
economy resulted in social self-destruction.
Our analytical surveys show the decay and blight of central areas and the
disintegration of what was once the heart of the old cities, their Core...As life has
been leaving the old Cores, business and commercial areas have developed
spontaneously along the new roads and new main streets. These streets soon
this point towards the end of the chapter. For the moment, we'll focus on the terms of
individuation being laid out in the core house.
216 See J. Tyrwhitt, J.L. Sert, and E.N. Rogers, eds., The Heart of the City: Towards the
Humanisation of Urban Life (London: Lund Humphries, 1952), p. 6.
217 Ibid.
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become congested and decay in their turn as blight continues to spread form the
centre outwards. This process of constant and unchecked decentralization and
land speculation is a real menace to all our cities and to the stability of civic
values. It only works in the interests of a few against those of the citizenry in
general. It brings in its trail municipal bankruptcy, and it must be stopped.21
To counter the process of decentralization, Core was a proposal of
recentralization:
To put an end to this unplanned decentralization process we must reverse the
trend, establishing what we many call a process of recentralisation. This
recentralisation process demands the creation of new Cores that will replace the
old ones that the unplanned growth has destroyed"
Keeping in tune with New Deal sensibilities, all speeches at the conference
consistently argued that the only means for social reform is public financing
and centralized government control:
such civic centers would consolidate governments; for the lack of them and the
dependence of the people on controlled means of information makes them more
easily governable by the rule of the few. The creation of these centers is a
government job (federal, state or municipal). These elements cannot be
established on a business basis. They are necessary for the city as a whole and
even for the nation, and they should be publicly financed.2
The idea of "organized growth" therefore translated into a publicly financed
remodeling of the urban fabric into a consistent and unified expression:
All the elements that commercial and business centers have banned from the city
in their ruthless urge for speculation should be reinstated in these centres of
218 Ibid., p. 4.
219 Ibid. p. 4.
220 Ibid., p. 11.
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community life. Harmony in such places is only possible when all parts are subject
to a whole, and we should now recognize that nobody really benefits from
individualism carried to extremes. Our shopping centres today are the expression
of competitive individual business, and no architectural solution can be found for
a whole district unless certain overall rules are imposed. If free competition is to
exist in these centres, it will have to be subjected to a unified architectural frame...
These pronouncements on the need for public financing and centralized planning,
took their cue from the massive public investments being made in the form of the
Marshall Plan in Europe and the continuing New Deal and the emerging Urban
Renewal projects in the United States. From its beginning in 1947 till 1951, the
Marshall Plan had invested some thirteen billion dollars into the European
economies, a figure that would rise to seventeen billion by 1953. CLAM's proposal
to revitalize urban "cores" was, in this context, a project of changing the direction
of existing urban planning projects away from decentralization - a direction
emerging from postwar fears regarding the vurnerablity of urban centers to aerial
bombing. As such they were projects that presumed the presence of an established
modern welfare state. In all of these proposals, the emphasis was on re-vitalizing
civic values in decline with decentralization. The armature of the welfare state had
also surrounded Sert's and Giedion's polemic of urban centers as a new form of
2 Ibid. p. 11. In a similar spirit, Paul Weiner-Sert's associate and partner in various Latin
American projects-would also claim that "[there is an ever-increasing trend toward
effortless consumer satisfaction and passive spectator pastimes and amusements....we will
be wise to prove facilities for greater and more numerous common meeting places, based
on more and more leisure and upon a greater freedom from want. It is reasonable to
anticipate planned land use of common ownership. Perhaps in the new chemical-atomic
age the needs of men can for the first time be provided for in orderly fashion. The new
sources of power will meet man's physical need and he will learn slowly to live without
the age-old economic struggle and thereby discover his better self, his superior spiritual
and moral qualities. The civic core should be the expression of this 'collective better self;
it should reflect the general forces and condition which I have defined as partly
technological, biological, and ideological." Ibid. p.85.
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modern monuments that replaced the classical idea of monumental form.2 2 2 The
imagined client of these projects was already a citizen.
Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposals for core housing are presented as
proposals of originating development, not of calibrating the profile of an existing
socioeconomic system. The problem facing Abrams and Koenigsberger was not
one of creating room for strengthening civic values, but of implanting the seeds of
civil society. The most critical difference between CIAM's urban core and Abrams
and Koenigsberger's development core house, is not of scale, but the manner in
which the citizen of the European city and the inhabitant of the core house are
inscribed into the surrounding socio-economic context. It is in addressing the
222 The theme of designing "civic centers" had been raised before the war in the fourth and
fifth congresses, in 1933 in Athens and in 1937 in Paris, respectively. But it was Jose Louis
Sert, who first raised the idea of urban redevelopment and social reform in the United
States in his first book, Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis,
Their Solutions, published soon after his arrival in America in 1942 by Harvard University
Press. The book, however, was part of a joint effort to promote CIAM's urbanistic agenda
in the US. The urban polemic was restated a year later in 1943 when Sert published a
short manifesto on urban planning with artist Fernand L6ger, and historian Sigfried
Giedeon called, The Nine points on Monumentality. Here, the authors argued that the
centers of civic and communal life constituted the new democratic monuments of
modernization that replaced the classical emphasis on monumental form. Incorporating
this new role, modern architecture would evolve beyond orthodox functionality that it
embraced to break from the neo-classicism of the 19* century. As Joan Ockman has
noted, even though The Nine Points remained unpublished till it was included by Giedion
some fifteen years later in his Architecture, You and Me: The Diary of a Development, the
individual articles by the three authors relating to the same argument appeared in different
places. Giedion and Sert published "The Need for a New Monumentality," and "The
Human Scale in City Planning," respectively, in Paul Zucker's 1944 collection of essays,
New Architecture and City Planning. For a prehistory of Jose Louis Sert, Fernand L6ger,
and Sigfried Giedion's The Nine points on Monumentality, dealing particularly with Sert's
initial years in the United States and his involvement with 6migr6 artists, see Joan
Ockman, "The War Years in America: New York, New Monumentality," in Guido Hartray
and Xavier Costa, eds., Sert: Arquitecto en Nueva York (Barcelona: Museu d'Art
Contemporani de Barcelona, ACTAR, 1997), pp. 22-45. L6ger's version of the argument
was published after the war under the title, "Modern Architecture and Color," in a volume
by the informal association of 6migr6 artists in the US, The American Abstract Artists(AAA).
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problem of originating development that the core housing proposal stressed
locating the inhabitant at the threshold between tradition and modernity.
3.2 Circularity of Origin:
We see great emphasis being given to positioning the development subject at the
threshold of the project of modernization in Abrams and Koenigsberger's first joint
mission to the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1954.223 For Abrams and Koenigsberger the
primary factor driving the Gold Coast's housing crisis was the presence of
"unmarketable," i.e. non-individualized, titles. "For a country with land that cannot
be used," declared the two experts,
is as poor as a country without land; the landed wealth of a country is indeed
measured by the quantity of land used or that can be brought into use. The
existence of unmarketable titles has been holding back considerable land
development and the development of mortgage financing mechanisms. It has been
causing...prolonged and costly litigations and keeping land from being brought
into use. Failure to remove the obstacles to land use has been impeding the
operation of the building and loan programme, aggravating housing shortage, and
223 Keonigsberger was already in the Gold Coast advising on the planning of the Volta
River Dam project when Abrams joined him there in late 1954. The third member of the
mission was Vladimir Bodiansky, CIAM member and planner with the French protectorate
in Morocco who had designed the now well known housing for the "Arab population"
with Michel Ecochard, also a CIAM member and the Director of Planning in Morocco.
Bodiansky's role in the mission report for the Gold Coast, however, is limited. While
Abrams and Koenigsberger outlined the proposal for core housing and land reform,
Bodiansky advised on setting up a Center of Design in Accra that was to hold competition
for core houses and carry out building material research. In discussing core and land
reform aspect of the report, therefore, we will refer to only Abrams and Koenigsberger as
the primary authors of the mission report. Bodiansky had recently published report
emphasizing the importance of including in architectural curriculums the design of social
project such as mass-housing. See Vladimir Bodiansky, Charte de l'habitat du Cercle
d'etudes architecturales (Paris: C.E.A. 1955); Bodiansky and Ecochard's Moroccan housing
projects had also recently received immense exposure in architectural press. See, "Habitat
pour le plus grand nombre: un exemple-type, l'habitat au Maroc," insert in LArchitecture
d'aujourd'hui (December 1953): 50-51.
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inducing sporadic development of sites. It has also been affecting rural property
adversely.
This mission report is one of the first proposals that relates individualized
ownership in housing as a precondition for development, making it one of the
primary sites of establishing the individual as a legal economic category in
development. Yet it is important to note that in the above statement the existing
socio-economic structure of relations is defined as a negation-a lack and a
hindrance-of the system of marketable tenure and individualized ownership. Had
it not been for the lingering effects of existing hindrances, the authors argue, it
would have been the individual, the modern figure of legal ownership, who
would be the natural face of the development subject. This text of negation
proliferates throughout the report, implying in every instance that if all existing
hindrances were removed, marketable tenure would have existed as a self-
sustaining system of "voluntary negotiation and acquisition":
The uncertainties of tenure are accelerating the housing shortage... By removing
large areas of land from the possibility of purchase, the supply of available land for
housing is being narrowed. Not only are the opportunities for development and
occupancy withheld from the people but the pressure for public intervention and
acquisition is being entrenched when much of it might be the subject of voluntary
negotiation and acquisition [emphasis added].2 "
In these statements, marketable tenure arrangements are presented as an
unrealized quality of the traditional social realm. The absence of a marketable
tenure structure, thus, indicates not the absence but the presence of an originary
224 Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 16.
225 Ibid. p. 65.
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demand. Only this demand is prevented from being turned into an effective
economic demand because of a stunted economic supply.
This emphasis on the presence of a pending demand in the traditional social
context betrays a desire to break an inherent circularity in the argument. It is
asserted that the supply of land is based on an economic demand, but that there
can be no demand without the realization of supply. In other words, we are told
that when land is made available, individual owners will emerge and finance it
because there is unrealized demand for it.
The circularity of this logic, and the attempt to break it, emerges from a
shortcoming in the Third World socio-economic structure which was commonly
presumed in the development literature of the time: the absence of existing large-
scale consumer markets for industrial production in most Third World countries.
Due to this limitation, demand is not given the primacy that it holds in Keynesian
economics as the engine of economic growth in a market economy. It must be
remembered that this emphasis on supply precedes the rise of "supply-side"
economics in the 1970s, which is commonly attributed to Robert Mundell.226 In the
development context of the 1950s, the emphasis on supply is underpinned not by
the need to establish production (as opposed to demand in the Keynesian models)
as the primary variable of a capitalist economy. Rather, the emphasis on supply in
the early development context speaks to a different agenda: solving the problem
of inaugurating broad national industrial production in the absence of consumer
demand.
226 See Robert A. Mundell, Man and Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
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The curious status of demand in an argument giving primacy to supply that we see
in Abrams and Koenigsberger's statements points to the circular relationship
between demand and supply that haunts the scenarios of inaugurating
development. Theories of capital investments in industry (architecture, equipment,
machinery, labor costs) assume the presence of consumer markets, just as the
building of consumer markets requires the presence of capital investments. This
chicken and the egg paradox hinges on an economic axiom: there is no supply
without demand and vice versa.
Why is this assumption necessary in the development arena? The circular
relationship between demand and supply takes on critical importance when
attempting to solve two important elements of the development puzzle: identifying
the mechanism of self-aggregating growth and establishing the presence of the
social welfare effects of that growth. After all, if modern industrial production took
root as development advocates desired, the question of why the industrialists
would pass on their profits for social welfare is left unanswered?
All prominent development theories argued that if all current production shifted to
modern industrial methods and began production on a large enough scale, it
would set up mutually cumulative benefits for all industries. Any industry
producing on a substantial scale would generate demand for more industries to
furnish its supply requirements, creating a cycle in which the resulting social
welfare would outweigh private benefits.
This scenario of the large scale, self-reinforcing, socially beneficial aggregate
effects of modern industrial production acquired the name of the Big Push. The
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Big Push model demanded the presence of circular causalities in market behavior.
Leading development economists such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, J. M. Fleming,
and Albert Hirschman particularly argued that after a point of minimum working
scale of economies, the division of labor was limited only by the extent of the
market, and in turn the extent of the market was in turn determined by the
division of labor.
This circular relationship between demand and supply stressed by Big Push
theorists, however, assumes the very thing they want to answer: the process
though which the required scale of production is reached. The problem of
originating development is bound by a series of economic limitations and
paradoxes: It is necessary for modern industry to operate on a large scale in a
development context, not only to have cumulative social benefits, but also to be
profitable. Modern industrial production requires more capital investment than
existing traditional production methods. Consequently, it requires a bigger market
to cover these additional investments and costs. A modern industry cannot
produce commodities for the existing market and be competitive with existing
methods of production. Production on a bigger scale is needed to match even the
price of existing production, and on an even larger scale to produce at a lesser
price.
Herein lies another paradox: given the burden of added costs and scale, an
industry based on modern production methods cannot offer labor more wages
than current production methods allow and begin production. But, if it doesn't
offer labor competitive wages, it cannot attract labor from existing production
processes to begin production. For modem industrial production to begin, take
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hold and achieve a necessary minimum profitable scale, the industry must
somehow be able to realize a contradictory scenario: it must offer labor lower or
equal wages compared to existing methods of production to compete and yet
continue to attract labor to grow.
This in turn lays out a contradictory profile of labor: the labor force must move
toward new industrial production methods only as if motivated by the
quintessential modern characteristics of personal interest and search for better
wage opportunities, the fundamental trait of Homo economicus, and yet upon
reaching the destination, not want these benefits.
It was Arthur Lewis' paper, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of
Labor," (1954) that provided the most convincing way out of the paradox of
originating development. 227 As evident in the title, Lewis' answer was to assume
infinite "under-employment" in the rural production which would enable modern
industry to draw labor out of the "traditional sectors" without added costs. Lewis
was not the first to assume the presence of idle labor in the rural arena. This
assumption is also present in Paul Rosenstein-Rodan's paper (1943)."" Lewis was,
however, the first to model this assumption as a plausible economic proposal. For
227 Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," in The
Manchester School 22 (1954): 129-144.
228 P. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe." Economic Journal 53 (1943): 202-211.
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this reason, Lewis' paper is often regarded as one of the most influential papers in
development economics."'
The cumulative development Big Push models rely crucially on the assumption of
an infinite supply of labor. This assumption also formed the basis of prominent
theories of economic geography. The very idea of a "regional growth" is based on
the assumption that labor supply to any individual region can be elastic, i.e. can
sustain itself increasing costs, because more labor can always come from
somewhere else, enabling self-aggregating regional growth when a certain
production scale is reached. This assumption persists in Walter Isard's magnum
opus, Location and Space-Economy, inherited from Von Thinen's early analyses of
land rent and land use in the latter's Isolated State.30 It resurfaces in Alan Pred's
work in the 1960s as well.
This assumption is usually explained, indeed explained away, as the lack of the
availability of technical tools to model the complex "realities" of the market. As
Paul Krugman has argued, economists since Ricardo had always used abstractions
229 For Paul Krugman, Lewis' paper represents "[p]robably the most famous paper in all of
development economic..." See Paul Krugman, Development, Geography and Economic
Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 18.
230 The cumulative development Big Push models mentioned earlier rely crucially on the
assumption of an infinite supply of labor. This assumption also formed the basis of
prominent theories of economic geography. The very idea of a "regional growth" is based
on the assumption that labor supply to any individual region can be elastic, i.e. can
continue without increasing costs, because it can always come from somewhere else,
enabling self-aggregating regional growth when a certain production scale is reached. This
assumption persists in Walter Isard's magnum opus, Location and Space-Economy,
inherited from Von Thinen's early analyses of land rent and land use in the latter's
Isolated State. The same can also be seen in Losch's The Economics ofLocation, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. It resurfaces in Alan Pred's work in the 1960s as well.
181
to explain complex phenomena.2 3 1 The economic world is modeled as if based on
"perfect competition," the supposition that all firms have access to equal
information and resources, and do not use their strategic position to influence
pricing and stifle competition. Similarly, production is represented as if based on
"constant returns," the supposition that increasing input by a certain amount also
increases output by the same amount. Perfect competition and constant returns are
seen to be tied together. Its typical milieu is agriculture production where the price
of any crop is seen to be fixed. 3 ' Farmers do not have the power to influence the
price of wheat and only receive profit by increasing production. In this setting, any
attempt to artificially increase profits cannot be sustained and is corrected by the
market competition.
The classical and neo-classical development economists knew very well, Krugman
tells us, that the real world operates according to imperfect competition and
increasing or decreasing returns with investment. 3 Firms compete, set prices, and
stifle competition and opportunities. Greater production lowers the price of
production and opens opportunities for monopoly and control of the market. Yet
the use of a perfect competition and constant returns model is not seen as too
severe a "judgment and compromise" to the "real" world where firms operated
according to imperfect competition and increasing returns." These abstractions,
despite their reductionism, produce "rich insights," however limited, into the
231 Paul Krugman, Development, Geography and Economic Theory, op cit. p. 79.
232 Ibid. p. 76.
233 Ibid., p. 79-81.
234 Ibid., 69.
182
"complexity of reality."23 1 We may ask then, what allows the reductions to not be
seen as an intolerable compromise with the way the "the vastly more complex real
system behaves"?23
These compromises were tolerable, we would argue, because in the context of the
developed world, it was possible to assume that modern industrial production and
market structure exists and operates according to imperfect competition and
increasing returns. In as much as neo-classical economists avoided the question of
imperfect competition and couldn't explain the working of the market, it was seen
as the limitation of the model, not "reality." In the development arena this
assumption is moot. The development intervention is based on the assumption of
the absence of the market. The limited scope of the model is not seen as a result
of its inherent reductionism, but of the limitations of the development context
itself. In the development theater, economic modeling is called upon to construct
that which it assumes is well established in the developed world: a working
market. Here, economic analyses must also simultaneously be a policy
prescription. With this switch, the "judgment" of the model is displaced on a
different register. The model is no longer a logical abstraction but a historical
explanation. The economic models shed their claim to reductionism and take on
historical and geographical specificity. What development economists offer are not
just economic models, but also policy prescriptions tied to historical presumptions.
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235 Ibid., 79.
236 Ibid. 71.
Abrams and Koenigsberger's framing of the individual as an indeterminate
transitory subject caught between tradition and modernity speaks to these
dilemmas of originating and continuing development. Their delineation of the
individual as a subject of the development that occupies the space between the
modern and pre-modern satisfies the contradictory requirements of the analyses of
originating development. Let us now look at this relationship more closely.
It must be noted that the development subject in Abrams and Koenigsberger's
framing is, to borrow a phrase from Gayatri Spivak, not-yet an individual, only its
negated possibility. Moreover, this not-yet-individual is also a no-longer-traditional
being.23 ' The indeterminate status of the development subject as an individual is
paralleled by her equally indeterminate status as a traditional subject. "[Tihe old
mores are being challenged at many points," Abrams and Keonigsberger tell us,
The biological family replaces the tribe as the new social unit and individuation
supplants the communal group. The ways of the West are being exposed to the
hinterlander pressures to abandon older values manifest themselves; imports of
consumer goods between 1938 and 1950 show the pressures of new demands -
cigarette imports have trebled, wireless sets have gone up more than six fold and
vast increases have occurred in the imports of bicycles, beer, boots and
confections; dress, styles, modes of life, marriage, family customs and folkways are
all in transition affecting housing needs, room sizes, housing design and materials.
Pressure for the new sometimes tends to obscure some important values inherent
in the old. Devices such as prefabrication which have not proven themselves even
in the more developed countries assume a lure beyond the value; the thatched
roof and concrete slab. Social pressure is converted into political pressure
237 Spivak uses the term, "not-yet-no-longer," to describe the peculiar status of woman's
body as a site of productive labor in work of the writer, Mahasweta Devi. See Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, "Woman in Difference," in Outside in the Teaching Machine, op cit.,
pp. 77-95.
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sometimes subordinating need to demand and wisdom to haste [emphasis
added]."
Within the opposition set between tradition and modernity, the old and new, the
development subject appears to be irresolutely located somewhere between the
forces of individuation and the values of the hinterlander. It would not be
incorrect to call this irresolution a certain sense of aporia - the impossibility to
occupy or leave either the old or the new - that is projected onto the development
subject. While the "pressures to abandoned older values manifest themselves,"
they leave traces that disrupt (with demand for whimsical consumer goods), the
building of meaningful demand for industrial production. This is not the individual
responsiveness that Abrams and Koenigsberger seem to have in mind as the
desired vehicle for industrial growth. The absence of corrective social pressures
and norms, we are told, leads to the building up of rudderless individual demands
that counter, rather than strengthen, social goals.
It is this sense of aporia that we see being stressed repeatedly in the Abrams and
Koenigsberger description of the clash between tradition and modernity:
In the process of growth and change, old and new are highlighted, brought into
contrast and often into conflict. There are contrasts or conflicts between the rural
and tribal ways and the urban ways of life; between barter or trade-in-kind and
money; between human co-operation in meeting life's trials and the more
bureaucratic routines and specialization of function that come with
industrialization; between the social customs of the West and of the Old World;
between the British legal system and the customary law; between the old ethic
and the new; between Christianity and fetish; between chief and Government.
238 Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 4.
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By describing changes induced by development in opposition to a preexisting
"old," "customary," and "tribal" state of things, Abrams and Koenigsberger indeed
dehistoricize the long colonial construction of "customary" and "tribal" laws as a
strategy of indirect rule. In Africa in particular, British colonial government gave, in
the name of preserving existing customary law, native chiefs immense powers to
use brute force as a way to indirectly govern the native populations.23 9 Yet we
cannot limit our reading to the current of naturalization running through the text
alone. How are the dehistoricised notions of tradition and modernity employed in
the development discourse? What particular ends do they serve and what means
do they satisfy in constructing the philosophical and logical basis for economic
development? The summation of the African migrant's account under the
dehistoriced banners of tradition and modernity supports the framing of the
aporetic shuttling of the development subject between them.
This indeterminate, aporetic status of the development subject, not-yet-individual-
no-longer-traditional, is summed up repeatedly, as it was done above, under the
umbrella term, transition. The Gold Coast report begins with the heading, "The
Gold Coast: A Country in Transition," and continues to outline the various facets of
this transitory terrain: social, economic, and political. The clash between the old
and the new results from the rapid pace of historical change being experienced by
the Third World; something that was not seen in the Anglo-American context. For
there, we are told, the speed and scale of transition was gradual:
239 For a detail account of British colonial strategies of governance in Africa, see Mahmood
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, op. cit.
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In countries such as England and the United States which have experienced these
transitions gradually and sequentially, time has afforded opportunity for
experimentation and adjustment. Safeguards have been built against abuses by the
private power on the public and the public on the private. In the Gold Coast, the
transitions have come almost at once.240
On the one hand, the framing of the Third World subject as a sphere in a
conflicting transition, caught in the aporia of choosing between tradition and
modernity is held up as an alibi for a deteriorating traditional social structure that
needs preservation:
The co-operative nature of operations and the community spirit which some of the
more developed countries are trying hard to recapture still exists in many aspects
of tribal life and the production of housing can be facilitated by utilizing existing
practices and devices. In fact, one of the attainable frontiers would seem to be the
grafting of the co-operative aspects of tribal and village life onto the more
developed patterns without disrupting existing values as occurred in countries
which experienced economic and social upheaval more and over a longer
period.
On the other hand, it was precisely this grafting of the "more developed patterns"
on "village life" that was seen as the reason behind the formation of misdirected
demands. Thus, as a transitory sphere, the Third World is described as charting a
movement of both deteriorating social and improving economic and personal
conditions.
These contradictions in the notion of transition emerge from the need to map
historic change in terms that are consistent with the logic of development. The
idea of the individual as a client of development validates the fiction of a self-
240 Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 4.
241 Ibid. p. 6.
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conscious, independent subject responsible for self-perpetuating development. The
notion of deteriorating social conditions allows seeing the absence of welfare
effects of industrialization as a result of the move away from a traditional social
structure, rather than the result of moves towards industrialization. Tradition,
idealized as a basis for social welfare, serves to separate the push for
industrialization from the problem of providing a welfare structure and constituting
a middle class, the primary hindrance in the logic of development through
industrialization.
It is this transitory subject that Abrams and Koenigsberger would hold up as an
alibi in recommending "slum conservation" by using the core housing approach in
Lagos in neighboring Nigeria. 4 ' The British and Nigerian officials manning the
Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), which included the city's public
works department, focused on replacing illegal settlements with planned housing
as their primary development approach. This costly program required interim
settlements while new housing was constructed. Due to the lack of funds and the
slow pace of the projects these settlements, such as the Sure-Lere scheme
constructed at the outskirts of the city, acquired permanent character while what
Abrams and Koenigsberger called the new "crops of entrepreneurs" dealing in
illegal property moved into the vacated lots.
Countering the slum clearance approach, Abrams and Keonigsberger,
accompanied in Nigeria by the Japanese traffic planner, Susumu Kobe, proposed
2 Otto Koenigsberger, Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe, Moshe Shapiro, and Michael
Wheeler, Metropolitan Lagos, a report submitted to the Ministry of Lagos Affairs (New
York: United Nations, 1962).
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providing minimum services into existing settlement and giving them legal status,
an argument that would later be adopted by architects turned squatter advocates
such as John Turner. Yet as the project unfolded, these core "services" proved to
be just as unforthcoming as the housing schemes they were supposed to replace
and only extended the scope of government control on existing settlements
through taxation, loan, and tenure allocation policies that favored the interests of
newer "crops of entrepreneurs."24 3
The core approach, however, did something more. As opposed to the previous
government strategy of development, in Abrams and Koenigsberger's conservation
proposal, these displacements could now be absorbed under the logic of
transition to development. "It may have to be conceded that in the formative years
of the industrialization," asserted the experts, "the slum will be the inevitable by-
product of urban development, like the abdominal distortion that precedes birth
and growth. The trouble has been that reformers have always called the swelling a
cancer to be excised wherever it appears."244
With core, the costs of development are deferred while its inevitability is
naturalized and assured. This framing of squatter settlements as a necessary, and
necessarily painful, step in the Third World's birth into the modern world works to
advance a two-fold agenda. On the one hand, it helps secure the inhabitants'
consent as unified participants in the development process. On the other, it
243 This State control is assured in the conservation process. We are reminded that all
conservation efforts are tentative and temporary and may shift under future development
policies: "At some future time... when the housing shortage in Lagos has been eased, slum
clearance may be resumed." Abrams, Man's Strugglefor Shelter, op cit., p. 125.
244 Ibid., p. 125.
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reasserts the presence of insolvable traditional communal structures that can
absorb the pain of modernization:
The combination of isolation, higher expenses, and lower incomes has threatened
an established way of life and livelihood for many. Not only do the...occupants [of
the new housing schemes] see less of their relatives, but the quality of the
relationships has changed. In central Lagos, even though the communal family
houses were gradually being broken up, the unity of the extended family had
survived in day-to-day visits, in regular meetings, and in the mutual-help
characteristic of these people. But the families in [new housing] have been finding
it less and less easy to maintain these visits or to discharge their obligation. Forced
into a self-sufficiency alien to their traditions and harassed by the demands on
their overstretched resources, once-unified households have been shattered
[emphasis added].2"
The "communal family house" is made to stands in place of the missing modern
social welfare structure. This positioning constructs a collective profile of slum
dwellers as development subjects caught between the poles of tradition and
modernity. On the one hand, they are participants in the modernization process:
their communal family houses are in the city. On the other, they require the
traditional social set up (evident in the description of the inhabitants as people
with an "established way of life" who are being "forced" into "self-sufficiency").
The self-help process is then presented as a balancing act that allows the two
conflicting yet simultaneous dimensions of tradition and modernity to find a
tentative resolution. This is evident in the description of the social setup of the
existing settlement in the language of the self-help discourse ("...and in the
mutual-help characteristic of these people"). Core housing, as a modification of
this exiting dialectic, is presented as a tool that can maintain this transitory
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resolution and defer the question of the economic and welfare costs of
development.
Inherent in the notion of transition as a conflicting process is the contradictory
claim that development is necessary but the welfare costs of development are to
be provided by the very "traditional" socio-economic structures it constructs as
replaceable. The logic of development demands that this contradiction never be
resolved, that the tradition should always be held up to absorb the cost of welfare
whereas the existence of the individual is positioned to pursue market oriented
reform. These dualities are, therefore, projected as the inability of the development
subject herself to find a place within the clash of modernity and tradition. The
dialectic of tradition and modernity is presented as a reflection of the irresolvable
dynamics of change in the Third World, rather than as a testimony to the aporia
built in the logic of development itself: to keep the subject of development
involved in market-driven production but outside the socialized growth of
consumerism and its attendant capital expenditure.2 46 Without the aporia of
negotiating the demands of tradition and modernity projected onto the
development subject, the logic of development cannot hold.
3.3 House Without a Plan:
One of the most striking differences between core and the earlier self-help
schemes at the level of the individual house is what can be described as core's
246 This careful positioning of the modern and traditional dimensions of development
subject under the umbrella of core points us to an important dimension of the critiques of
development. The status of terms such as "tradition" and "native culture," must be
interpreted in terms of the differential they set up with their supposed terms of
opposition. If the critiques of the framing of tradition in development are limited to
accusation of naturalization and dehistorisization, they end up reproducing the very
differential that drives the development logic.
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erasure of the plan. A core house doesn't have a plan, only a plinth and a roof
(FIG. 12)."4 The plan is left to be filled in by the inhabitant over time. This de-
emphasis, if you will, stands in contrast to the host of government sponsored self-
help schemes and "finished" housing projects designed by famous modern
architects for various Third World governments.
A critical example of earlier self-help projects revolving around the centrality of
form is the development projects of Hassan Fathy and Constantine Doxiadis. As
Panayiota Pyla has shown, both Fathy and Doxiadis sought to build a vocabulary
of vernacular forms as a basis for mass housing.248 For both Doxiadis and Fathy,
"traditional forms" represented a storehouse of not only dormant social values and
psychological preferences, but also principles of climatic design and efficient
building techniques sedimented over generations through countless experiments,
accidents, and errors.24 ' The architects asserted that traditional building forms could
provide guidance to modern building techniques and disclose principles of
efficient organization as well as psychological wellbeing of the inhabitants.
Though Fathy's famous New Gourna project in Upper Egypt near Luxor (1945 to
1948) was not met with enthusiasm by it users, it was a project that launched a
thousand papers in the Western architectural literature (FIG. 15). The inhabitants
often associated the domes, vaults, and courtyards re-fabricated by Fathy from
24' This can be seen in the much repeated image of core housing in Ghana that we saw in
the beginning.
248 Panayiota I. Pyla, Ekistics, Architecture and Environmental Politics, 1945-1976: A
Prehistory of Sustainable Development, PhD Dissertation, MIT, 2002.
See Hassan Fathy, Architecturefor the Poor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1973).
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distant references with mausoleums and tombs."' The architects and critics,
however, saw the design as an experiment in combining "economic efficiency,"
"aesthetic fulfillment," and "psychological satisfaction" embedded in the
"traditional" forms.251
When Fathy joined Doxiadis Associates for the Greater Mussayib housing project
(for 3000 to 5000 households) in Iraq in 1957, he carried out extensive studies of
vernacular building practices to the point of inviting criticism from Doxiadis for
emphasizing tectonic details over mass production and standardization techniques
demanded by the scale of the project. Both Fathy and Doxiadis, however, held the
view that vernacular forms provided the opportunity to give universal principles of
science and humanism local characteristics and vice versa. 52
In both projects for Iraq and Pakistan, we see extensive studies of how "traditional
empirical solutions," such as the bagdir (wind-catcher), loggias and courtyards
responded to sun movements and prevailing winds to control temperature and
created spaces suitable for use at different times of the day. These analyses,
together with studies of brick-making techniques, laying patterns, and vernacular
building equipment, were then weighted to formulate a vocabulary of design that
250 Fekri Hassan, and Christine Plimpton, "New Gourna: Vernacular Remodeling of
Architectural Space," Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Papers Series XVI 49-
77 (1989): 50-77. Qouoted by Pyla, op cit., p. 92.
251 Fathy, Architecturefor the Poor, op cit; also see, Raymond Mortimer, "A Model Village
in Upper Egypt," in Architectural Review (September 1947): 97-99.
252 Hassan Fathy, "Report on Egyptian Village Housing, Building Materials, and Methods of
Construction to Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State"
(Cambridge MA: Arthur Little,1952); Doxiadis Associates, "A Regional Development
Program for Greater Mussayib, Iraq, 1958," Ekistics 5:33 (October 1958): 149-186. Quoted
in Pyla, op cit., p.95, 98.
193
could reproduce local climatological, aesthetic, social, and cultural requirements
on a mass basis.2'
What results from this approach is the coding of plan, elevation, and section as a
complex socio-economic and aesthetico-technological calculus. Each
arrangement-the location of family rooms and bedrooms around the courtyard,
the location of guest rooms next to the entrance, loggias on the leeway side of the
prevailing wind, the location of domes, vaults, and wind catchers-generated
tables and charts of psychological, economic, and technological efficiencies. The
organization of household activity around the central courtyard was a matter not
only of natural illumination and ventilation to different spaces, but also allocation
of serenity and privacy to reduce psychological stress."5 4
This centrality of form-form as the mediator of social, economic, and scientific
forces-betrayed in the importance laid on the careful articulation of section, plan,
and elevation-is absent in the core house. In the core house, the arrangement of
walls is left to the discretion of the inhabitant. The possibilities of plan are only
limited by external limitations such as height restriction, layout of the foundations,
and party walls. The interior is emptied out of all design requirements. All
administration and development prescriptions end at the envelope of site. Abrams
2" Fathy, Architecture of the Poor, op cit; Also see, James Steele, An Architecturefor the
People: Tile Complete Works of Hassan Fathy (Cairo: The American University in Cairo
Press, 1997); James Steele, Hassan Fathy, Architectural Monographs 13 (London: St.
Marton's Press, 1988).
For instance, Fathy adopted the idea of courtyard as "temperature regulator," from
Daniel Dunham, a researcher at the Department of Tropical Architecture at the
Architectural Association, London in the early 1960. A summary of Durnham's article also
appeared in Ekistics (September 1, 1961). Daniel Dunham, article, "The Courtyard House
as a Temperature Regulator," appeared in the The New Scientist in 1960 (Sept 8, 1960):
663-666.
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and Koenigsberger stressed this differentiation during their mission to the Gold
Coast. As part of their broad proposal that combined land reform (on which we
say more later), legislative changes, and financial restructuring, they proposed core
housing to be the primary government sponsored form of housing. As we saw
earlier, the photographs of the project depict a core house without a "core" in the
traditional Western neo-traditionalist sense. Though these particular houses were
later "filled in" through standard designs on a self-help basis, they were to serve as
a model of future core intervention in Bolivia, Nigeria, and Kenya in which the
provision of governmental loans was limited to the construction of the plinth and
the roof and, in some cases, windows and doors.2
This shift can be, and had been, explained as an economic response to the
impossibility of funding a large number of finished houses on the model of early
housing schemes. Yet that shift cannot occur without a shift in the idea of the
development subject and the architectural object. The emptying out of the interior
of the core house represents a shift in the framing of the role of the Third World
subject in the development enterprise. The core house is proposed to
acknowledge the necessity of recognizing the agency of the inhabitant.
255 See, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, prepared for the government of the Gold
Coast by Charles Abrams, Vladimir Bodiansky, Otto H.G. Koenigsberger (New
York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1956); Report on Housing
Financing in Bolivia, prepared for the government of Bolivia by Charles Abrams (New
York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1959); Metropolitan Lagos:
Report Prepared for the Government of Nigeria under the United Nations Programme of
Technical Assistance (New York: United Nations, Commissioner for Technical Assistance,
Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, 1964); United Nations Mission to Kenya on Housing,
prepared for the Government of Kenya by Lawrence N. Bloomberg and Charles Abrams
(Nairobi: United Nations, Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Dept. of Economic and
Social Affairs, 1965).
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The focus on the agency of the development subject contrasts with the previous
approaches that bound design and development. In both Fathy and Doxiadis'
design proposals the interior was seen as a micro-cosmos of the larger socio-
psychological terrain. The house was seen as the direct means of producing the
worker, having a socializing function related to, yet outside, the economic
complex. In this continuist narrative, the intersection of tradition and modernity so
celebrated by the designers, nevertheless emphasized their separation. In this
dialectic, tradition is framed as a natural and static sphere, while the inhabitant, its
naturalized subject, ahistorical and unchanging. The extraction of modern scientific
principles from traditional forms was described as the responsibility of the
designer. It was important that to the inhabitant the house still appeared
"traditional."
The emphasis on transition we observed earlier serves to assign historical agency
to the development subject. As a subject in transition, the Third World subject is
no longer unified with the traditional realm and the traditional object, the rural
house. With the migrant's journey to the city, the house and the inhabitant are
separated. As the future inhabitant of the core house, s/he has the ability to
transform the object through conscious intervention guaging the economic and
material resources of the new urban context.
"The Gold Coast," stressed Abrams and Koenigsberger
is undergoing a period of social and economic transition which makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to set standards of minimum housing
requirements that would be uniformly applicable or which would survive the
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impacts of migration and other economic developments now unforeseen but
inevitable [emphasis added].25
The shift to the envelope of the house makes itself apparent most strongly in the
climatological calculations for core houses. In this arena, it is Koenigsberger, rather
than Abrams who has the disciplinary authority. Koenigsberger's climatological
calculations are not concerned with the architectural object, and therefore not
focused on the manifestation of climatic calculations in the plan. For
Koenigsberger, the architecture's connection to industrialization, and to socio-
economic development in general, was cut off at the roof. In his famous book,
Roofs in the Warm and Humid Climates, Koenigsberger argued that while cultural
and climatic demands, and economic conditions in the west instituted the wall as
the primary element of the house, in the context of the temperate, dry, and arid
climate and limited capital resources of the Third World, it would be the roof that
would have to serve as the engine of socio-economic transformation through
housing.17 This point is also stressed in the UNManual on Low Cost Housing he
prepared in collaboration with others at the Department of Development and
Tropical Studies of the AA. 258 While the example of traditional houses are shown in
256 Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 44.
257 Otto Koenigsberger's Roofs in the Warm and Humid Climates, Architectural Association
Papers; no. 1 (London: Lund, Humphries, 1965). p. 1. As the design of walls of the core
house is given over to the occupant, standardization, that modernist dictum connecting
architecture to industrial production, looses its position in the development equation. The
discourse on standardization shifts from instituting standards of form-room number and
sizes, standardized plans and sections-to is instituted not in the repetition of modular
formal elements, but rather through setting standards of material properties and
climatological performances.
258 This emphasis on the roof can also be observed in Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney
and Martin Evans, Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and Community
Facilities (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971),
UN Document ST/SOA/93.
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detailed plans, the guidelines for new houses based on the lessons drawn from
vernacular housing focus on laying out schematic sections. When plans are shown
they are devoid of internal details (FIG. 16).
This can be seen as a reflection of climatology's focus on the envelope of the
house most exposed to the elements. Yet, this shift is simultaneously tied to an
alternative economic model of housing, its role in the development, and the role
of the individual as the subject of development.
The process of constructing an interior in the core house is imagined to hold a
different position in the economic equation than the one imagined by Fathy and
Doxiadis (FIG. 17). The socio-economic relations manifesting themselves in the
interior are considered too complex and too broad to be directly moldable through
architecture. As Koenigsberger et al. stressed in the UN manual on the Design of
Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities, one of the critical factors in any
housing plan was the "time scale in house design - relating plan to changing
social needs."259
In the core house, the individual cannot be approached through static architectural
elements. Climatology of the core shell focuses on the dynamism of use in time,
rather than static arrangements of the plan in space. Its focus is on the range of
activity, not the efficiency of specific motions. All architectural configurations are
limited to the threshold of the exterior. Their influence on the interior is mediated
through formless phenomena, such as temperature, light, and wind, bodily
sensations that influence the behavior of the inhabitant necessarily without form.
259 Otto Koenigsberger et al., Climate and House Design, op cit., p. 7.
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Following this unpredictability, Koenigsberger et al. suggested that
even such commonly accepted space measures as "room" should be dropped from
the vocabulary of space standards, since not all people live in rooms as do the
typical city-dwellers of colder regions. In fact, in some climates 'space that can be
covered and opened" and 'community space and private space' have more
meaning than the traditional concept of rooms.
With the core house, and Koenigsberger's brand of climatology, architecture gives
up the pretense to climatological determinism: the idea of directly influencing the
occupant's propensity for economic development and efficiency, something we
witnessed in Doxiadis and Fathy's framing of the importance of standardization
and traditionally inspired modernist design. In the core house, the role of
architecture is limited to facilitating the tentative intersection of the socio-cultural
and the economic. The climatological shell does not attempt to mold the socio-
cultural values intersecting in the interior. The household is not imagined through
the bounds of the interior, but as a field of behavior spread onto a broader socio-
economic terrain.
This concern with the extended socio-economic terrain is betrayed in the comfort
zone charts of the temperature analyses during the day (FIG. 18). The house is not
seen to be limited to the interior but defined as a map of a broader field of
activity, in which different occupants are likely to use the house at different times
(during the day "men are out at work," "children are at school," and "women at
home"). "No room or open space is used all the time by all members of a
household," Koonigsberger asserted.26 ' The core shell employs this concept of a
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260 Ibid., p. 4.
261 Ibid.
broader movement to present the limited provision of space and budget for the
core house as adequate for the functioning of the household.
As opposed to the "traditionally inspired" climatic devices of Fathy and Doxiadis'
designs, the climatological logic of the core house is not limited to the envelope of
the house. The warm temperatures during the day demand thick walls to absorb
heat. Yet the same walls generate heat during the night mandating the presence of
outdoor sleeping space. Since all these requirements extend beyond the budget of
the core house, the core shell is imagined on the presumption that the inhabitants
would be able to organize the limited space of the interior around their different
schedules-when they are off to work, school, doing errands outside the house-
such that only a few spaces could satisfy the requirements of different activities at
different times of the day. Responding to these budgetary and climatological
requirements, the core house doesn't seek to plan an interior, only situate itself
within the existing socio-economic terrain.
Consequently, the core house is not concerned with the shape of the house, but
how it can relate the socio-cultural practices of the inhabitants with the larger
economic field (FIG. 19). It is the opportunity of this interaction that Abrams and
Koenigsberger saw being wasted when they saw building material lying fallow in
the streets of Accra:
[Elverywhere in the cities we saw people of small and moderate means saving
building blocks and storing them in the areaways and in backyards.. .Block-savings
has more implications than appear on the surface. Savings which normally might
be channeled into long-term investments lie sterilized in blocks that will probably
never see the mason's trowel or shelter an occupant. The cement used in the
blocks is paid for with money that does out of the country but produces no wealth
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within it. In that sense it is even less constructive than the purchase of local gems
as a form of savings. The family foregoes purchase of other necessities in favour of
the futile block and despite the need, the product rarely contributes to the
production of the housing for which it was intended. Often the blocks are actually
set up, but the house remains unfinished because of inability to finance the
purchase of a roof or the other final elements of the structure."'
With the core house, the primary characteristic attributed to architecture in the
development process changes from being its physical form to the specific
economic form(ation) it enables. Architecture is no longer seen as a medium that
controls the behavior of the inhabitants through design. Rather, it constitutes a
process that requires the inhabitant to save and invest in a manner that relates to
industrial production and circuits of finance.
It is this interaction that Abrams and Koenigsberger attempted to formalize through
their proposal for the "roof loan" scheme for the core houses which, quite simply,
provided a loan for just the roof and not the house itself. First proposed in the
Gold Coast, the scheme was repeated by Abrams in Bolivia, and then later
together by Abrams and Koenigsberger in Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, and
Kenya in the following years. Koenigsberger had already described the roof as the
most critical weather-related element of the house in the tropics in his
climatological studies. With the roof loan, we see how those calculations become a
vehicle to carry out the economic logic surrounding the core house.
The roof loan turns the architectural sequence of financing a building on its head.
Though the house still began with foundations and walls, each building block put
in place served as collateral to receive the loan for the roof, and "final elements of
262 Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 21.
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the structure," such as doors and windows, elements whose expense, according to
Abrams and Keonigberger, prevented the assembly of blocks into a building
before. The roof loan schemes would not only "ease the perplexing problem of
the 'unfinished house,"' the authors asserted, "[but it would] even bring into being
the 'unstarted house,' represented by the vast stocks of sterilized building blocks
punctuating city streets." 263 The roof loan not only presumed consent even before
the house began, but also translated that consent is into a logic of finance that
inscribed the inhabitants' savings into the calculus of development at the least risk
to the financial institutions and the greatest risk to the inhabitants.
This strategy risk management inherent in the roof loan scheme did not evade
Abrams and Koenigsberger. Since the "[1]oans on the roof would be represented by
the last section of the building," argued the authors, "[it] enable[d] the lending
agency to be selective in its loans and reduce the danger of defaults in
completion. The loans would be made only when, after inspection, the roofless
building was found to have a good foundation and a solid wall structure."264
The emptying out of the building-the erasure of the plan, if you will-inscribed
architecture into a broader economic field and a strategy of risk management by
only dictating requirements for materials and specifications while avoiding the
added cost and risk of controlling formal design and construction supervision.
A core house thus is simultaneously a spatial structure and a temporal
infrastructure. It provides a node at which the unpredictable socio-cultural changes
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263 Ibid. p. 77.
264 Ibid.
are made to interact, through the mechanism of mortgage financing, tenure
allocation, employment of industrially produced building materials, into a larger
financial and industrial framework. Its function is not to mold the spatial form of
the socio-cultural terrain, but to tally the changes in that terrain over time. It is this
dual role, spatial and temporal, that Keonigsber would christen as "urban
infrastructure systems" later in Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing
Countries, a study carried out for the Ford Foundation:
There is a need to design urban systems which respond both to the resources
available in various countries and to the different time scales of potential change
in these resources. That is: Urban infrastructure systems needs to be designed to fit
the income levels of different countries, taking account of the ways in which
incomes are likely to change over time."
This status of the core house as a temporal infrastructure reduces the interior to a
schematic hollow, charting it only through schematic arrows representing air
movement and bouncing rays of light (FIG. 20). These abstractions represent its
status as a socio-cultural black-box. The socio-cultural terrain manifested in the
core house is seen to be too complex to be predictably modeled into economic
planning. The economy meets the socio-cultural terrain of the occupant at the
exterior of the house.2 6
265 Otto Koenigsberger et al., Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing Countries,
International Urbanization Survey (Ford Foundation, 1973). p. 1. Koenigsberger here is
citing David E. Bell, "Ekistics," 30: 179 (October 1970): p. 321-322.
266 If the plan of the individual house leaves the interior to the unpredictable choices of
the inhabitants, those sub-rational gestures are seen to begin to form a unified pattern at
the scale of the site plan and at the larger scale of a region. The climatoloigcal shell
provides only as a locational market at the level of the house. The logic and rational it
seeks to construct is considered to make itself apparent at scale which is invisible to the
inhabitant herself.
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It is precisely this declared opacity of the socio-cultural complex to the economic
calculations that allows it to be situated in that calculus as the engine of economic
growth. This framing of the socio-cultural terrain as opaque to economic analyses,
yet related to it, mapped by the core house, plays a critical role in the staging of
policy intervention in cross-cultural contexts. Architecture allows development
economics to enter the socio-cultural complex without staking any claims to
changing it.
Yet, it is precisely in bracketing the development terrain as too diverse, complex,
and shifting in its socio-cultural dimensions to be knowable through economic
science, that architecture participates in setting up a more transparent set of
legalistic and economic categories, such as the individual, with universally
applicable traits, such as the drive for economic betterment, categories which act
as economic "black boxes" in terms of their internal characteristics, yet provide
critical alibi for setting up legal infrastructure and assuming consent. The agency of
the development subject is recognized in terms of her ability to construct the core
house, and in being in excess of any socio-cultural behavioral mold projected onto
her. But that agency is recognized only as agency of the pending development
subject.
This framing of economic behavior as a realm whose socio-cultural causes were
opaque to economic analyses betrays a shift in development thinking, from a
focus on identifying why (why people do what they do) to how (how does what
they do affect economic growth). Economic growth, instead of being defined as a
problem of constructing mutually reinforcing socio-cultural values and traits, is
defined as a process of juxtaposing "contradictory" social practices as "pressure
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points" against each other for generating economic activity. The latter, called
disequilibrium analysis, begins to establish itself within international development
institutions as a "realistic" approach that could provide immediate and concrete
policy directions.
Let us return to the economic context surrounding the core house we looked at
earlier, only this time to a different aspect of it. If the idea of a transitory individual
made the idea of Big Push industrialization and "balanced" or "equilibrium"
growth-the "macro" dimension of the development planning-plausible in the
Third World, then in its "micro" dimension, development planning was driven by a
different paradigm: "unbalanced" or "disequilibrium growth," which explicitly
argued that contradictory socio-economic developments can not only be tolerated
but have a rationale that could be harnessed for economic growth.
It was Arthur Lewis, whom we mentioned earlier, who occupied both sides of this
micro and macro equation. Despite his neo-classical methodology of a balanced
approach, Lewis recognized the limitation of classical modeling in development
and advocated the virtues of unbalanced growth:
The most difficult problem...is to explain why people hold the beliefs they do.
Economic Growth depends on attitudes to work, to wealth, to thrift, to having
children, to invention, to strangers, to adventure, and so on, and all these attitudes
flow from deep springs in the human mind. There have been attempts to explain
why these attitudes vary from one community to another. One can look to
difference in religion, but this is merely to restate the problem... The experienced
205
sociologist knows that these questions are unanswerable, certainly in our present
state of knowledge. And probably for all time....217
The two mutually opposing philosophies, balanced and unbalanced growth
existed simultaneously in the development institutions and formed a unique
productive combination, intersecting in the profile of the development subject. The
core house, as an important site of this subject production, is a unique
development instrument that is able to resolve the demands of both the micro and
macro dimensions. Let us briefly look at some of the prominent features of
disequilibrium analysis before we return to Abrams, Koenigsberger, and later to
Turner, to see how their arguments of core housing both contribute to and draw
on the space created by equilibrium and disequilibrium analyses.
3.4 Rational Distortions:
Walter Rostow, the MIT professor whose theory of socio-economic "stages" of
development cast a major influence on World Bank policy during his tenure as an
advisor to the Johnson and Kennedy governments, retrospectively argued in 1990
that ignoring the continuing presence of "disequilibrium" missed a major operating
force in economic growth:
the pain, complexity, and endless creativity inherent in the process of growth,
including the strain, costs, and exhilaration of shifting from one set of leading
sectors to another... Growth analysis inherently consists of such successive phases
of irreversible dynamic disequilibrium, each solving a problem but creating new
problems to solve.2"s
267 Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp. 14-
16.
268 Walter Rostow, Theories of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 367.
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Rostow reflected the dominant view in development economics when he argued
that the theories of equilibrium in growth are misguided to seek systemic
regularities where there is only a broad terrain of deviations: "practitioners of the
craft of comparative structural analyses of economies fail to capture this process
[of change] because the dynamic model implicit in their charting of transformation
from poverty to affluence is one of general equilibrium." 269 For Rostow, economic
theory had to acknowledge that development happens by exception and deviation
from the averaged-out coefficients of the data that aims to define uniformities.
These deviations, asserted Rostow, figure only as "residual black boxes" in
equilibrium theory.270
The idea of modeling disequilibrium had preoccupied famous economists at least
since Marshall and Paretto, both of whom strove to construct within the neo-
classical economic tradition more nuanced and flexible economic models that
could absorb "extra-economic" variables into growth calculations. Rostow's
resurrection of this preoccupation betrays the centrality the idea occupied in
development economics and policy debate. From Albert Hirschman to Simon
Kuznet to Rostow, development economists described developed as an "endless
succession of growth problems" via the pressures of disequilibrium.2 71
269 Ibid. p. 367.
270 Ibid., p. 371.
271 Ibid., p. 367. Also see Simon Kuznet, Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business
Cycles, National Income, and Economic Growth ( New York: Norton, 1953); Albert
Hirschman, The Strategy ofEconomic Development, Yale Studies in Economics v. 10. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).
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As opposed to disequilibrium analysis, theories of equilibrium in growth only
sought to map systemic regularities underlying a broad terrain of deviations.
Economists like Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, who favored comparative
statistical models that emphasized equilibrium growth, themselves acknowledged
that while equilibrium models such as theirs may well suggest "the interdependent
changes in resource allocation which underlie the major development patterns,"
they cannot explain the "erratic" course economic growth actually assumes.2 72 Even
though the range of variation is wide in equilibrium analyses, Chenery argued,
they are underpinned by the "grand assertion of the ultimate imperatives of
balanced growth and dynamic equilibrium."2 73 This sentiment was shared others
who favored balanced growth. For Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, whose seminal paper
we encountered earlier, the idea of equilibrium was counter-informative if it didn't
take into account "the pursuit curve which shows the dynamic path toward
equilibrium."27 4
For Rostow, this framing of development defined it as a set of problems attended
by chaos theorists, problems, that related to "a science of process rather than state,
272 Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, Patterns of Development: 1950-1970
(London: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1975), p. 10.
273 Ibid.
27 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "Natura Facit Saltum," in Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers,
eds., Pioneers in Development (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank,
1984), p. 208. Rodan explains the idea of "the pursuit curve" with the following analogy:
"A dog pursues a hare, without anticipation, along the shortest distance at which he sees
him (a straight line). Meanwhile the hare runs from point 1 to 2. When the dog sees him
again in this new position he again runs along the shortest distance (a straight line) in
which he sees him. Meanwhile the hare runs to point 3, and so on. The line along which
the dog runs is what we want to explain. It is determined by a straight-line distance
wherever the dog sees the hare. The overwhelming majority of the points of the pursuit
curve are disequilibrium points. It many be called "state of equilibrium" if the dog
ultimately catches the hare. (Pareto had mentioned it but never worked it out)."
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of becoming rather than being... [where] the disorderly behavior of simple systems
acted as a creative process [that] generated...richly organized patterns, sometime
stable and sometime unstable..." 275
For the proponent of disequilibrium analysis, economic theory had to
acknowledge that economic growth happens by exception and deviation from the
average behavior of the model that aimed to define uniformities. In statistical
analysis those complexities were left out. This was the terrain of non-economic
variables. These deviations, asserted Rostow, form "residual black boxes" that give
the growth path a unique character. 7 1
For Rostow and others favoring disequilibrium analysis, the unpredictability of
economic growth did not strengthen the case for laissez-faire economics but
hinted at a different methodology of economic planning. It was Albert Hirschman,
economic advisor on one of the first World Bank development missions to
Colombia, who stressed this point in particular. Commenting on his early
proposals in the World Bank's volume on "pioneers of development economics",
Hirschman argued that what may be regarded as elements of irrationality or
distortion in a developing economy in fact provided a structure of powerful
incentives to solve problems, and thus manifested themselves as elements of a
"hidden rationality" on another scale. 277
275 Rostow, Theories of Economic Growth, op cit., p. 367.
276 ibid. p. 371.
277 Pioneers in Development, op cit., pp. 92, 96.
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Shortages and bottlenecks, capital-intensive industrial processes in an apparently
labor-surplus economy, pressures induced by inflation and balance-of-payment
deficits, pressures created by commitments to produce finished manufactured
products, were all mobilizing and productive forces in a developing economy.
Unlike laissez-faire, disequilibrium analysis acknowledged the unpredictability of
the market and yet used that unpredictability as a management tool in itself. These
forces of disequilibrium could not be left on their own, as laissez-faire economists
suggested. The invisible hand of the market identified by Adam Smith needed
guidance. The ensuing disequilibrium in an economy was to be managed for
productive ends through the logic of "pressure points":
I now searched for a general economic principle that would tie [disequilibrium
factors] together. To this end, I suggest that underdeveloped countries need
'pressure mechanisms' or 'pacing devices' to bring forth their potential. In my most
general formulation I wrote: 'development depends not so much on finding
optimal combinations for given resources and factors of production as on calling
forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities that are
hidden, scattered, or badly utilized."'
Disequilibrium analysis attempted to break open the arithmetic black-box with a
series of non-economic factors, variables, race, class, philosophy, ethics that
claimed to take into account the complexity of the socio-cultural terrain. With this
turn, the economic calculus itself is made to move away from an arithmetic to a
humanistic mold, from an emphasis on arithmetic modeling to preponderance of
assertive arguments, from being based on the rigidity of the proof to malleability
of rhetoric. It is this move away from modeling that is now recalled as the primary
reason behind development economics' demise. Yet it was precisely this move that
278 ibid., p. 94.
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allowed development economics to negotiate the demands of accounting for
cultural and geo-political differences in economic planning.
Yet in doing so, we see a different logic of "black-boxes" being set up. While we
see the set of non-economic variables proliferate in disequilibrium analysis
approaches, the separation between the internal logic of the socio-cultural
phenomenon under consideration and its relationship to economic calculus
remains intact. Keeping this division intact while creating a space for non-
economic variables in economic calculations was, in a sense, the ingenuity of
disequilibrium analysts (the very idea of the non-economic "variable" denotes this
division). Under this division the socio-cultural phenomenon is held in a
parenthesis, as a place holder, which is seen to have an internal logic of its own
that can be measured only in terms of input and output in its interaction with the
economic calculus. In this framing, the socio-cultural or geo-political complex is
not so much dehistoricized as held in abeyance. There is an implicit
acknowledgement of the historical complexity of the development terrain, yet at
the same time that complexity is seen as an independent variable like any other.
What emerges is a set of economic calculations seeped in a language of cultural
relativism that both lay a claim to account for the "uniqueness" of a particular
scenario and are able to hold that uniqueness in a form that is workable in
economic calculations.279
279 This strategy of abeyance, however, still operated under the promise of full (en)closure
with technical improvements in economic science. For advocates of disequilibrium
analyses such as Rostow and Hirschman, the parenthetic presence of socio-cultural
variables represented only a contingent arrangement until better or more technically
nuance modeling techniques were able to account for the complexities that they held. In
other words, disequilibrium analyses though acknowledged the unknowable character of
socio-cultural complexities it encountered in economic calculations, this was only seen as
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Disequilibrium analysis held the ability to bracket out the complexities of socio-
cultural phenomena within economic calculations; both acknowledging their
complexity and ignoring it, rather than ignoring their existence or claiming to
account for them in their completeness. It is these qualities that gave
disequilibrium theorists the advantage of operating in a development context
where claims of economic precedence, models, and planning were pressed to
address the question of geo-political and socio-cultural difference. It is therefore
not surprising that while dynamic disequilibrium analysis took root in mainstream
Anglo-American economics in the 60's, it emerged in the development arena.
3.5 The New Model of Expertise:
With the rise of disequilibrium analysis, we begin to see not only a new mode of
economic planning but also a new profile of the development economist, one
whose criticism of the agenda of the institution he operates within extends the
scope of that institutional agenda instead of undermining it. When in 1983, the
World Bank published a critical retrospective volume on the ten "pioneers of
development," a majority of the authors, including those mentioned above, were
described, either by themselves in new essays or introductions to their work by
a technical limitation which would be solved with increasingly complex modeling
techniques, a sentiment we still see shared by contemporary economists such as Paul
Krugman when they attribute the demise of development theories in the late 70s and 80s
to their lack of modeling techniques. Yet, even though the idea of black box is based on
the promise of complete knowledge, that promise is always pending. Each new modeling
techniques produces further unknown variable, more black boxes. The preponderance of
disequilibrium analyses in development terrain point to the critical role that perpetuating
cycle plays in economic planning. In the initial years of 1950s and 60s, because of, this
promise of complete knowledge, the idea of black-box takes on a the character of a
somewhat standardized modeling technique
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the editors, as "dissenters" within the development arena." This framing betrays
the role of the disequilibrium analyst in the development apparatus: a self-critical
figure who, in willing to acknowledging the "resourcefulness" of the "benefactors"
of development, translates all demands and criticisms into vetted categories of the
institutions he professes to challenge.
The "pioneers" of disequilibrium analysis such as Peter Bauer, Albert Hirschman,
and Colin Clark, all used different variants of disequilibrium approaches to
challenge what they called the economic orthodoxy of their times for ignoring
socio-cultural particularities of the late colonial or newly decolonized context they
operated within in their respective positions.
It was Albert Hirschman, whose description of "hidden rationality" of unbalanced
growth and "pacing devices" of disequilibrium planning we saw earlier, who
perhaps most strongly proclaimed this role. As mentioned earlier, Hirschman was
one of the first economic experts sent abroad by the World Bank. Soon after
arriving in Columbia on his first assignment, Hirschman turned against the
development plan handed to him by the Bank:
[W]ord came from World Bank headquarters that I was principally expected to
take, as soon as possible, the initiative in formulating some ambitious economic
development plan that would spell out investment, domestic savings growth, and
foreign aid targets for the Colombian economy over the next few years. All of this
was alleged to be quite simple for experts mastering the new programming
technique: apparently there now existed adequate knowledge, even without close
study of local surroundings, of the like ranges of savings and capital-output ratios,
and those estimates, joined to the country's latest national income and balance of
280 Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., Pioneers in Development (New York: Oxford
University Press for the World Bank, 1984).
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payments accounts, would yield all the key figures needed. I resisted being
relegated to this sort of programming activity.28
The primary focus of the "close study of local surroundings" flaunted by Hirshman
as an alternative to the "sort of programming activity" advocated by the Bank
headquarters was the emphasis on revision of economic projections:
Because of the interdependence of the economy in the input-output sense, the
expansion of one sector or subsector ahead of the other could be relied on to set
forth in motion (relative price changes and public policies in response to
complaints about shortages) that would tend to eliminate the initial imbalance.282
As Rostow later noted in his review of Hirschman's piece in the World Bank
''pioneers" volume,
in evoking his instruction from World Bank headquarters and the major battle he
fought 'against the then widely alleged need for a 'balanced'... industrialization
effort, Hirschman... [was] in indulging in a caricature....1 have never known a
serious development planner who didn't understand that a 5-year plan had to be
revised every year at least in the light of unexpected distortions...283
Yet the caricature so vividly drawn up by Hirschman cannot be discarded so
easily. Though there might have been in Hirschman's proposal, to use Rostow's
words again, "an element of rediscovering the wheel [and of] shock at finding that
history does not move forward along smooth paths with all sectors in dynamic
equilibrium," the caricature allowed Hirschman to posit a new profile of the
281 Ibid., p. 90.
282 Ibid., p. 105.
283 Rostow, Theories of Economic Growth, op cit., p. 391.
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development planner as in the classic mold of the "man in the field" reacting
against an ill-informed center.184
Hirschman's ingenuity lay in attempting to institute contingency planning, or crisis
management, as the primary engine of the development proposals, rather than a
supplementary mechanism. In the last measure, we are reminded, albeit
unwittingly, by Hirschman himself that the emphasis on contingency works to
abdicate responsibility implicit in a plan. The methods of this contingent approach
were contingent at best:
Would you actually advocate unbalanced growth, capital-intensive investment,
inflation, and so on? The honest, if a bit unsatisfactory answer must be: yes, but of
course within some fairly strict limits. There is no doubt that the unbalanced
growth strategy can be overdone, with dire consequences.. .But is it not
unreasonable to ask the inventor of the internal combustion engine to come up
immediately with design for pollution control and airbags?'
The 5-year plan was to be revised every year in light of unexpected changes. With
unbalance growth, Hirschman sought to purge development planning of its claim
to a plan as its justifying logic, and have it legitimize itself on its readiness to
revise its goals. With this turn, the expert is no longer a representative of the
center but becomes an advocate of the periphery.
These characteristics take on an even starker tone in the work of Peter Bauer.
Bauer, previously an economist of the British Colonial office, consulted widely for
the World Bank. Yet, at the same time, he was a staunch opponent of centralized
284 ibid., p. 392.
284
2Pioneers of Development, op cit., p. 96.
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planning and government intervention in the market advanced by the UN and the
World Bank in the 1950s. Bauer situated his opposition on the basis of his early
experience in studying the rubber industry in Malaya and cocoa and other cash
crop trade in British West Africa in the 1940s. Bauer argued that the informal and
traditional trade networks he witnessed showed a resilience and flexibility of the
shrewd and quick responsiveness of local farmers to incentives and disincentives.
The formal neo-classical analysis based on centralized planning and state
intervention was unable to take into account these cultural and social qualities in
predicting the behavior of the market.
Bauer's net of criticism was vast. During this period, he emerged as an ardent
polemicist whose criticism not only targeted the World Bank's development
approach, but also those of other advocates of centralized planning, including the
policies of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, P. C. Mahalanobis at the Indian
Statistical Institute, and the latter's contribution to the Indian Second Five Year
Plan that emphasized expansion of the capital goods industries. The opposition to
centralized planning led Bauer to also oppose the idea of the New International
Economic Order put together by the consortium of Third World governments in
response to the asymmetric trading practices of the Bretton Wood institutions.
Bauer's staging of a counter current to developing orthodoxy deliberately shies
away from any attempt at modeling. Walter Rostow, whose Stages of Growth
theory of development itself had been the target of Bauer's criticism, recounted
Bauer's stance as a particular feature of the latter's argument: "Bauer never
organized his more subtle perception about societies as a whole and related them
systematically to the economic process. There is a gap between the market
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economist and the wider but somewhat casual commentator on the human
condition."286 What Rostow ignores here is that Bauer and other disequilibrium
theorists didn't feel the need to model their casual commentary on the human
condition because it was precisely a mode of managed indeteminancy that they
intended to outline, the arena where the arithmetic model reached its limits. In the
name of flexibility of the market, and resourcefulness "on the ground," what is
advanced is the possibility of the flexibility of the policy itself.
The increased emphasis on rhetoric and policy as a result of the indeterminate yet
productive socio-cultural forces can also be seen in the work of another dissenter
within the ranks, Colin Clark. Even though Clark emphasized increasing
formalization in economic analysis and argued for extending the scope of
contemporary statistical methods, in his famous two-volume work, The Conditions
of Economic Progress (1940, 1951), he sought to do so through propositions that
situated him close to Bauer's rhetorical and informal stance within the institutional
arena of development.2 7
In India, Clark began a comparative study of agriculture in developing countries
that continued for 20 years and finally culminated in his famous book, an
approach that shows his training and experience as welfare economist in the
Cambridge tradition of Malthus and Keynes. He based the hypothesis drawn from
the immense statistical data collected in the two editions of the book, however, on
286 Rostow, Theories of Economic Growth, op cit., p. 386.
287 Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (London: Macmillan, 1940, 1951).
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what he called the inescapable hierarchy of values-philosophical and religious,
ethical and political-that determined welfare consideration in all societies.
The result was a set of theoretical assertions that inverted the established
conclusions at the World Bank regarding some of the fundamental postulates of
development thinking such as population growth and idle agriculture labor.
Reflecting on his earlier view of the 1940s that high population increase was
"disadvantageous," Clark argued that "[n]early everyone then, as indeed now,
tended to regard population growth as an adverse factor... But with growing
population a mistaken piece of physical investment is much more likely to find an
alternative use than in a state of stationary population." 88 Similarly, Clark
challenged the view that "low productivity countries" have reserves of idle
agriculture labor that could be employed in industrial production, except
seasonally. "After all, to put it simply," he asserted, "if you are going to cultivate a
country the size of China with hand hoes-very few draft animals and still fewer
tractors were available-you are going to need the labor of something like 600
million people."'
In a manner similar to Bauer, Clark also targeted the centralizing policies of the
Indian statistician and economic planner, P. C. Mahalanobis at the Indian Statistical
Institute. To make his argument, however, he put forth Gandhi's support of the
village industry movement as an attestation for free-market reform:
288 Pioneers of development, op cit., pp. 75-76.
289 Ibid., p. 65.
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Gandhi (nobody would believe this)," he averred with evident relish, "proved to
be a convinced free-market economist, strongly critical of the price controls,
rationing, and compulsory purchase of farm crops which the Nehru government
was then introducing. The right solution, he said, was to raise the price of food,
then everyone would have to work harder. The source of India's troubles was that
the people were thoroughly idle. 90
It is important to note that what remains intact in these series of reversals of the
development "status quo," is the breach between the socio-cultural and the
economic in the development equation. The "values" employed to give hierarchy
to statistical data are treated as self-contained entities with self-contained internal
logic, the interaction of which with economic relations can be measured in terms
of input and output alone. The fundamental parenthetic structure of this
relationship allows the accommodation of any resistance to development projects
within the marked out socio-cultural sphere. This accommodation preserves the
logic of development, precluding the possibility of unraveling how particular
socio-cultural framings, from the idea of the individual to tradition, shape the
structure of the economic and make value exchange possible. What is advanced in
the self-declared form of dissent within the ranks is a particular mechanism of
absorbing resistance to development. Indeed in all of these examples of the
dynamic disequilibrium approach, what is given up is the sanctity of the model.
What is outlined is the limit of economic law. Gained in its place is the malleability
of a different realm: policy.
Development is presented as a project not just of planning, but also of confronting
the difficulties of implementation. The scope of economic theory is displaced from
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290 Ibid., p. 63.
identifying the rules of economic behavior to correcting the inevitable
shortcomings of any economic projections. It is in this spirit that Hirschman
defended the theory of unbalanced growth with its "remarkable unintended
effects" in The Passions and the Interests."' These characteristics, the ideas of
hidden rationality, scale of association, sensitivity to cultural and social values,
recognizing the resourcefulness of the participants, allow the expert to stake out a
position as an advocate for the development subject against the development
institution.29
In all these dissenting voices, we see an emerging tendency toward describing
economic processes through non-mathematical relations, particularly when
identifying the influence of social and cultural forces. This tendency has often
been described as a result of the lack of modeling techniques available to
development economists in the '50s and the '60s. Yet, if we look at what role this
non-mathematical modeling plays in the overall argument being made, it does not
betray a shortcoming, but appears to serve a particular purpose in making a case
for a particular mode of development intervention. In Bauer, Clark, Hirschman,
and Lewis' arguments, we see a concerted effort to outline the limits of economic
modeling. It is at this limit, that a new space for contingent policy intervention is
carved out. Policy is defined as contingent intervention at the limit of economic
modeling, raising its status from a tool for implementing economic hypotheses to a
291 It is in this spirit that Hirschman defended the theory of unbalanced growth with its
"remarkable unintended effects" in his The Passions and the Interests. Political Argumentsfor Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
292 This position was mutually staked out and defended. It was Carlos Diaz Alejandro who
defended Hirschman's dissent in Clark's book, Condition of Economic Progress, as a fight
against, "vulgar recipes imposed on the weak or the vanquished." See Pioneers of
Development, op cit., p. 90.
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mechanism of another sort of economic modeling, one that was necessarily
incomplete and always operated in response to constant socio-cultural changes on
the ground.
This muddling of the economic terrain, however, emphasizes the differentiation of
the economic and the non-economic, as intermingled but separate spheres. While
the socio-cultural is opaque to economic calculations, it permeates through the
web of economic relations and can be measured, albeit partially and only
intermittently, through the logic of input and output.
This diffused separation emphasizes that whatever appears irrational on the
ground is rational at another level. It lays out the ground for a claim to universal
human rationality through a certain logic of scale. This claim is not based on the
assertion that this universal rational dimension is absent in certain populations and
that it therefore needs to be introduced and cultivated through development
schemes, that certain socio-cultural practices do not have modern economic
consequences. Rather, it is asserted that the universal rational dimension already
exists everywhere. We only need to read it at the right scale. Since, however, this
scale is continuously shifting, we cannot predict the workings of this hidden
rationality through economic calculations and standardized economic models
alone. The path to growth is always going to be through disequilibrium,
imbalance, and over- and underestimations.
This framing of the relationship between the economic and the socio-cultural has
important repercussion in the framing of the development interventions. This
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assertion that the development subjects are rational despite themselves, preempts
all possibilities of resistance to prescribed development approaches.
This strategy of preempting resistance can also operate in reverse, positing the
"rational" behavior of the third world subject to be irrational on another scale. We
may remember that the example of sterilized savings blocks lying in the streets of
Accra often repeated by Abrams, could be described as "sterilized" precisely
because they could be framed as counter-productive and irrational at the scale of
the "regional" economy.
Architecture functions as a critical element in the creation of a space between
policy and model, socio-cultural and the economic, enabling this particular mode
of reading the development terrain as an inevitably productive terrain despite
itself. It is one of the unique development tools that indeterminately straddle the
socio-cultural and economic dimensions, emphasizing their separation and
intersection. It has a composite nature that can relate different dimensions in terms
of input and output. And most importantly, in the mode of self-help, it undoes the
sequentially of development as an intervention on a virgin tabula rasa that bears
the burden of proving its effectiveness. All village housing is carried out, Abrams
and Koenigsberger had reminded us in various contexts, on a self-help basis.2"
Architecture as self-help is simultaneously the evidence for and the result of the
principles of unbalanced growth advocated by disequilibrium analysis.
It is this logic of preempting resistance that Abrams and Koenigsberger employ to
confront the question of political demands of "squatters" on their missions to the
2" Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p 6
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Philippines and Pakistan, where they propose core housing as a strategy of
relocation and land reform. Returning to Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Turner, we
see how the core and "sites and services" schemes advocated by the trio
contribute to and draw from the mode of development intervention set up by the
proponents of disequilibrium analysis and unbalanced growth.
3.6 "Settlers Welcome": The Politics of Recognition
"In the long run... a sign on land made available which reads 'Settlers Welcome'
will produce more acceptable, more durable and more morally-structured
neighborhoods than the timid 'no trespass' sign that is respected more in the breach
than in the observance."
Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Programfor Pakistan, (1957). 294
More than a piece of land and a rudimentary structure, the core house is the
conceptual site where the profile of the development subject is constructed as a
conflicting negotiation between an innate, modern, individualistic realm and a
traditional social realm. This profile would become instrumental in not only
advancing the particular brand of partial incorporation into capitalist production
we saw above, but also form the basis of censoring political demands from the
discussions of development.
Very soon we see Abrams and Keonigsberger pushing the core housing approach
to individual governments as an efficient strategy to not just provide housing, but
294 A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation,
prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger,
September 14, 1957 (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance
Administration, 1957), p. 19.
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to tackle urgent political issues of land reform and legal status of "squatter"
settlements. What is interesting in this realm is that this erasure is carried out not
on the basis of categorically excluding political demands from development
discussion, but laying out a field of protracted recognition of migrant politics, a
strategy that would later take on the slogan of "empowering the poor." The core
housing approach's strength lay in its apparent attempt to cater to the interest and
political agency of its constituents.
We witness this strategy in Abrams and Koenigsberger's mission to Pakistan in
1957 and to the Philippines in 1959. When Koenigsberger and Abrams arrived in
Pakistan, seventy five percent of the population of Karachi, then the country's
capital, was housed in one or another squatter settlement. This was partly the
result of the influx of refugees from India after the partition of the subcontinent at
independence in 1947. Over the next decade, the situation had been exasperated
by continuing migration to Karachi from other parts of Pakistan.
The logistics of the situation, however, were not the primary concern of the
experts. Rather,
it was the political ramifications of the buildup of the squatter population in the
city. "Mass squatting," Abrams and Keonigberger asserted,
offers a formidable threat to... legal and property rights, and to community and
national well-being. When the problem is ignored, illegal possession gradually
develops a colour of right bringing with it increasing political pressure to protect
the status quo or enforce excessive compensation for removal.95
295 A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation,
prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger,
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For Abrams and Koenigberger, the key to solving the squatter problem was to
understand squatter "motivation" and to form a proper policy response to those
interests. Inattention to the squatter's motivation, the two argued, was one of the
fundamental causes of the irresolution of the squatting problem in Pakistan: "The
past policy of blindness to the motivating causes of population movements has
provided an open invitation to squatting."'
296
It is this emphasis on identifying squatters' interests that Koenigsberger would later
define in a report on land reform for the Ford Foundation as the most critical, as
well as the most uncertain, element of Third World urbanization:
The clearance of squatters does not in any way extend the urban space. No net
gain of space-or even land-is represented by the shifting of groups of
populations from one place to another. This is obviously the case as, even if not
officially rehoused, squatters must rehouse themselves. 7
The emphasis on understanding squatter motivation represents a marked shift from
the focus on the provision of finished houses emphasized by the past
development missions to Pakistan headed by modern architects such as
Constantine Doxiadis (for the Ford Foundation) and Michel Ecochard (for the UN).
Though Abrams and Koenigsberger acknowledge the contribution of these
missions in their reports, for them, the institutionally provided housing didn't take
September 14, 1957 (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance
Administration, 1957), p. 7.
296 Ibid. p. 18.
297 Otto Koenigsberger, Beverly Bernstein (ed.), Michael Foot, Judith Rees, Michael
Roberts, Michael Tyler, John C. Wylie, Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing
Countries: An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation (New
York: International Urbanization Survey, Ford Foundation, 1971), p. 231.
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into account the varied forces behind squatting. For Abrams and Koenigsberger,
architecture in the development arena was not a problem of formal design. Rather
it was fundamentally a tool of administrative policy that allowed aligning the
varied terrain of squatters' interest with that of the state. In recognizing squatters'
ability to house and rehouse themselves, the core housing approach
acknowledged the varied interests and limitations defining squatter motivation.
The core house gave squatters freedom to set their own schedule of work, the
amount of investment, the form of the house and thus constituted an efficient and
cost-effective solution to the housing crisis.
Implicit within the idea of legitimate squatter motivation, however, is it its
opposite, the notion of illegitimate political demands: "As long as the towns grow,"
Abrams and Koenigsberger argued, "there will be newcomers, many of them
penniless, in search of work and shelter. If no provision is made for them, they
too many be forced to become squatters, flaunt the law and create slum
settlements as in the past."' In this framing, the squatter always appear to be
standing at the threshold of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Abrams and Koenigsberger
also draw this distinction on their next mission to the Philippines as well. There,
this distinction manifests itself in a curious mixed tone of sympathy and
condemnation of squatting practices. The squatter appears as both a victim and an
aggressor. On the one hand are the declarations that almost celebrate the
unending variety of squatting as "a somber tribute to human ingenuity in the face
298 Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Programfor Pakistan, op cit., p. 18.
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of privation."299 Yet, on the other hand, squatting is described as a political
"indulgence," more opportunistic then necessary.
We may ask then, what are the criteria for making this distinction? The squatters'
demands are considered illegitimate when they take on a collective form. They
have "dug in deeper," we are told, exploiting the sympathy felt for them after the
war. Private owners have "often feared for their lives if they took summary action
to evict them." This tactic of intimidation, the experts tell us, has resulted in further
expansion of squatting: "Encouraged by their success, such squatters then moved
on to the land of another owner in the hope of repeating the experience."0 The
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate demands in Pakistan was also
drawn along the distinction of individual and collective politics. The newcomers
were framed as non-political and lone transgressors who are forced, when faced
with the impossible situations upon their arrival in the city, to become squatters -
the despised collective political entity - and "flaunt the law and create slum
settlements" 30 *
As a collective tactic of exerting political pressure, squatting is seen as nothing
short of a threat to the structure of state governance:
29 A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands, by Charles Abrams and Otto
Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1959), p.
26.
300 Ibid.
30* The degradation of collective politics is continuously grounded in the urban reform
discourse in the US. While there have been "admirable attempts to make homes out of
remnants," Abrams and Koenigsberger acknowledged, squatter "colonies are generally
safety and health hazards, and nests of crime or delinquency. They are dangers not only
to their inhabitants but to the community." Ibid., p. 28.
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[Squatting] symbolize[s], the general breakdown of civic responsibility and of
respect for public law and private rights. People who get away with appropriating
what is not their own, take a cynical view about paying rent and taxes, or about
respecting contract or authority. Worse still, others are encouraged by their
example, disrespect for law and government becomes epidemic and lawlessness
leans upon lawlessness as the structure of the state sags under the challenge.
When a program for re-settlement is under way, it suggests that the government is
still sovereign; when none is in sight, it puts sovereignty in issue.'"2
Collective political opportunism is equated with economic opportunism. Soon the
squatting begins to appear almost a highly profitable venture:
[S]quatting has often come to be an enterprise in itself, and poverty, guile and
opportunism compete for the prizes that lawlessness offers. When squatters have
begun to feel greater security in their possession, optimism vies with despair and
odd evidences of affluence manifest themselves amid the squalor; speculation and
turnover increase and as the vested illusion of right begins to ripen, it commands a
cash price."3
Contrary to the hard line taken against the collective dimension of squatting - its
political interest or demands, local as well as regional - is a sympathy of its effect
at a personal level. Koenigsberger and Abrams express the two attitudes side by
side in discussing the nature of the policy a government should adopt in dealing
with squatting:
Solution of the squatting problem is not self-operating. It requires policy and
program. It cannot be achieved by eloquence, persuasion, threats or recrimination.
The policy must be both humane and firm, taking into account the personal needs
and postures of the individuals affected as well as the larger requirements of the
302 Ibid., p. 29.
303 Ibid., p. 30-31.
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communities and the strained resources of the national economy [emphasis
added]."'
Here we have a model of developmental change similar to the one set up in the
core program for the Gold Coast. The dialectical interaction between individual
desires and social needs becomes a model of differentiating between legitimate
and illegitimate political dimensions. In core housing approach, the squatter is
acknowledged as a legitimate client of development only as a singular subject. Her
demands are recognized by the development apparatus only as demands of an
individual with personal needs; when the demand is cast as a reflection of the
individual's innate, atomistic, economic, and rational behavior. When the demands
take a collective form, it appears under the core lens as opportunism and
irrationalism. In other words, whenever political demands are considered
legitimate, the subject is singular: the squatter; whenever the political demands are
considered illegitimate, the subject is plural: the squatters (FIG. 21, 22).
Through core, the Third World subject comes to be recognized as rationalistic
economic agent, a legitimacy that would find much resonance in national political
theaters and global multicultural framings. Yet this recognition operates precisely
at the exclusion of all forms of collective politics other than those based as an
extrusion of the legitimate subject of development, the individual (FIG. 23, 24).
This differentiation, the appropriation of squatter practices into a discourse of
sympathy and admonition, is expanded to inform a policy model for allocating
housing and carrying out land reform. In the Philippines, "[siquatting (at least
initially)," we are told,
304 Ibid. p. 30.
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is caused by lack of housing for newcomers and by the absence of a rational land
policy to accommodate newcomers. Unable to buy land, they trespass. Unable to
afford the construction cost they build poorly. Unable to assert a legal claim to
possession, they band together to assert a moral claim to it and to win its political
recognition. As squatting is caused by lack of land and housing, it can be cured
only by providing land and housing."3 '
Each step, or transgression, leading to squatting is described as a result of a
dissatisfaction of an elementary human "need": the need for housing, rational
understanding, availability of land, of material, of security. Even the last link in
the chain, strongly repudiated before, when squatter's "band" together to claim
"moral" legitimacy, is explained, and explained away, through a humanistic
argument, as a result of a chain of fundamental wrongs.306
It is this division between fundamental human needs and collective political
demands that allows the analyses of squatter practices in Pakistan to be applied in
the Philippines without losing the claim to the specificity of the geopolitical
situation in question. In Pakistan, attention to the specificity of the social and
political situation was one of the fundamental points of Abrams and
Koenigsberger's mission. "In recommending any programme or legislation," the
30 Ibid., p. 30.
30' This framing defines squatting though a series of "lacks," and consequently through a
logic of demand and supply, at the root of which lies the rational subject who can
respond to the logic of demand and supply. Calculating from the number of building
permits issued and census data (giving population and number of households), a rough
estimate of in-migration, and rate of replacement of decrepit structures in and around
Manila, Abrams and Koenigsberger conclude a "housing deficit" of 8,700 houses per year
to "keep housing conditions in greater Manila at about their present condition." Ibid., p.
19. To improve conditions, if a "squatter replacement program" is to be carried out,
another 3,300 houses would be needed, bringing the net total "target to 12,000 houses per
annum for the next 6 years." These calculations, which were to become commonplace in
every five-year plan in Third World countries, however, are based on the presumption of
the rational individualistic subject who can respond to the logic of demand and supply.
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two had asserted, "it must be emphasized that neither the character not the
intensity of the problem is uniform throughout the country." 07 Yet, by mapping the
"refugee" question onto the language of individual needs and collective demands
of the core approach, Abrams and Koenigsberger translated it into a comparative
problem of development change:
The housing problem as such is therefore no longer purely a 'refugee problem'...If
there had been no refugees from India, the problem would have confronted
Pakistan, as indeed it confronts other developing countries to-day. Our first
underlying recommendation is therefore that while certain aspects of the housing
problem are emergency in nature, the problem as a whole must be viewed as long
term, requiring long term programming and long term treatment.
The core approach, by framing squatting as a practice of legitimate individual
needs and illegitimate collective demands, turns what was a political crisis of
governance into the language of "long-term" development. As such, core
constitutes a strategy of managing the space of political discussion in the
development discourse; a strategy that is able to both account for geo-political
differences between contexts as well as dismiss them.30
307 Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Program for Pakistan, op cit., p. 3.
308 ibid., p. 2.
3 It is the same logic of displacing political threats through long-term development
projects that Abrams would advance in Bolivia at the same time. When the International
Cooperation Administration (later the Agency for International Development, USAID)
rejected his proposal for a million dollar revolving fund for core houses on the argument
that "if the Bolivian knows the money comes from the United States, he won't repay it,"
Abrams shot back with the argument of political pacification through development in the
long term: "Cities like La Paz are nerve centers, and their slums are the festering places of
revolt. Even if housing is not a prime factor in promoting productivity, a million dollars
lent for housing in La Paz could have prevented incalculable losses over the longer run."
See Abrams, Report on Housing and Financing to the Government of Bolivia, 1959.
Quoted in Man's Strugglefor Shelter, op cit. p. 193.
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For the Pakistani government, this duality provided a critical alibi for its
resettlement policies. For the international experts, it allowed the tying of the
situation in Pakistan to the global pattern of Third World development, a
connection without which their advice had no leverage:
The squatting problem is not peculiar to Pakistan, but exists in Turkey, Iraq, the
Philippines, Hong Kong, Algiers, Morocco, Uganda, India, Puerto Rico, Jamaica -
in fact wherever there has been a mass movement of people to cities and an
absence of shelter in which to house them."'
In the alignment of development and national policies, however, core gives the
former the leading role. Only those national policies and interests that can be cast
in terms of the market economy favored by international financial institutions find
resonance in the core argument. In the Philippines, the landed elite with an
interest in preserving their holdings found themselves at the shorter end of the
stick under the core approach. There, the profile of the rational individualist
subject outlined by Abrams and Koenigsberger not only stood in opposition to the
opportunism of the squatters, but also stood in opposition to the irrational
opportunism of the elite who refused to make their land available to the market.
Their resistance too is described as a strategy of monopolistic corruption precisely
in terms of deviating from the above signposts of rationalistic behavior:
310 Ibid., p. 6. The framing of the threat of a political breakdown in terms of individual and
collective demands is repeated to frame the situation in Philippines as a near global
phenomenon in the Third World: "Experience in other countries suggests that the threat to
sovereignty is not an exaggerated possibility. In Jordan, disregard of property rights has
led to the disregard of contracts and to breakdown of general order. In Pakistan, the
squatters' political strength has intimidated officials and stayed their power. In Manila, the
squatters have openly threatened bloodshed if any effort is made to remove them..."
Abrams and Koenigsberger, Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit., p. 29.
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The land problem in the Philippines is not one of land hunger, but land
refrigeration - much of the land in the urban and urbanizing districts lies frozen in
the hands of owners who have no present intention of developing it. Neither the
magnetism of demand nor the temptations of profit nor the lure of liquidity seems
to provoke them into putting their land into urban use or selling it to others who
will.,"
At the scale of the individual house, core housing provided the instrument to
continuously turn squatters' assets into financial capital through incremental loans.
Under the logic of the core approach, the practice of keeping their land outside
capital markets made large-scale land holders strange bedfellows with squatters
who didn't participate in the market process.
How are these curious conflations possible? They are possible, we'll contend by
drawing on the point we made earlier, because of the erasure of the distinction
between analyses and reality in the development context. The core is presented
not as a model to understand the working of a complex reality, but as a tool to
mold the periphery in terms of the analyses itself. It was Keynes who had posited
"the three fundamental psychological factors," of individual behavior necessary to
be presumed for economic analysis, "namely, the psychological propensity to
consume, the psychological attitude to liquidity and the psychological expectation
of future yield from capital assets."312 Keynes proposed this definition of "rational
behavior," however, with an eye to the limit of its scope in reality. As Walter
311 Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands, 1959, op cit.,
p. 104.
312 Keynes, General Theory, op cit., pp. 246-47. This is a well-known passage which was
quoted by Pigou as containing "Keynes's main and very important contribution to
economic analyses" in Retrospective View, p. 20. Walter Rostow also quotes the same
passage in his Theories of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present (with a
Perspective on the Next century) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 280.
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Rostow, a famous development consultant and an economic historian at MIT, later
recalled, Keynes' postulation in the General Theory was "a self-conscious exercise
in applying to complex reality his current theoretical system."" Paul Krugman, a
strong proponent of modeling of economic arguments, justified this distinction as a
methodological necessity:
[Any] kind of model of a complex system.. .amounts to mak[ing] a set of clearly
untrue simplifications to get the system down to something that you can handle;
those simplifications are dictated partly by guesses about what is important, partly
by the modeling techniques available. And the end result, if the model is a good
one, it is an improved insight why the vastly more complex real system behaves
the way it does.'
While Krugman's teleological belief in economic modeling would only compel him
to assert that the "cycle of knowledge lost...can be regained [with better] formal
model-building,"" many an economic theorist set aside this distinction completely
as they explain the reality as a reflection of hidden economic phenomena. In
Krugman's arguments too, the making of the model, though recognized as a
simplification, is just that: a simplification that can be filled in with details to
construct a fuller picture over time.3'
3" Walter Rostow, Theories ofEconomic Growth, op cit., p. 280
314 Paul Krugman, Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1995), p. 71.
" Ibid., p. 72
316 While the construction of the model is recognized as a disciplinary tool, the historical
specificity and ideological grounding of systemization as a model of thinking itself remains
unacknowledged in this view.
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This tendency to neglect the limitations of the model becomes a uniform
occurrence in development economics. It is this distinction between model and
reality that is erased when the psychological profile of the rational individual
drawn from perfect competition models finds its way into Abrams and
Koenigsberger's analysis as an explanation of the historical moment in Pakistan
and the Philippines. The declaration of the limits of simplification, the lost details,
that should supposedly accompany the construction of a model are missing in the
Third World context. The refugee in Pakistan, or the migrant in the Philippines, is
not an abstraction because the details and complexities of context from which s/he
is abstracted are assumed to have not emerged yet. The rational individual in the
Third World is not an abstraction from the past, or the present, but a projection
into a totalizable future. The distinction between the collective irrationality of the
squatters and rationality of the individual, instead of being a characteristic of the
model of analyses, becomes the evidence of its accuracy. This displacement turns
into a preemption of the possibility of a discourse on political negotiations
inasmuch as it is continuously perpetuated under the rhetoric of progress.
This preemption is betrayed by the different role and status of policy vis-a-vis the
model. In Abrams' own advocacy, policy is presented as a tool to address the
limits of the model, to rule on the exceptions to the rule. This is also the case in
Keynesian prescriptions. Policy is calibrating the economic model to the always
exceptional and infinite complexity of reality. Under the foreclosed difference
between the model and the real under core, policy's role is not to address
exceptions but to dictate uniformity. "Sporadic concessions should not be made,"
stressed Abrams and Koenigsberger,
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"to one group which cannot be matched by concessions to others. The isolated
proposals to give the Tondo squatters land will inevitably lead to pressure for
similar concessions to other groups. It will also encourage further squatting as a
means of obtaining bonuses or valuable land cheaply."'
This uniform policy was to be based on the following principles:
a) bring land into use and create a free market in land at reasonable cost. b)
permit the expropriation of such land when essential for development and
resettlement and particularly for the housing of the lower income groups. c)
recover for the public at least part of the costs of public improvements, the
benefits of which have accrued to the owner without any exertions of his own. d)
compel land owner to pay their fair share of the upkeep of government and its
services. 1 8
These were combined with proposals for legislation enabling the power of
expropriation or eminent domain, the power to impose taxes on large land
holdings, and extended police power to regulate allotment and redistribution.
These element were proposed by Abrams and Koenigsberger on their mission to
Pakistan as well. This "uniform" approach, however, presupposes a powerful, yet
neutral and transparent state, whose interests, political and financial, are separate
from the interest of the landed and industrial elite whom it is bound to affect with
any redistribution measure.
In an exceptional report titled, Diagnosis of India's Development Problems and
Approaches to an Alternative Path, written for the Indian Council of Social Science
Research, development economist and later critic, Kalpana Bardhan, points out
while speaking from "within" the development apparatus, how any claim to the
317 Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands, 1959, op cit.,
p. 35.
318 Ibid., p. 115.
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neutrality of the state structure serves the interest of a disseminated network of
those in power, and undermines the political organization of the "poor."319
For Bardhan, development is "essentially...a process of changing or evolving
organization structures."3 0 Representational politics do not translate "effective
political power of the poor," rather only amount to "multiplying the components
of a ruling coalition," though cooperation and cooption of "middle level political
leaders," and "intermediaries," without any "base level," "hard-core organization of
the poor." "Patronage management," Bardhan argued, "has been used as a
substitute for hard core organization of amorphous poverty groups into classes
with articulated interests that are coherently pursued."32 1
As Bardhan herself would later acknowledge, the idea of class organization is also
simultaneously a ruse for covering the asymmetric participation of women in
development. Projects of women empowerment deployed from within the State
and development complex serve to rule out the possibility of subaltern resistance
to economic and social development projects and give the lie to the idea of the
neutrality of any organization project.
As Jan Van der Linden notes, though still in an effort to provide a "solution or
stopgap to the Third World housing shortage," the preparation of master planning
for New Delhi in the 1958, 1962, and later during the phase of "emergency" (1976-
319 Kalpana Bardhan, Diagnosis of India's Development Problems and Approaches to an
Alternative Path, Occasional Monographs #1, Indian Council of Social Science Research
(NewDelhi: Rakesh Press, 1977).
320 Ibid., p. 19.
321 Ibid.
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77), resulted in a system in which the state emerged as the major instrument of
speculation in land.22
The Delhi Development Authority was formed in 1957. In 1958 it hired Abrams'
fellow housing activist and planner, Catherine Bauer, who was consulted on the
master plan for Calcutta, to also help draw the first master plan for New Delhi
(1961-1981). Echoing the proposal of Abrams and Keonigsberger, the two major
tasks of the Bauer plan were: "(a) more efficient and equitable distribution of land,
by making it available to everyone at reasonable prices; (b) controlling land prices
and preventing speculation in land and its concentration in the hand of a small
minority."323
The strategy outlined to carry out these tasks was to acquire a majority of the
vacant land within the urban limits of the city through the Land Acquisition Act of
1894, which stipulated that the land owner be paid 115 per cent of the market
value of the land. After acquiring and developing the land on a sites and services
model, the DDA was to supply plots and some housing units on a 99-year lease
basis. This was thought to ensure a constant flow of revenue while leaving a
degree a control to take back the land through eminent domain if needed. 4
32 Jan Van Der Linden, Sites and Services Approach Renewed: Solution or Stopgap to the
Third World Housing Shortage? (Hants, UK: Gower House, 1986).
*2 Jan van der Linden, Land Delivery for Low Income Groups in Third World Cities (Hant,UK: Avebury, 1992). p. 62.
324 For details and history of the Delhi Plan, see, B. Misra's often quoted paper, "Public
Intervention and Urban Land Management - Experience of Three Metro Cities of India,"paper presented to the 9 EAROPH International Congress (Hong Kong: August, 1984), p.
24. Quoted in Ibid.
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The primary target of this plan were the "low-income groups" who were to be
resettled from squatter settlements throughout the city. It was thought that this
transfer would allow the demolition of these settlements on a massive scale. In
addition, the DDA was to regularize illegal land subdivision in these schemes and
throughout the city.
One of the major strategies of saving costs over the long run proposed by Abrams
and Koenigsberger in Pakistan and the Philippines was a similar policy of
acquiring land on a large scale. Echoing this proposal, as early as 1959, the DDA
too issued notifications for the acquisition of 27,520 ha. of vacant land which, at
the time, constituted about 62% of the total urban area. Yet, due to limitation of
funds, the DDA did not acquire the majority of the notified land. This limitation,
rather than serving as a drawback in achieving the required goal of savings costs,
positioned the Authority in the strategic position to influence the land market
prices and increasing its revenue, into a monopolistic position of a "land bank."
With the initial notifications the value of the majority of the available land around
New Delhi was frozen. This led to prices of the remaining "non-notified" land to
rise dramatically. As Misra notes, "[in no part of the city [did] the land prices
increase less than 25 times during the past two decades (1964-1984). Whereas,
during the same period the average per capita income had increased by only
about two times and the consumer price index of Delhi by only four times."325 This
switched the Authority's role from an instrument of public land supply to a
political and commercial instrument of land acquisition and land auctioning.
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325 Ibid., p. 28.
In the first decade after the implementation of the master plan (1961-71) some 78%
of total residential land supply ended with relatively high income owners.326
Though this was justified as a strategy of building up initial revenue reserves for
cross-subsidizing land and housing development for low-income groups, a strategy
endorsed by Abrams and Keogniberger elsewhere, it manifested itself more as a
permanent approach. The proportion of land allocated to low-income groups fell
from 55% in 1960-61 to 2% in 1970-71.321 In the second decade (1971-1981) this
situation appears to have improved substantially. This increase, however, was only
an indication of the major relocation project underway at the time.3 28 If the
relocation land is excluded from this tally, then 58% of public supply of land was
still marked for auctioning." In addition, there developed a constant market in
illegal transfer of low income plots and houses to higher income owners.
Furthermore, the general shortage and high price of land and housing supplied
through formal channels encouraged the development of a parallel "illegal" market
on the frozen land. Here too, as noted by Mitra, the Authority's power to tolerate
or regularize illegal subdivisions positioned it as an instrument of financial gain for
the owners of frozen-value land." This dual involvement in both formal and
326 Ibid., p. 29.
327 P. MacAuslan, Urban Land and Shelterfor the Poor (London: Earthscan, 1985), p. 88.
328 B. C. Mitra, "Land Supply for Low-Income Housing in Delhi," in P. Bar6ss and J. J. van
der Linden (eds.), The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World Cities(Hants: UK: Gower, 1990), p. 216.
3 Misra, "Public Intervention and Urban Land Management," op cit., p. 29.
330 Mitra, "Land Supply for Low-Income Housing in Delhi," op cit., p. 216. One of the most
notorious, yet typical example of forced relocation and of eviction of squatter was the
"juggi jhompri" scheme. The unattractive location of new plots caused allottees to sell
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informal land markets provided the basis for effectively turning the DDA in part
into a land bank and an instrument of speculation.
These developments are important to note in looking at Abrams and
Koenigsberger's proposal of land acquisition and relocation since they are
contemporaneous to their missions. Yet similar developments are dispelled by
Abrams and Koenigsberger in the Philippines as a result of "corruption" in the
state bureaucratic structure. It is precisely the framing of the planning structure as
a response to the rationalized behavior of the depoliticized subject of
development, the individual, that results in the political dimension of planning
appearing as corruption. This exclusion of the political dimension, as we saw in
the case of the DDA, help regularize the existing power and market relations. The
strategies and legislative powers proposed by Keonigsberger and Abrams enable
and provide a justification for this particular mode of (de)politicization of planning
authorities. This mode of politicization betrays the complicity of the foreign
consultants, the state and private elite interests in capitalization of land in different
contexts.
Let us now turn to John Turner's argument of funding and legalizing squatter
settlements as an alternative form of development strategy. Here we see a different
structure of incorporation of squatter politics, one that results when the expert
positions himself not as a representative of the state, but of the interests on the
ground.
their plots or refuse to pay monthly installments. The time-gap between clearance and
relocation resulted in re-squatting of cleared sites. Ibid., p. 206.
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3.7 John Turner: The Expert as Squatter
'Ingeniero, si nos habian dado las ayudas y orientaciones cuando las
necessitabamos...' 'Mr. Engineer (or Architect) if only you had helped us when we
most needed your knowledge...'
Colin Ward, editor, Anarchy*
Forfulfillment there must be a resorption [sic] of government into the body of the
community. How? By cultivating the habit of direct action instead of waiting upon
representative agencies.
Patrick Geddes in 1912, Quote by John Turner in 198232
John Turner left Britain in 1957 with Kitty Turner and Pat Crooke to work for the
municipality of Lima, Peru, as one of the architects assigned to work with various
squatter associations in and around the city. Turner stayed in Peru for eight years,
before returning to the United States to join MIT for another eight. Turner was
followed to Latin America by a wave of his fellow former students at the
Architectural Association in London. Many of them had been associated with the
famous counter-culture magazine, Anarchy, published from London in the 1960s.'
Among them was William Mangin, who published case-histories of particular
Barrio dwellers in the magazine (January, 1964) as well as several other articles
331 Colin Ward, Housing: An Anarchist Approach (London: Freedom Press, 1976), p. 77.
332 Patrick Geddes, Quoted by John Turner in "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed
Housing," op cit., p. 110. Geddes was originally quoted by Peter Cadogan, Direct
Democracy: the Casefor an England of Sovereign Regional Republics, Extra-Parliamentary
Democracy and a New Active Non-Violence of the Centre (London: Direct Democracy,
1975).
"3 The first editor of the magazine was Colin Ward, who later wrote the introduction to
Turner's famous book. A second series of the magazine was published in 1970s and
1980s. Anarchism was defined by Colin Ward as "the political philosophy of a non-
governmental society of autonomous communities." Later editors included the pulp-fiction
writer, and sub-culture historian, Stewart Home; and Martin Wright, the organizer of the
antiroyalist, Movement Against the Monarchy (MA'M).
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with Turner."' Also present in Lima at the time was Margaret Grenfell, an English
architect "working privately for owner-builders in the barriadas of Lima."335
Turner's first assignment was to work with the association of the squatters of
Arequipa, in the south of Peru, then a city of population around 100,000.336 The
work was part of an experimental office set up in 1955 to provide technical
assistance to squatters in developing their settlements. This was largely seen as an
ancillary activity. Major planning and other decisions were already controlled by a
large and powerful federation, Associaci6n de Urbanizadores Populares de
Arequipa (AUPA), which was composed of different local sub-associations. AUPA
had sanctioned the majority of the squatter growth since World War II, constituting
about "one-third to two-fifth of the metropolitan area" of the capital. The official
planning bodies had little control over this activity. Turner recalled that, "fresh
"4 John Turner and William Mangin, Barriada Movement, Progressive Architecture, 5 (May,
1968): 154-62; John Turner and William Mangin, "Benavides and the Barriada movement,"
in P. Oliver, ed., Shelter and Society (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1969), pp. 127-36. Also
see, John Turner and William Mangin, "Urbanization case history in Peru, in Mangin, ed.,
Peasants in Cities (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970). This volume also includes Turner's
"Barriers and channels for housing development in modernizing cities," pp. 1-14. Versions
of Turner's essay had appeared earlier with slightly different titles: "Barriers and channels
for housing development in modernizing countries," in Journal of the American Institute
of Planners, 33 (1967): 167-81; "Housing Priorities, settlement patterns and urban
development in modernizing countries," in Journal of the American Institute ofPlanners,
34 (1968): 354-63.
"3 See Colin Ward, Housing: An Anarchist Approach (London: Freedom Press, 1976), p.
76.
336 Turner gives further details of his assignment in chapter 6: "The Re-education of a
Professional," in Tuner and R. Fichter, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing
Process (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
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from England, [he was surprised] to be warned by strange characters that physical
harm could come to be if [he] persisted in interfering with AUPA's activities."3 37
Yet, not surprisingly, Turner claimed that good relations were soon established
between the AUPA and him and his colleagues. The reason for these amicable
relations, according to Turner, was none other then his and his fellow young
Britons' ability to identify with the interest of the "locals" in contrast to the local
elites:
Unlike the then owner of a principle national newspaper who visited the
urbanizacionespopulares at the time, we did not weep crocodile tears over their
unfinished and often incipient conditions. Like the people themselves [emphasis
added], we saw their settlements not as slums but as building sites. We shared
their hopes and found the pity and despair of the occasional visits from elitists
professionals and politicians quite comic and wholly absurd.338
The Turners lived among the squatters in a project house among the expanding
settlements. This mode of operation afforded a claim to identification and
transparency to the squatter psyche that was not available to the visiting experts.339
Turner's claim to the position of the spokesperson for and advocate of the
interests of the poor was based on positioning himself, in a manner much similar
to disequilibrium analysts, against the authority of the institutions he was in
contact with.
1 John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," in Peter Ward, ed., Self-
Help Housing: A Critique (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1982), pp. 99-113. Above
quote on pp. 100-101.
338 ibid., p. 101.
338
33A point emphasized by Turner and Fichter in chapter 6: "The Re-education of a
Professional," in Freedom to Build, op cit.
244
The government self-help schemes were funded primarily on the model of aided
self-help implemented by Jacob Crane and Rafael Pico in Puerto Rico. As Turner
later recalled, the
manual from Puerto Rico which we were using was.. .based on the assumption
that, what the North Americans call 'sweat equity' is the key to self-help
economies in housing, and that the self-helpers can therefore achieve economies
by working in organized groups, and that an outside agency is needed to set up
and administer such mutual self-help projects.4
For Turner, the model was not only unsuitable in Peru, it was unsuitable in Puerto
Rico and everywhere else in the "developing" world as well.
We quite failed to appreciate the nature and economy of direct action that people
had been taking all along and, with enormous and unnecessary effort, introduced
a far less efficient system which failed to make proper use of the resources with
which the immense number of houses all around our own project dwellings were
being built.41
In Peru, all that was needed, according to Turner, was to economically strengthen
and legally sanction what was already an established practice: "In Arequipa... it
was quite absurd to have introduced so many complications. All we really had to
do was to approve simple sketch plans, and distribute cash in appropriate stages
as each operation was completed satisfactorily."4 2
30 John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," op cit., p. 102.
341 Ibid.
342 Tuner and Fichter, chapter 6: "The Re-education of a Professional," in Freedom to Build,
op cit.
Quote from Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," op cit., p. 102.
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The force of Turner et al's proposals was based on the impossiby high figures of
housing units required by regional housing organizations such as the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In the 1965, an ECLA study predicted that
by 1975 Latin American countries would require an additional 1.5 million housing
units in urban areas alone to keep up with the housing demand. Added to this
were the substandard houses that needed to be replaced each year. Turner, as
well as other critics of the institutionally provided housing such as Peter Ward,
argued that in these estimates the standards of replacement "were often
ridiculously high." One "survey in Mexico City in 1964," Ward describes, "classified
over 90 per cent of the houses as substandard in some respect or other - even if it
was only an unglazed window in a bathroom."343
Turner and Mangin's early writing established a new sociology of squatter
settlement in the Western academic and development community. They
challenged the assumption that "slums" were, as it had been asserted to be in the
case in the history of Anglo-American cities, the site of incoming migration with
little hope for advancement." Rather, they were sites of upward economic
mobility, social organization, and democratic participation. Mangin's paper, "Latin
American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," was particularly
influential in this regard, the title of which was clearly influenced by Abrams'
paper, "Squatter Settlement: The Problem and the Opportunity," published a year
34 Carreo Econ6mico (1965) p. 62. Quoted in Peter Ward "Introduction and Purpose," in
Self-Help Housing: A Critique (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1982), p. 13.
3".John Turner and William Mangin, "Barriada Movement," Progressive Architecture, 5,
(May, 1968): 154-62; John Turner, "Housing Priorities, settlement patterns and urban
development in modernizing countries," in Journal of the American Institute ofPlanners,
34 (1968): 354-63.
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earlier. Mangin reviewed the existing literature and identified eight common
"myths" regarding the squatter settlements in the Third World:
1) The squatter settlements are formed by rural people (Indians where possible)
coming directly from "their" farms. 2) They are chaotic and unorganized. 3) They
are slums with the accompanying crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, family
breakdown, illegitimacy, etc. 4) They represent an economic drain on the nation
since unemployment is high and they are the lowest class economically, the
hungriest and most poorly housed, and their labor might better be used back on
the farms. 5) They do not participate in the life of the city, illiteracy is high and the
education level low. 6) They are rural peasant villages (or Indian communities)
reconstituted in the cities. 7) They are "breeding grounds for" or "festering sores
of" radical political activity, particularly communism, because of resentment,
ignorance, and a longing to be led. 8) There are two solutions to the problem: a)
prevent migration by law or by making life in the provinces more attractive; or b)
prevent the formation of new squatter settlements by law and "eradicate" (a
favorite word among architects and planners) the existing ones, replacing them
with housing projects."
For Mangin, the squatter settlements were not a problem, but as the title of the
paper indicated, already a solution to the cheap housing needed for the poor.
Most households had a nuclear family structure and regular employment. They
used the lots as means for economic advancement by slowly improving the
structures on them, renting part of the house or subdividing the lot.
" William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," Latin
American Research Review, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer, 1967): 65-98. Abrams paper was
prepared for US AID's Department of Housing and Urban Development and was
published as part of its Ideas and Methods Exchange series. Charles Abrams, Squatter
Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity, Ideas and Methods Exchange #63
(Washington, D.C.: Division of International Affairs, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, April 1966).
346 Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements," op cit., p. 66.
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Turner similarly argued that squatter settlements improve over time. He
documented the Pampa de Comas "squatter invasion" in a report that was later
published in a special issue of Architectural Design."' The report was filled with
photographs of the squatter settlement, which Turner called, the "un-aided self-
help solution: a demonstration of the common people's initiative and the potential
of their resources."3 4 Here he showed the progress of individual families over the
years. Even with small funds available, a structure was changed from a straw
structure to block construction over time. Collectively squatters were able to
negotiate paved streets and services from the government. Faced with limited
opportunities of economic advancement elsewhere, the households invested in the
house, improving it in situ, rather than moving to different class-divided
neighborhoods as was the case in the Anglo-American cities.1"
As we have seen in the context of Puerto Rico's self-help schemes and Abrams
and Koenigsberger's proposals, the self-help discourse had already incorporated
tradition and resourcefulness of the migrant as an important alibi of development.
347 John Turner, "Dwelling resources in South America," in Architectural Design, 37 (1963):
360-93. It is well known that Turner also situated his studies of the self-help housing as s
critique of finished housing for the poor. His report laid out in detail what happened to
the spectacular "superblocks" at Caracas which were built by the former Venezuelan
government of Perez Jimenez between 1954 and 1958 to house 160,000 people. "By the
time the dictatorship finally collapsed the superblocks were in social chaos which, even
now, has only partially resolved. The incomplete and unoccupied apartments and many
community buildings were invaded, controlled by gangs, the utilities and even the lifts
broke down, the facilities were totally inadequate, the groups were isolated by difficult
communications, from the rest of the city, and, on top of these and many other difficulties
the political situation made it extremely difficult to do anything at all."
348 Ibid. p. 375.
349A point Turner would later emphasize at a UN conference in, Pittsburgh in 1966. See
John Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions," paper presented
to United Nations Conference, Pittsburgh, 1966. Published in G. Breese, ed., The City in
Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 507-34. The
discussion of housing improvement on p. 510.
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Nevertheless, Turner, Mangin, and others situated there assertions as radical
challenges to the established developmental beliefs. The success of this
positioning stemmed from Turner et al.'s ability to situate the squatter settlement
phenomenon as a model for global human development. For Turner and his
fellow counter-culture enthusiasts, the manifestations of "spontaneous"
organization and action they witnessed in Peru's squatter settlements provided the
perfect antidote to not only the bureaucratic and ceremonial culture of Britain, but
also an answer to the alienation experienced by people in industrialized countries
from mass produced and standardized consumer culture. The squatters'
spontaneity, effort, hope, and ingenuity was not just a solution to the Third
World's housing problem, but also a way out of the standardized solutions of
social reform and social mobility offered in the developed world.
For Colin Ward, Anarchy's first editor, these principles of "un-aided self-help," a
term coined by Turner, held universal lessons of social reform that were just as
applicable to housing problems in the First World. In his preface to Turner's
second book, Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environment
(1976), Ward stressed that Turner
evolved an ideology of housing applicable to the exploding cities of the Third
World. But when he moved from South to North America.. .he found that the ideas
he formulated in Peru were also true of the richest nation in the world, and when
he returned to England.. .he found that the housing situation in Britain too fitted
his formulation. He was perhaps to his surprise, expressing universal truths about
housing."'
" John Tuner, Housing by People: Toward Autonomy in Building Environments (London:
Marion Boyars, 1976).
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It is this dimension of global humanism that is also emphasized in Turner's first
book with Fichter, Freedom to Build.351 There Turner argued that the
elementary resources for housing - land, materials, energy, tools and skills - can
only be used properly and economically by the people and the local organizations
that they can control personally, and that most plentiful and renewable resources
are in any case possessed by people as users."2
Keeping with the libertarian aspirations of Anarchy, Turner associates barriada
living as having the seed of three fundamental human freedoms: "The man who
would be free must build his own life. The existential value of the barriada is the
product of three freedoms: the freedom of community self-selection; the freedom
to budget one's own resources and the freedom to shape one's own
environment."
These freedoms were to provide an antidote to the lack of hope permeating the
standardized life offered to the poor in the Western consumer societies:
the mass of the urban poor in cities like Lima are able to seek and find
improvement through home-ownership (or defacto possession) when they are still
very poor by modem standards is certainly the main reason for their optimism. If
they were trapped in the inner cities, like so many of the North American poor,
they too would be burning instead of building. The mass-designed, mass produced
environments for an increasingly homogenized market of mass-consumers are not
more than assemblies of material goods devoid of essential meaning. They are not
the product of dialogue. Decisions are made for a producer's market by those
themselves bound by highly institutionalized norms and procedures. The occupant
351 Tuner and R. Fichter, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, op cit.
p.
352 Ibid.
"5 Ibid.
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buys or rents a ready-made unit in much the same way as he gets his motor car or
tv set-and if it is a flat or in a tightly controlled subdivision, he can do little more
with his house than he can with the other manufactured 'good' essential to his
way of life. The intense dialogue that takes place between squatters planning an
invasion, and the continuing dialogue of its development and administration are
with rare exceptions, totally lacking in the modern housing process."1
This description of the barriada life provides an "anarchist" antidote to the
deprivation of socio-cultural values faced by England and developed world in
general with industrialization. It is a correlation that, once again, is established
because the developing world is presented as in a transitional state between
tradition and modernity: "The cities of the incipiently industrializing or transitional
world, such as Lima, respond far more readily to the demands of the poor
majority. Than cities of the industrial or postindustrial world, like Chicago or New
York, respond to their poor minorities."355
This sense of freedom was the guarantee of the squatter self-formation and a
model of proper entry into modernity missed out in the West:
The squatter barriada-builder who chooses to invest his life's savings in an
environment that he creates, forms himself in the process. The person, as the
member of a family and of a local community, finds in the responsibilities and
activities of home-building and local improvement the creative dialogue essential
for self-discovery and growth. The barriada is ground for living that the housing
units, marketed or allotted by mass-consumption society, does not provide.
"5 Ibid.
"5 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
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When Architectural Design devoted another issue on self-help in August 1968, the
editors declared that in their previous study of the squatter settlements in the
"developing" countries they found, "contrary to much popular opinion, that these
serve a very positive function for their residents." The question then posed by the
editors was also, "what lessons we can draw from this work which are relevant to
the very different situation in which architects work in the developed nations?'
Turner's emphasis on individual participation does appear in stark contrast to the
importance given to "supervision" in the earlier self-help schemes. The following
remarks of Richard Margolis, who preceded Jacob Crane in organizing schemes in
Puerto Rico and later competed with Turner for several project grants in the US,
are a good example of this contrast: "Lower income groups do not understand or
believe that anyone would want to help themselves. Worse, once being convinced
of this point, they question the motive.. .what new scheme to exploit the poor is in
the wind now?""5 8
If we recall, self-help schemes in Puerto Rico had been organized on the basis of
"aided self-help" approach. When the programme began in 1949, it was organized
through regular meetings with "interested" families who were divided into
construction teams of thirty each who worked on each other's houses. The teams
were supervised by a construction supervisor and "social orientation" staff. Even
though a large number of houses (between 30,000 to 40,000) were built by the
early 1960s on the basis of the core model that allowed expansion on "individual"
3" John Tuner, "The squatter settlement: architecture that works," in Architectural Design,
38 (1968): 355-60.
358 Richard J. Margolis, Something to Build On: the Future of Self-Help in the Struggle
Poverty (Washington D.C.: International Self-Help Associates, 1967), p. 36.
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basis, restrictions were placed on the form and "standards" of construction. In the
rural areas, officials held meetings to create enthusiasm for the projects. "We want
them to want it, they must ask for it," said Rafael Pico, the Director of Social
Administration. It was deemed necessary for the organizers "to have social goals
firmly in mind" and "to combine community development with housing." In these
tasks, the foreman or supervisor had to be, Margolis later noted. "half-supervisor,
half-saint. He must cajole, teach, persuade, befriend, plead and organize.. .As the
participants often see it, the line between (organized) self-help and conscription is
extremely narrow."3"
In contrast, Turner argued with Rolf Goertz that
The principal resources for housing are those directly controlled by the people to
be housed - their own savings, their initiatives, skills and spare-time... Housing
cannot be provided on a significant scale without the voluntary contribution of the
household concerns.60
This self-critical framing served the same function as the dissenting voices of
disequilibrium analysis in development economics. Turner's criticisms, though they
appear to maintain a radical air, represent the changes in the institutional climate
of development agencies from a state sponsored to a more "market oriented"
approach. It is not surprising that Turner was the one to negotiate one of the first
loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for housing aid to Peru
based on core-based revisions of the self-help approach.361 By 1966, the arguments
3' Richard J. Margolis, Something to Build On, op cit., p. 39, 44.
360 Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions." op cit.
361 Tuner and R. Fichter, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, op cit.
p. 139.
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of Turner and others, celebrating the squatters' role in the development process,
had staked out a position of radical critique of development within the
development establishment. The UN was particularly keen to have such voices in
the mix. In 1966, in the United Nations conference in Pittsburg, Turner presented
the key paper titled, "Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policies," that
criticized existing self-help policies in developing countries and proposed that
state and international support be limited mostly to water and sewage provision
for existing settlements and to sites and services schemes for the new ones.3 2 As
Turner himself later recalled, it was Ernest Weissmann, who was one of the first to
visit Turner at Arequipa.363
Despite its opposition to the establishment, Turner's point of view continued to
find a secure place in the institutions he confounded. Soon, Turner was able to
secure a grant from HUD (US Agency of Housing and Urban Development) in
1968 to "study self-help in construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of housing
for low income families and for methods of selecting, involving and directing such
persons and families in self-help activities" in the US. For this grant, Tuner
competed, as mentioned earlier, with Richard Margolis, who had already worked
on housing in rural areas and on Indian reservations in US and Puerto Rico. In the
end, Turner and his organization, OSTI (Organization for Social and Technical
362 See John Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions." Paper
presented to United Nations Conference, Pittsburgh, 1966. Published in G. Breese, ed.,
The City in Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp.
507-34.
363 John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," op cit., p. 111. It is also
not surprising that to distinguish his agenda of individualized effort with Weissmann's
institutional approach, Tuner would remember Weissmann as "the distinguished Yugoslav
communist." Ibid.
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Innovation) received the contract which resulted in the report, "Self-help Housing
in the U.S.A." in 1969.64
3.7.1 Critiques:
Turner's work attracted a host of critiques on account of his assertion that self-help
housing, as practiced by the squatter of Lima and elsewhere in the Third World,
represented "human" values of freedom and hope because it was a practice that
was shaped by factors outside of abstract market relations. This version of self-
help was driven, Turner stressed, by the economy of directly satisfying individual
"needs." For Tuner, it was this individualized dimension that gave squatter self-
help operations a decisive advantage over institutionally provided housing that
relied on averaged data and standards.
In his second book, Housing by People, Turner expanded on this point by
differentiating between the notion of "market" and "human" value of housing.
It is entirely reasonable to speak about the market value of houses. It is also
entirely reasonable to speak about the human and social values of housing action
or housing processes. But it is absurd to mix these sets of terms and their
meaning. The performance of housing, i.e. what it does for people, is not
described by housing standards, i.e. what is materially speaking.6 ,
In Turner's formulation then, the "value" of the house could not be separated from
its "meaning" for the inhabitant, and was not just determined by its "market
364 Hans Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help
Housing," in Peter Ward, ed., Self-Help Housing: A Critique, op cit., p 28.
365 John Turner, Housing by People: Toward Autonomy in Building Environments, op cit.,
pp. 60-1.
255
value."366 For Turner, the priority to invest in housing, therefore, could only be best
estimated by the users themselves:
Only in an impossible world of limitless resources and perfect justice where
people could have their cake and eat it too could there be a coincidence of
human and material values. For the present we must accept that as long as there
are unsatisfied desires for material goods and services people must choose
between the cakes they can afford to eat. So long as this fact of life remains and as
long as people's priorities vary, the usefulness of things will vary independently of
their material standards or monetary value.36,
Turner's valorization of squatter living as a model that spoke to basic human
qualities received wide criticism, particularly from a Marxist perspective. For many
critics, Turner's argument betrayed a belief in the possibility of a set of socio-
cultural relations outside of capitalist economy. For Rod Burgess, who himself had
extensive experience in Latin American housing programs, Turner's argument
proceeds from a fundamental "confusion" regarding the definition of the
commodity and the circulation of capital in capitalism.68 Turner proceeded from
the assumption, Burgess argued, that if the self-help house is only for self-use, "it
is not a commodity." For Burgess, this is sign of a "classical error that equates use-
366 ibid.
3 John Turner, Housing by the People, op cit., p. 61. Turner himself faults burgess for this
continuist relation: "The primary question does not seem to be addressed directly in
Marxist analysis, at lest not in Burgess' interpretation. The treatment of housing as a
wholly dependent product of the socio-economic and political system that should be
supplied to all citizens as a 'right' implies a very limited range of relations and uses,
whether these are monetary or non-monetary. If housing is denied the status of an
instrument, or a potential instrument at least, for action by people then, as far as local
communities are concerned, housing is a product, not an activity."
368 Rod Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy: A Curious Form of Radicalism. A Critique
of the Work of John F. C. Turner," in Peter Ward, ed., Self-Help Housing: A Critique, op
cit., pp. 55-97.
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value with total utility and identifies market-value [only] as the ratio of
exchange." 369
Burgess points to the "dialectical interaction" between use-value and exchange
value emphasized by Marx to argue that what is deemed outside of the capitalist
circuit by Turner is very much an integral part of it.
The commodity is the direct unity of use and exchange value.. .The commodity is
use-value but as a commodity it is simultaneously not a use-value. It would not be
a commodity, if it were a use-value for its owner, that is a direct means for the
satisfaction of his own needs... The commodity is a use-value for its owner only
insofar as it is an exchange value. The commodity therefore still has to become a
use-value... a use-value for others.70
The separation between use and exchange value imagined by Turner, Burgess
argues, stems from a confusion regarding the
particular characteristics of land and housing within capitalist society. First, both
have always been an important method of storing actual and future use- and
exchange-value. Second, in comparison with other goods and services they only
rarely assume the commodity form because they enter relatively infrequently into
the exchange process; and thirdly, the use-values that people find in them are
highly variable...
This point is also emphasized by Emilio Pradilla, a well known critic of Turner's
work. For Pradilla, in seeing self-help housing as outside the relations of
exchange, Turner ignores the distinction between housing as "real" commodity
369 Ibid. p. 59.
370 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p.
413. Quoted by Burgess in ibid., p. 60.
371 Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit., p. 60.
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and housing as a "potential" commodity.3 72 Indeed Turner, at moments, appears to
validate these criticisms when he argues that "to treat housing as a commodity is
silly enough but to assume that it must or should be supplied by ever-larger
pyramidal structures and centralizing technologies is suicidal." 73 According to
Burgess, to see self-help as part of the capitalist economy is not to argue for more
centralized control: "[I]t is nonsense," Burgess stresses, "to look at low-income
housing in terms of use-values alone particularly when its constituent elements
have either already been given a value or are in the process of being valorized by
the labour input."74
For other prominent Marxist critics of urbanization such as Harvey and Manuel
Castells, Turner's insistence to see self-help in term of use-value alone stems from
his preconception to see capitalism as a process typified by the production of
commodities, from which one can voluntarily escape, and not as a generalized
mode of socio-economic production which has "valorization" of capital as its end.
Turner insists, these critics maintain, on seeing housing and urbanization as objects
and processes respectively that, if taken out of circuits of commodity production,
can be matched with user needs.37' For Manuel Castells and Chris Pickvance, this
372 Emilio Pradilla and Carlos Jim6nez, Notas acera del problema de la vivienda, Ideologia y
Sociedad (Bogoti), 16 (Manuary/March): 70-108; Also see, Manuel Castells (ed.),
Estructura de Clases y Politica Urbana en Amirica Latina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones SIAP,
1974).
"7 John Turner, Housing by the People, op cit., p. 37.
*' Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit.
"7 See David Harvey, SocialJustice and the City (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1973); Manuel Castells, Clase, estado y marginalidad urbana, in Castells, ed., Estructura de
clase ypolfica urbana en Amdrica Latina (Buenes Aires: Ediciones SIAP, 1974); Manuel
Castells, City Class and Power (London: Macmillan, 1979).
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perspective results from the improbable conceptual position of seeing the city as a
theoretical object in itself...6 ...
In light of these criticisms, Burgess argues that
it is fair ask if [for Turner] the cost of production of a house, the level of effective
demand and the size of the housing problem are determined by technology and its
managerial and legal organization per se; or whether it is the manipulation of these
elements by the dominant capitalist mode of production that determines such
considerations. This is, of course, a time-honoured argument and centres on the
most important question that confronts the students of the Third World: can those
problems that we are all so ready to identify be more correctly understood as
properties of a specific mode of production, or as urban/industrial or technological
per se?378
For these critics, Turner, despite his self-positioning as the advocate for the poor,
performed a critical role containing political dissatisfaction and economic demands
at minimum expense for the very institutions he so vehemently criticized. Turner
de-politicised, the critiques maintained, the question of housing and purged it of
issues of class struggle over the use and accessibility of resources. By presenting
the poor as organized, self-disciplined and motivated groups, Turner ignored
political paternalism and fractional infighting, as well as the negotiations with the
police and authorities that accompany squatter invasions. Also ignored is the
376 Manuel Castells and Chris G. Pickvance, Urban Sociology (London: Tavistock
Publications, 1976).
"7 For other authors such as Raymond Aron and Ralf Dahrendorg, writing from a similar
Marxist perspective, the use-value and exchange value divide frames the housing as a
primarily a technical and administrative issues and stems from seeing technological and
administrative character of industrialization as the primary determinant of social forms.
See, Raymond Aron, 18 Lectures on Industrial Society, trans. M. K. Bottomore (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967); Ralf Dahrendorg, Class and Class Conflict (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1959).
378 Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit., p. 64.
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cynical manipulation of squatter groups for vote catching, land grapping, and
financial gain by other political parties. For Castells, it is precisely through such
manipulations that the "State becomes though its arrangement of space the real
manager of everyday life. 379
For Burgess, Turner sees
the effects of urban policy on the structure of the Latin American city... as a
distortion of the model. This is very dubious because a settlement model that is
adequate for the Latin American reality must be able to unite conceptually the
activities of the State and other interests involves in the housing and settlement
process, for these are not distortions but rather integral processes in the evolution
of the Latin American urban structure.380
Other acute critics of Turner, such as Hans Harms, go further to assert that the
popularity of Turner's proposals stem from its cadence for the status quo.
[G]overnments have become interested in self-help as a policy to avoid the
distribution of surplus value; self-help processes are being used as a means of
stimulating savings.. .from the poorest groups. This policy provides the dominant
groups with a chance to appear liberal (not repressing self-initiatives but
promoting them) and at the same time allocating very few resources to an
operation in which the lower paid people had to pull themselves by their own
bootstraps out of a situation of misery.38
3 Manuel Castells, La Cuestion Urbana, 2nd ed. (M6xico DF: Siglo XXI, 1976), p. 80.
Translated and quoted in by Rod Burgess in "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit., p. 75.
380 Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit., p. 75.
381 Hans Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help
Housing," op cit., p. 49. Hans argues further that "Self-help does not reduce the total
'socially necessary labour' for the production of housing. Rather it increases it, and
moreover it shifts the responsibility from... State to the users. Self-help policies allow cost
accounting in housing to be shifted from societal costs to individual and family
costs... [resulting in] increase[ing] the overall amount of unpaid labour in society." Ibid., p.
20.
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The brunt of this criticism falls on the insistence of Turner and others, such as
Mangin and Colin Ward, on seeing self-help as a sphere separated from the
capitalist mode of production. Yet the Marxist critics, in insisting on a dialectical
relationship between use-value and exchange value, nevertheless maintain them as
separate spheres as well. The dialectical relationship between use value and
exchange value emphasized by Burgess, Harms, and Castells holds the socio-
cultural sphere as a direct means of producing economic relations (i.e., the family
as means to produce the worker). In this continuist relationship, feminist critiques
of patriarchal relations can only enter the umbrella of Marxism under a
paternalistic shadow of economic relations.
3.7.2 Negation of a Negation:
Imbued in economic relations or separated from them, for both Turner and his
critics, the development subject is taken to be a given. The question of how this
subject is constituted as a differential between the economic and socio-cultural
notions of tradition and modernity, the individual and the social, development and
underdevelopment, is ignored. If Turner imagines the development subject outside
of capitalist relations then the Marxist critics operate a reversal, and imagine the
development subject as completely determined by those relations.
In both the readings, the possibility of the development subject appearing as an
effect of the unacknowledged appropriation of a shifting differential between these
domains is precluded. It is not surprising that all the Marxist criticisms aimed at
Turner's propositions remain silent regarding the subject of development. The
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focus remains on the working of the socio-economic relations and the
impossibility of independent agency within them. The presence of architecture in
this domain, however, affords a different reading of the relationship between the
socio-cultural and the economic that points to a necessarily ambiguous open
ended textuality.
It is the constitution of this unacknowledged unity between subject and agency,
marked by a separation between the individual and collective choice, that we
have charted in the work of Abrams and Koenigsberger. There, it was the practice
of building core houses that bestowed a sense of independence on the individual
subject and tied it to a logic of collective rationality without undermining the
notion of individual agency.
The Marxist critiques miss this textuality when they assert that Turner's most
critical affront to his stated goals of social welfare is to emphasize privatization as
the means to achieve them. For example for Harms, it is this emphasis that allows
"Self-help housing [to be] used as an inexpensive policy for housing provision
without changes in resource allocation or structural changes. The emphasis [has
been] on privatizing the problem to the individual household away from collective
action.,,182 These assertions are based on a linear relationship between social
formations and economic consequences: Privatization leads to economic
exploitation by reducing the cost of reproducing labor.
382 Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help Housing," op
cit., p. 23.
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This linear logic is evident in Burgess' statements as well, who insists that self-help
is part of "a constant expansion of the sphere of commodity production for
capitalist exchange... [an] expansion is a necessary condition of capitalist
development and not an effect of it."383 If, however, we consider the relationship
between the social and the economic as a continuous shifting differential then self-
help appears irresolutely as both the condition and the effect of the circuit of
capitalist expansion. The focus then shifts from just the notion of privatization to
the particular form of privatization advanced through self help and how it allows
unacknowledged appropriation of value in the differential between the notions of
the private and the public.
In the specific form of privatization proposed by Turner, and Abrams and
Koenigsberger before him, the individual agency, emphasized in the move
towards private effort and resources, conforms to a rational logic only on a scale
beyond the individual. The actions of the choosing individual fit into a rational
mold despite him/herself. This positioning frames the rational behavior projected
onto the development subject as an originary, quasi-natural sensibility.
Consequently, this rational subject stands as the justification of the State, and not
as its effect. The preservation or realization of his/her rational behavior is framed
as a human right and not one that should be claimed as a political one against
political interests.
This staging, however, does not answer the critical question: why architecture?
Why does architecture, whether in the mode of earlier self-help schemes, the core
383 Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," op cit., p. 62.
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house, or slum redevelopment advocated by Turner and others, form a critical
aspect of this staging of subject and agency?
Architecture plays a critical role in this staging, for it is architecture as activity that
posits the individual behavior as rational, yet maintains that rationality as originary,
and not political. Abrams and Koenisgberger reminded us in the Philippines that
development holds the desire for home ownership is a orginary human aspiration:
Peoples' attitudes toward savings are one of the most important factors in the size
of savings. Their attitudes are favourable toward savings when savings becomes a
means of acquiring the commodity they yearn for most. A home on a piece of
land they can call their own is one of the great human aspirations."384
Architecture is the terrain, the site of the constitution of the development subject,
on which the subject appears rational, but rational in a way that precedes her
constitution as a development subject. It is important to note that in the statement
above, the propensity to build is not described as a phenomenological or a
material need. It is the human desire for a home, and not the bodily need for
shelter, that drives people to home ownership. It is this partially, this irresolute
differential between the modern and premodern, attributed to architecture that
allows it to stage this development subject. It is this irresolution that allows
translating the building activity into circuits of finance and industrial production
despite the individual builder and yet maintains it outside the realm of political
demands and rights because of him/her.
384 Abrams and Koenigsberger, A Housing Programfor the Philippine Islands, 1959, op cit.,
p. 49.
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The architect's role in this domain is not to design form-that much is guaranteed
by the human desire for home-but to tie the inevitable realization of individual
desire, the inevitable emergence of form, to industrial production and finance so
that it matches the presumed social needs. It is this quality that Turner appeals to
when he describes institutionally provided housing as "aesthetically hideous,
socially alienating and technically incompetent architecture."385
Turner's critics miss his emphasis on the setting up a differential between tradition
and modernity sustained by architecture when they take his statement that "to treat
housing as a commodity is silly," as a declaration of the phenomenological and
natural status of architecture outside the economic. For Turner, the promotion of
use-value-or "human value," the term he'll use later-does not require the
elimination of all relations to the logic of market economy. Only, he advocates
relating "use-values" to circuits of exchange in a non-linear fashion.
This diffusion of the linear relationship between the social and the economic is
evident in Turner's insistence that housing is not an object but a site of the
constitution of the development subject, a point Turner had emphasized with
Fichter in his book as well:
if housing is perceived as functions of what housing does in the lives of its users -
of the roles which the processes play in their life-history and not in the material
qualities of the physical products, then the material worth of the objects and the
manner of their production are entirely dependent on their highly variable uses.386
385 Turner, Housing by People, op cit., p. 49.
386 Turner and Fichter, Freedom to Build, op cit., p. 159.
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Turner sustains an irresolute differential between the "market" and "human
aspirations," between tradition and modernity. Responding to Burgess' criticism
Turner argues:
The second of the three basic issues raised in Housing by People and discussed by
Burgess, is that of value. The [question] as I put it is 'What it does versus what it is.'
Perhaps through lack of clarity on my part, Burgess has misinterpreted this as
meaning 'use-values versus market-values.' The case that I am arguing is that
values lie in the relationship between subjects and objects, and not in subjects and
objects alone. It would be illogical and inconsistent of me to deny market-values,
or to suppose that they could or should be eliminated - the secondary issue of
use-value 'versus' market-value is a question of balance, not of exclusion.'
Turner's affront to his stated goals lies in not simply attributing a
phenomenological need for human shelter to the squatters, casting them outside
the circuits of capitalism into some natural state of use-values, but on arguing for
the presence of a modern rationalistic quality in their behavior that precedes the
emergence of law and politics.
In all of these formulations, the squatter, despite of all the resourcefulness and
ingenuity attributed to him/her, constitutes a truncated subject of development,
differentiated in a manner that allows only a promised, but perpetually delayed,
entry into the discourse of political demands and labor rights. His/her rationality is
one that is already assumed to precede development, not taken to emerge as an
effect of an embattled and political process.
In Turner's framing, the form of the house is no longer necessary to map this
truncated relation between the individual and the social. This difference results
387 Turner, "Issues in Self-help and Self-Managed Housing," op cit., p. 105.
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from the shift in the terrain of development, from the field of industrial
production, to the field of finance capital. Yet, nevertheless, the idea of
architecture is crucial for implementing a similar logic of displaced rationality that
was operational in Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposals. Attempting to read
these displacements and value differentials set by them is a fundamental question
in our inquiry into the alternative and formless history of modern architecture and
planning in the development arena.
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4 Pushing Patterns: Planning the Third World City
"This century has been a losing battle with the issue of quantity." This statement,
penned by Rem Koolhass in the section on urbanism in SMLXL, sums up the
relationship of modernization to the burgeoning Third World metropolis, a site
where, we are told, all logics of modern urban planning have been defeated."' In
the next few pages Koolhaas takes us to Singapore. Here, however, we learn that
not all battles are lost in the same way. Sometimes a winning battle can be an
ultimate defeat. In Singapore, modernism did not lose its struggle with the rising
urban population, but won it many times over. It is the horror of this victory that
Koolhaas narrates for us here. The Singapore Housing Development Board (HDB)
relentlessly pursued the modernist planning principles till it turned the entire
island into a constant "tabula rasa," forever caught in the process of destruction,
displacement, and redevelopment (FIG. 25). Koolhaas tells us, "The civil servant-
the bureaucracy of Singapore-are obsessively active. Like horsemen of the
Apocalypse, they will not rest before the entire island is plowed over, made utterly
unrecognizable."389 The result is a city without a "songline," a tabula rasa gone
mad, a "Disneyland with a death sentence." 390
388 Rem Koolhaas, and Bruce Mau, Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Officefor
Metropolitan Architecture (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995). Hereafter cited as SMLXL.
389 ibid., p.1033.
390 The section is called "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis... or Thirty
Yeas of Tabula Rasa," ibid. pp. 1009-1089.
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For Koolhaas, what is lost in the monotonous rows of the island's housing towers,
marching down the landscape in militaristic formation, is quality-that elusive
Other of quantity-the commitment to which can be witnessed in the ideological
convictions of modernist manifestos in the West. Singapore, however, we are told,
is "modernity stripped of ideology."391 In Singapore, there is no embarrassment at
a soulless modernism. In fact, "it is shown with pride," Koolhaas tells us. "They
think there is no crime, we think there can be no pleasure."39 2
The seeds of Singapore's "Herculean" obsession with quantity, Koolhaas asserts,
were planted by a UN mission composed of "American Charles Abrams, the then
stateless and formerly-German Otto Koenigsberger, and the Japanese Susumu
Kobe," that arrived in Singapore in 1963.393 The UN experts argued, we are told,
that to prepare for the onslaught of urban growth that was to accompany the
pursuit of modernization, Singapore must create a comprehensive plan for the
entire island. For the UN mission, the solution was to lay out a "cluster of cities"
based on the Dutch model of "the Ring City," in which a group of major towns
such as Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht, Delft, The Hague, Leiden, Dordrecht, and
Rotterdam, formed a large circle around a central stretch of open country. It was a
mistake, Koolhaas argues, to attempt to reproduce through planning what has
been a self-evolving process in Europe.
391 Ibid., p. 1021.
392 Ibid.
*93Ibid., p 1024.
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Yet, for Koolhaas, what sealed Singapore's fate was not just the idealism of the UN
recommendation itself, but also the "inscrutable nature of the Asian mentality.",1 4 In
the hands of Singapore's HDB, the UN report became a horror of modernity,
destroying that curious balance between quantity and quality that the Ring City
idea had achieved for the Dutch. Singapore was a network of clusters that kept
growing till the distinction between cluster and open space was replaced by a
monotonous infill of modernist blocks (FIG. 26). For Koolhaas, this incessant and
incestuous reproduction of density on density, quantity on quantity, represents the
quintessential condition of Third World urbanization, a condition that would
reproduce the same sense of estrangement and fascination when Koolhaas and
others would visit China's booming economic zone, the Pearl River Delta, for the
Harvard Graduate School of Design's Project on the City.'9 ' For Koolhaas, the Asian
mentality, bent on producing a "rogue Europe" in the heart of Asia, cannot discern
the delicate balance between the essential conditions of modernism, the balance
between quantity and quality, density and openness, mobility and settlement.
From the perspective of this dissertation, this irrecognition of Asia's modernism
hides the long history of modern architects and planners' critical involvement with
the Third World that we have sketched so far. As we have seen, UN missions such
as Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Kobe's mentioned by Koolhaas were not
bureaucratic nemeses of modernism, but the very mode through which the
3 Ibid., p. 1037.
"9 Rem Koolhaas, Jeffrey Inaba, et al., eds., Project on the City: Harvard Design School
(K61n: Taschen, 2001).
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modern architects and planners sought to find opportunities in the decolonizing
world after the Second World War.
The erasure of this history is betrayed in Koolhaas' description of the Singapore
UN mission itself. Koolhaas describes Koenigsberger as a "stateless" bureaucrat on
account of his being a refugee from Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Koenigsberger at
the time, however, was neither stateless nor a bureaucrat in the conventional
sense of being disconnected with the modernist movement implied by Koolhaas.
Koenigsberger was closely related to the CLAM circle,396 and had also established a
formidable career in India where, in March 1950, he had become an Indian citizen
on the special recommendation of Jawaharlal Nehru. Though he returned to the
UK in 1951, he kept his citizenship until 1991, when he was forced to renounce it
under duress from the British government.
Geo-politically speaking, the phenomenon of Koolhaas and other architects on the
global stage today is very different from that of the development expert in the 50s
and the 60s. Yet, the contemporary architects' presence on the global stage is
based on a set of assumptions regarding the Third World city that were shaped by
modern architects and planners' earlier involvement with institutions of Third
World development. It is precisely by ignoring this relationship with the history of
Third World development planning-and the financial and economic space
396 As mentioned earlier, Koenigsberger had already been on a mission with Vladimir
Bodiansky and Charles Abrams to the Gold Coast.
397 In Britain, his activities as a pedagogue, planner, and expert on the Third World during
the 1950's and the 60's cast a critical influence on the direction and curriculums of
architectural academies in London, particularly the Architectural Association [AA] and the
Barlett School [UCLI. It was in the AA of the 1960s that Koolhass received his formal
education in architecture, a period that he would later describe as the coming to age of
his generation.
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opened by it-that modern architects' current global involvements, chasing the
postwar flight of capital to new economic territories, can simply be described as
following a self-perpetuating historical process of globalization, rather than part of
a process with a particular history, one in which modern architecture has been
critically involved.
One of the most pervasive of these shared assumptions has been the framing of
the Third World city as an exploding demographic mass that is unable to
formulate its own emergence into modernity. So far, we have seen how this
inability is staged through the idea of self-help to legitimize various strategies and
modes of direct and indirect socio-economic intervention. In this section we will
look at the idea of historical change inherent in arguments that describe this
inability as an effect of the rapid pace of urbanization in the Third World. At the
scale of the city, the operative term is not self-help or core, but pattern. The
challenge for urban planners seeking to curb the flow of rural-urban migration is
to identify patterns of social and cultural change, patterns of settlement, of
displacement, patterns of economic investment, of physical resources, and
somehow juxtapose all of them through comprehensive and regional planning so
that they yield the desired pattern of development.
398 We have seen how this inability, manifests itself at various scales of development, from
the core house to the squatter settlements. It is sometimes framed as a shortcoming, as
was the case in the early self-help models, and sometimes it is celebrated as a sign of
traditional resilience to mass produced modernization, as was done by Turner and later
self-help advocates. Both the positions, however, share the idea of modernization as a
process that looses its ethical and moral bearings with the speed of socio-cultural change.
Moreover, this projected inability takes the effect, the socio-cultural conditions of the
inhabitants, for the cause. What is excluded from this metalepsis, is how particular
development and modernization policies dictated by the World Bank, the UN, and the
Third World national governments themselves, actually produced these conditions.
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The term pattern appears throughout urban planning literature on development.
Its preponderance, we will argue in this section, stems from the need to find
models of intervention that present development as a continuation of the existing
socio-cultural structures rather than a rupture and an external imposition. The term
patterns inheres a sense both of continuation and change and betrays a model of
expertise and intervention based on ideas of cooperation and participation, a
model that fulfills the requirement of the postwar geo-political arena, both past
and present.
4.1 Changing Patterns:
Let us begin with one of the better known proposals of population movement and
settlement in the postwar era, namely the "Cluster City" projects of Alison and
Peter Smithson in the 1950s. 99 The so-called "clusters" were composed of
interconnected housing, office, and commercial blocks that, in turn, were
connected with similar clusters through a series of highways. The Smithsons,
together with other future members of Team 10 such as Jaab Bakema and George
Candillis, carried out a number of these studies throughout the fifties, beginning
with more abstract proposals presented at CLAM meetings, to competition entries
such as the Haupstadt Berlin Plan of 1957 (FIG. 27).
What is of interest to us here is the relationship between stability and change that
the Smithsons called the "patterns of associations."'01 These projects have been
399 See Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson, ed., "Urban infra-structure," in Team 10
Primer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), pp. 59-73.
400 Included in the competition entries is a study of London Roads system in 1959. Ibid.,
pp., 42, 51, 56.
401 Ibid., p. 55.
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seen as examples of modern architects' fascination with technologies of movement
and communication. Indeed, mobility formed a key component of the schemes,
featuring the automobile as a democratic symbol of communication. The projects
presented, according to the Smithsons, the "theme of the road system as the basis
of the community structure. 2 Yet, there is another ingredient in the mix: density.
Every cluster, the Smithsons stressed, was an equilibrium of the forces of mobility
and density particular to that context. "To accept the dispersal implied in the
concept of mobility," the Smithsons argued, also meant "...to re-think accepted
density patterns and location of functions in relation to the new means of
communication."401 If mobility represented the freedom to communicate, then
density represented the judgment to settle. Together they formed the vectors of a
democratic society. One is inextricably tied to the other. Have only unconstrained
mobility, and you have chaos. Let the forces of density rein uninterrupted, and you
have congestion.
The Smithsons use of the term pattern to designate this shifting balance is
important. Through the idea of pattern of associations, the Smithsons attempted to
propose a model of urbanization that escaped the sequential linearity of master
planning then in vogue in CIAM circles. 4 For the Smithsons, if the contemporary
402 Ibid., p. 52.
403 Ibid. p. 58. Proper relationship of "[d]ensity and intensity," the Smithsons argued, "will[result] in communities of much greater genuine variation of living pattern." Ibid. p. 64.
For example, when in 1943 Jose Luis Sert and Sigfried Giedeon published a short
manifesto on urban planning with artist Fernand L6ger called, The Nine points on
Monumentality, the authors assigned the role of social change to the architect who
designed the new democratic monuments of modernization such as the centers of civic
and communal life. As Joan Ockman has noted, The Nine Points remained unpublished till
it was included by Giedion some fifteen years later in his Architecture, You and Me: The
Diary of a Development. The individual articles by the three authors, however, appeared
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Western cities were given proper infrastructure, the society would transform itself
according to the forces of mobility and density in the pattern of the clusters. In
the Smithsons proposal, as well as in those of other members of the later Team 10,
the architect, instead of claiming to be the sole agent of writing the script of
stability and change, handed over the responsibility of urban change to the
inhabitants of the city. The architect/planner only provided the framework of
stability and change.
The active agent of negotiating the dynamic of urban life was the "changing man,"
the modern subject of the cluster city."' At present, the Smithsons argued, this
changing man was repeatedly exposed to an outdated reality that provided no
outlet for his stress and built up a sense of frustration. 406 All he could see from the
window of his commuter train were the monotonous rows of backyard gardens.
The changing man wanted to see the reality of his dynamic mode of living
expressed aesthetically. He wanted to exercise the choices of mobility and
settlement provided to him by the modern society. The pattern of clusters
provided an opportunity to exercise this democratic choice.
Indeed it is this self-evolving "pattern of association" between the forces of
mobility and density, movement and settlement that the Smithsons saw depicted in
in different places, assigning the same primary to the architect as the agent of socio-
cultural change. Giedion and Sert published "The Need for a New Monumentality," and
"The Human Scale in City Planning," respectively, in Paul Zucker's 1944 collection of
essays, New Architecture and City Planning. See Joan Ockman, "The War Years in
America: New York, New Monumentality," in Guido Hartray and Xavier Costa, eds., Sert:
Arquitecto en Nueva York (Barcelona: Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona, ACTAR,
1997), pp. 22-45.
405 Team 10 Primer, op cit., p. 12.
406 ibid., pp. 66-68.
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Geddes' famous "valley section" that formed the frontispiece of Team 10's 1954
Doom manifesto (FIG. 28).407 "To comprehend the pattern of human associations,"
it was declared, "we must consider every community in its particular
environment." 40 8
Yet, the comparison of the logic of the clusters with that of Geddes' diagram is
made possible by a sleight of hand. In redrawing the Geddes section in the
manifesto, the Smithsons' created a mirroring by combining the original section
with its reflection. This doubling underplays the possibility of reading the original
diagram as a linear development. Like the Geddes diagram, the Smithsons' version
also seeks to highlight the relationship between different settlement types and
their environment. Yet, it attempts to do more. The new diagram is presented as a
negotiation between different settlements and the space between the settlements
marked as "field."40 9 Each settlement stands as a precarious moment poised at the
possibility of expanding or shrinking toward the adjacent settlement. Instead of
depicting different settlements as benchmarks of socio-ecological development, the
Smithsons' diagram seeks to present them as an active negotiation between density
and mobility, or in other words, as a "pattern."
Ironically, for the Smithons, the prime examples of this self-evolving, democratic
expression of population movement and settlement were the colonial projects of
Atbat Afrique, CIAM's offshoot in the French Moroccan and Algerian protectorates.
407 Ibid. p. 57
408 ibid.
409 The version of the Smithson's diagram with the word, "field" is shown by Jos Bosman
in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modem Movement," The Last CALMs, Rassegna,
special issue 52:4 (December 1992).
276
When Atbat members, Shadrach Woods, George Candillis, and Michel Ecochard
presented their Moroccan housing projects at the outskirts of Casablanca-such as
the Nid d'abeille housing-at the 9*' CIAM meeting in Aix en Provence in 1953, all
of the CIAM, older and younger members alike, saw them as evidence of the new
thinking on urban planning.'" Indeed, Atbat emphasized density and mobility as
the primary forces shaping the traditional Moroccan bidonville (FIG. 29)." Yet, the
apparent contradiction of holding projects of colonial reform, carried out under a
colonial administration, as examples of democratic urbanization does not appear
as a contradiction at all, neither to the designers nor to the audience. The colonial
administrators appear transparent. This is stranger still since, at the time, Michel
Ecochard was the Director of Town Planning of the French Protectorate of
Morocco.
This apparent transparency, however, is based not on a belief in the benevolence
of the colonial civilizational mission. Rather, the late stages of French colonial
presence in Morocco are seen as something already beyond colonization. The
architects are seen as development experts, as transparent conduits, not fulfilling
the agenda of a particular colonial power, but helping different populations realize
the global aspirations of technological advancement. As the Smithsons put it:
[we] believe that if so many architects are interested nowadays in the [settlements]
of the Indian (the Pueblos) or in that of the Negroes in Africa, it is because here
one may still recognize the spatial expression of the whole population. We should
not forget, nevertheless that this population is leading afierce battle in order to be
410 Vittorio Gregotti, "Editorial," The Last CLAMs, op. cit. p. 5.
411 Jos Bosman "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," op cit.
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equipped with modem techniques which were developed in different countries of
Europe, of America and Russia [emphasis added]. 2
The Smithsons' statement betrays a shift from the perspective of colonial
anthropology and its focus on preservation that characterized the earlier avant-
gardes' fascination with the "primitive" in colonial territories, to advocating
technologically based change. There is an assertion of both sameness and
difference in the statement above. On the one hand, the Pueblo Indian and the
African Negroes are described as different from the Western civilization for having
retained what has been lost in the West (the ability to represent the fundamental
expressions of population as a whole). On the other hand, a certain parallel is
constructed between the Western and non-Western worlds when they are
described as developed and underdeveloped contexts. The populations of the
underdeveloped world, leading a fierce battle for technological development, are
presented as an extension of the subject of modernization in the developed world,
the changing man of the Cluster City projects. The presumed desire of the
changing man reflects the assumed consent to modernization in the Third World
population. Both are seen as participants in the project of molding the pattern of
historical forces that define them. To the extent that this dialectic of symmetry and
asymmetry serves to hide the different underpinnings of socio-economic
intervention in the two contexts, it betrays a new mode of participatory
development. The plural subject of development planning in one context appears
similar to the singular subject of the welfare-state in the other. Implicit in this
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4' Team 10 Primer, op cit., p. 28.
mode is the positioning of the expert as an aid in facilitating a historical change
that is already underway.
4.2 (Dis)Functions of Density:
The Smithsons' use of Ecochard's projects as an example of this model of change
becomes even more ironic in retrospect. The same year, in 1953, Ecochard secured
a consultancy position with the United Nations to design the refugee housing at
Landhi, near Karachi, the first federal capital of the newly established government
of Pakistan after the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947. The project
ignited a controversy around its usefulness and around the usefulness of its
designer that betrays the consequences of inattention to the language of
participatory development and historical continuation implicit in the term pattern.
In his application to the United Nations and the government of Pakistan, Ecochard
presented the Moroccan projects as a major credential of technological
development (FIG. 30)." For Ecochard, the refugee housing in Karachi presented
a similar problem of rural-urban migration that Atbat had resolved in Casablanca.4 14
If Karachi was mapped into sectors of varying densities, Ecochard agued, it
disclosed more than the geography of population concentration. The result was
also a map of needed population movement. The problem of Karachi's
modernization, according to Ecochard, was not just settling its refugee population,
41 Michel Ecochard, "Study of Satellite Cities for Refugees and Industrial Worker at
Landhi," Karachi, Pakistan, File no. TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations
Archives, New York.
41 Michel Ecochard, "The Problem of Refugees in Karachi: 1' and 2"d Reports," December,
1953, File no. TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.
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but also resettling its congested areas (FIG. 31).4' The city's refugee problem had
to be considered as part of a broader dynamic of density and mobility suitable for
modernization. The new refugee housing proposal did not just fulfill the
immediate need of providing shelter. Instead, it provided an evolving
"framework" in which the refugees kept moving into settlements of different
densities with increasing modernization and accompanied by a rise in the
"standards of living" (FIG. 32).4
For Echocard, the primary means for managing the dynamic of modernization was
housing based on CIAM's four functions, called "circulation," "living," "care of
body and spirit," and "working" as mentioned in Ecochard's UN report on
417Pakistan. Consequently, Ecochard designed site plans for housing of varying
densities that employed the language of four functions: each settlement was
composed of individual neighborhoods that surrounded schools, commercial
centers, and parks, and was connected to Karachi's industrial and business districts
through public transportation (FIG. 33).418
Ecochard argued that his proposal would bring the relationship of mobility and
settlement in Karachi in line with the patterns of association so admired by CLAM
members. Yet, the influx of refugees and migrants in Karachi refused to follow
Ecochard's appraisals. The reality of Karachi's changing environment proved to be
4" Michel Ecochard, "The Problem of Refugees in Karachi: 2 "d Report," December, 1953, op
cit.
416 ibid.
417 Ibid. p. 12.
418 ibid.
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quite different from the logic of four functions that assumed the presence of an
established welfare state with investment in public infrastructure and ample
employment opportunities. 419 Even before Ecochard had finished writing the final
project report, it became obvious that the approach of providing "finished"
housing could neither meet the calculated demand nor be furnished with the
required investments in infrastructure.4 Given the limited resources, only certain
parts of the proposed plans could be approved. Karachi Improvement Trust, with
which Ecochard was attached, disagreed with the scheduling of the tasks and
objected to the extended "functions" attached to the plans.
Ecochard, in principle, should not have been there to answer these objections. Yet
just as his contract with the UN was about to terminate, he had signed up for an
independent commission with the Pakistan government to design the Karachi
University campus. For Ecochard, the decision to put another development project
on his resume culminated in a minor scandal. His extended stay in the city on
another major project while the last one proposed by him was being contested
raised a debate in the local government circles on the adequacy of his proposals.
Ecochard defended his decision to stay as well as his refugee housing proposal by
arguing that all he wanted "to do [was] some useful work for the good of Pakistan
41 Ibid.
42 These "difficulties" were acknowledged by Eleanor M. Hinder, Chief, Office for Asia
and the Far East, Programme Division, UN Technical Assistance Administration, in a letter
to Jean Louis Mandereau, Director, European Office, Technical Assistance Administration,
Palais des Nations, Geneva, 30 November 1953. This exchange resulted in the drawing of
a "supplement agreement" with the Government of Pakistan to allocate more funds to the
Project. "We must do all we can," Hinder wrote to Mandereau, "to save his [Ecochard's]
project." File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.
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before [his] departure. Ecochard's motives were indeed more benevolent than
financial. He had agreed to prepare the plans for the Karachi University in "his
free time" without any "remuneration" from the Pakistani government in addition
to what he was being paid as a UN consultant. Despite this explanation, however,
the UN became concerned that its experts might appear opportunistic and had
questioned Ecochard's decision, leading to an exchange on the ethics of securing
independent projects while on UN missions.
To quell the controversy, in a long letter to M. Qureshi, the Joint Secretary of the
Ministry of Health and Labor, Ecochard insisted that his refugee housing proposal
only seemed out of place because it looked to the future "pattern" of the city and
not its present conditions. The proposal was "conceived" Ecochard argued, "in
such a manner that these new satellite towns become a consistent part of the
expanding city of Karachi following the rise of the standard of living." This
optimistic approach, Ecochard maintained, had a better chance of improving the
city's conditions than the one taken by "the P.W.D. [Public Works Department,
which has] built new colonies at Malir and Landhi in the same pattern as [the
previously built] Drigh Road and Lalukhet colonies which can only become terrible
slums in the future."422 Talking with the self-assurance of an ex-colonial
Letter to Mohammad Akbar, the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Works(July 17, 1954). File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations Archives, New
York.
422 Michel Ecochard to M. Qureshi, The Joint Secretary of Ministry of Health and Labor,Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 26 June, 1954. File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box
256. United Nations Archives, New York. Ecochard supported his claim by pointing to his
previous planning work in Syria: "Your Excellency has recently visited the city and
museum of Damascus. May I mention that the planning of the city and the museum had
been done by me when I was the Directory of Town Planning for the Government of
Syria." Ibid. p 3.
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administrator, Ecochard insisted that his "comprehensive" plans were what
Pakistan needed:
It is still time to change this situation. These plans and reports I have made can be
considered as a whole.. .Thus it will be seen that I have laid the foundations of all
plans and recommendations, and unless Authorities now study them, there is no
point in my continuing to follow them up.'
Ecochard's use of the term "pattern" above implies the conclusiveness of a
signature design, rather than the indeterminacy of approaches like the Smithsons'
cluster city or Abrams and Koenigsberger's core. Ecochard's design anticipated
growth and transformation by articulating the final outcome, leaving only room for
contributions of the inhabitants as well as the sponsoring national government to
appear as deviations from the original proposal. Though Ernest Weissmann at this
point supported Ecochard's proposal as well as his involvement with the Karachi
University project,44 the exchange betrays the incongruence of "finished" housing
proposals, such as Ecochard's, with the trajectory of development intervention in
both the UN and national theaters. This incongruence would become apparent
when four years later in 1957 the UN would re-send its experts on housing, this
time Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, to propose self-help and core
423 Ibid.
424 Ecochard himself recounted Wessmann's support in a letter to Eleanor M. Hinder,
Chief, Office for Asia and the Far East, Programme Division, UN Technical Assistance
Administration, 14 January 1955. File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256.United
Nations Archives, New York.
Ernest Weissmann to Syed Ali, Office for Asia and the Far East, TAA, 25 April 1955,
"Comments on Plans for a New University of Karachi - Mr. Ecochard's Report." File TAA
173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.
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housing approaches that presented the inhabitants as the principal agents of
developmental change.
The role of the development expert demanded avoiding accusations of not only
the expert's irrelevance but also of the inadequacy of the national government to
carry out the recommendations. More than any other shortcoming in the project
design, this is where Ecochard had failed. In proposing finished housing based on
the four-function approach, Ecochard did not consider how the discrepancy
between the actual and projected fate of the project would figure in the
development discourse, in both its national and international contexts. The UN's
diplomatic footings demanded that the Smithsons' changing man and the Third
World migrant must appear side by side, despite the absence of the welfare state
in the context surrounding the latter. It also demanded that the UN and the
national government involved appear as transparent conduits serving the interest
of the masses, not parties with their own agendas. This required that the potential
failure of development projects such as Ecochard's not be allowed to figure as a
reflection of the incapacity of the local authorities or the migrant, but as a result of
abstract contextual forces that displaced the migrant: the hardships of
independence, the difficulties of the path to progress, and so forth. This frame is
precisely what Abrams and Koenigsberger's core housing proposal would succeed
in creating a few years later.
425 Even during Ecochard's presence in Pakistan, Weissmann stressed the importance of
exploring "self-help housing" options in Pakistan. Ernest Weissmann's memo to S. Habib
Ahmed, Chief, Office for Asia and Far East, Programme Division, TAA. File TAA
173/70/027, Rag 2/173 - Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.
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The controversy around Ecochard's projects betrays a turn in the logic of
development intervention. The failure of the project could no longer be described
as the "failure" of the inhabitants or even of the national governments. If the
agency of the migrant is seen to be limited, the causes of those limitations must be
identified in a larger frame that does not challenge the make up of the migrants'
socio-cultural sphere. Though in the Smithsons' statement development was
framed as a project that required management, that managerial role is taken to be
limited to helping the Other survive modernization on her own terms. Herein lies
a project of constructing logical symmetries between the projects of First World
social reform and Third World development that hides the inherent asymmetries
between the modes of socio-economic intervention in the two institutional
contexts.
This is a hard case to make. In the development context, modern architecture has
constituted a site that ironically makes this case in its supposed "failure," rather
than in its claimed successes. In histories of architecture, in the photographs
depicting the contemporary fate of Ecochard's Nid d'abeille housing, we are
shown that the migrants, if left to their own devices, fill every nook and cranny of
the architecture that was intended to reveal the patterns of modernity to them
(FIG. 34).426 Yet, these transformations are presented as a failure of modernism to
understand the cultural dynamics of the contexts. Through the lens of cultural
relativism, it is modern architecture that appears as too restrictive to the cultural
426 See Jos Bosman in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," The Last
CLAMs, op cit.; Also see Minique Eleb, "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism:
cochard, Candilis, and ATBAT-Afrique," in Sarah Williams Goldhagen and R6jean Legault,
ed., Anxious Modernisms (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 67.
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demands and social requirements of the inhabitant. The inhabitant's agency is
preserved to preserve the possibility of development as a mode of assistance
rather than of external imposition. The image of the masses engaged in a ferocious
battle for technological development outlined by the Smithsons serves to claim
consent not at the expense but through acknowledging agency.
4.3 (A) Symmetrical World:
We see the apparatus of constructing this symmetry between the First and the
Third World contexts being deployed under UN and Unesco social research
projects in the postwar era. The ability to negotiate between stability and change
under pressures of modernization was seen by the development organizations as
an issue that affected both the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. The
crises of the World Wars were seen to have stemmed directly from the failure of
the European citizenry to negotiate the supposedly contradictory demands of
modernity for cultural preservation and technological progress, a failure that was
exploited by Fascism. The rapidly expanding Third World city appeared as the
next site where such a crisis might repeat itself. To study this dual or shared
problem, the organizations were in the process of setting up joint centers of urban
and social planning and research all across the globe under the project title,
Tensions Affecting International Understanding. As evident from the title, the
underdeveloped world entered this international project as a function of the
industrial powers' future in the emerging Cold War. Rapid and uncontrolled Third
World urbanization was seen to generate political uncertainty that pointed to
another geo-political crisis between industrial powers.
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The Tensions Project, as it came to be known, was inaugurated at the second
meeting of the Unesco's general assembly in Mexico City in 1948 under Unesco's
first Director-General, Julian Huxley, the grandson of the famous English biologist,
Thomas Huxley and the elder brother of the novelist, Aldous Huxley. As a
Professor and Honorary Lecturer in Zoology at Kings College (1925-35), Huxley
traveled widely throughout the British mandated territories, writing frequently in
policy journals on the position of the British Empire in world politics, which
gained him wide prominence as a public figure well before he was appointed
Unesco's Director General in 1946.
Huxley had already expressed his views on how the relationships between
European powers were tied to developments at the periphery, in no uncertain
terms in a 1932 article, "Why is the White Man in Africa?" in the policy journal,
Fortnightly Review. Arguing that the British Empire needed a decisive policy, to
stay or to leave, in the face of rising nationalist movements in Africa, Huxley
pointed to India to draw a lesson:
We may gain some idea of the difficulties in the international sphere [resulting
from the British policy in Africa] by thinking of India. Conditions are difficult
enough in India to-day; but what would be happening there if the peninsula had
not all fallen under the control of a single European power, but had remained
divided between British, French, Dutch and Portuguese? As Western ideas and the
spirit of nationalism filtered through to the Indians, there would have grown up
the same difficulties between the native-born population and its white rulers. But
events would have moved at a different pace and in different directions in the
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different territories, and each change would have been the signal for the gravest
international difficulties in Europe.427
In the postwar era, the question of the pace of postwar decolonization and Third
World development posed a similar threat to the future of a collective European
identity. The question of how the emerging populations absorbed capitalist values
as part of their "own" socio-cultural setup was seen to be critical to the role they
might play in the balance of powers in the emerging Cold War.
The tensions project's hides this underlying relationship by carrying out
simultaneous programs of social and cultural change focused on European and
Third world contexts. On the European side of the equation, the Tensions project
had a particular psychological bent, which soon came to be known as "the minds
of men doctrine" after the famous statement penned by American historian
Archibald MacLeish in Unesco's founding charter: "Since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."
Consequently, the first social scientists that Unesco turned to were those already
involved in "character studies" in the different national contexts. This group
included the anthropologists, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, and ethnologist
Gregory Bateson, as well as Hadley Cantril, a psychologist who headed the Public
Opinion Research Program at Princeton, and Otto Klineberg, the chair of the Social
Science Program at Columbia.
Unesco's interest in this loosely connected group is not surprising. Benedict
headed the Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures (RCC).428 The
41 Julian Huxley, "Why is the White Man in Africa?" in Fortnightly Review (Jan. 1, 1932):
63-4.
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institute had first carried out anthropological studies of "national character" for the
Committee for National Morale, a wartime body focused on employing social
science methods to map the enemy's social psyche.429 During the war Benedict
joined the Office of War Information, producing similar studies of Romania,
Thailand, the Netherlands, Germany, and after the war, Japan. The last resulted in
her book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns ofjapanese Behavior
(1946).410 Here Benedict applied culture and personality theory laid out in her
previous famous book, Patterns of Culture, to identify the aspects of upbringing
and social norms that contributed to supposed aggressiveness of the Japanese
national character. The book on Japanese character became one of RCC's major
credentials. Given the urgency of the war, it enabled Benedict to secure more
funding first from the Office of Naval Research, and later in 1948 from the RAND
Corporation for similar projects on other "national cultures." Prominent among
these were the studies of the "Russian personality," which soon received funds
from the Carnegie Foundation for a book on the topic.4 1
428 The research center had emerged out of The Council of International Relations, a small
program founded in 1940, and renamed the Institute of Intercultural Studies, Inc. in 1944,
by Mead, Bateson, Benedict, and sociologists Lawrence Frank, Harold Wolff, Lyman
Bryson, and Edwin Embree
4 See, Margaret Mead, "The Institute for Intercultural Studies and Japanese Studies," in
American Anthropologist, New Series 63:1 (Feb., 1961): 136-7. One of the primary studies
coming out of this contract was Geoffrey Gorer's 'Japanese Character Structure." See
Geoffrey Gorer, 'Japanese Character Structure," in Transactions of the New York Academy
of Sciences Series II, 5:(5): 106-124. During the war Gorer joined the Office of War
Information producing similar studies of Burma before he was succeeded by Benedict.
430 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns offapanese Behavior (New
York: World Publishing, 1946).
"' The book funded by the Carnegie Foundation did not materialize due to Benedict's
sudden death. See, Margaret Mead, An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict
(Boston, 1959).
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With Benedict's ailing health at the time, however, the RAND Corporation project
was transferred over to her famous student and anthropologist, Margaret Mead at
the American Museum of National History. In addition to the contract with the
RAND Corporation and the Office of Naval Research, Mead was also able to secure
a contract with MIT, producing Studies in Soviet Culture and Japanese Character
Structure and Propaganda: A Preliminary Survey (1942). Portions of the latter
were also published in the book, The Study of Culture at a Distance, that Mead co-
edited with her former student, Rhoda Mdtraux.12
It was against the background of these collective credentials, that Hadley Cantril,
the psychology professor at Princeton, was appointed the fist director of the
Tensions Project at Unesco's second meeting in Mexico City in 1948. Cantril's first
initiative was to call a two-week conference in Paris during the summer of 1948.4"
He invited to the conference eight social scientists, including Max Horkheimer
from the New Institute of Social Research established in New York after the exile
of the Frankfurt School members to America, and Gordon Allport, a professor of
Social Relations at Harvard who had become famous for his public opinion
surveys showing the multi-sided personae of the modern man. The conference
432 Margaret Mead and Rhoda M6traux, eds., The Study of Culture at a Distance (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953). At this point, the group also produced the report,Suggested Materialsfor Training Regional Specialist, for the Army Program in 1943. At the
end of the war, RCC turned its attention towards producing manuals for sociologists
headed to the previously occupied and axis territories. This included The Columbia
University Research in Contemporary Cultures: A Manual for Field Workers (1947).
"3 The conference was organized in collaboration with the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations.
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resulted in a joint statement and individual papers that were later published in the
book, Tensions That Cause Wars (1949) that Cantril edited.**
4.4 "Permanent Alibi":
This inaugurating moment is particularly important for us because it highlights the
difference between the crisis of European identity and that of the exploding Third
World which Unesco attempted to cover with the fig leaf of development. In the
aforementioned essay in Cantril's book,'' Horkheimer asked a question that
loomed over Unesco's traumatized postwar Europe: how was it that such violence
erupted in the heart of Europe during "a high stage of [its] cultural
development"?436 Horkheimer's answer was clear: Europe had lost the precarious
balance between "public and private life" that was demanded by modernity.
Horkheimer's word for this dynamic is also "pattern." "The task of the social and
psychological research," Horkheimer asserted, "is to analyze the character traits
that have emerged from this new social and cultural pattern and to investigate
their relationship to fascist ideologies [emphasis added]. "437
For Horkheimer, and for other Frankfurt-school members as well, fascism was not
an exception to the logic of modernity, rather it was the logical conclusion of the
increasing and non-reflective reliance on "reason" that characterized the history of
*3 Hadley Cantril, ed., Tensions that Cause Wars: Common Statement and Individual
Papers by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together by UNESCO (Urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 1950).
" Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," in Tension that Cause Wars, op cit. pp. 209-
242.
436 ibid. p. 229
437 ibid.
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modernity in the West. Horkheimer had laid out this argument in greater detail in
1941 in his now famous essay, "The End of Reason."4 18 There, Horkheimer argued
that the forms of modern life, tied to capitalist monopolies and industrial
production, demanded "obeying and adapting to objective ends," the quest for
"personal preservation" being the foremost among them.4 " The resulting separation
between the individual and the social, however, was unthreatening and marked an
underlying affinity, the "elimination of the conflict between individual and
society.
In the prevailing order of industrialism and capitalist monopolies, Horkheimer
asserted, "the whole world was transformed into a mere 'material'...""4 In this
system, "The individual constricts himself. Without dream or history, he is always
watchful and ready, always aiming at some immediate practical goal. His life falls
into a sequence of data which fit in advance the questionnaires he had to
answer."44 2 In this context, Horkheimer argued, "[r]eflective thought and theory lose
their meaning in the struggle for self-preservation."44 3 Consequently, "[t]o be
accepted, men must sound like the vocal chords of the radio, film and magazine.
For in point of fact, no one seems to make his living by himself, and everyone is
438 Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, The
Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 1993), pp. 26-48. First published in
Philosophical and Social Sciences, vol. IX (1941).
4 Ibid., p. 47
440 Ibid., p. 42.
441 Ibid., p. 34.
442 Ibid., 37.
"4 Ibid., 38.
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suspect in mass society. Everyone needs a permanent alibi..."" "With the decline
of.. .reflective reason," Horkheimer argued, "human relationships tend to a point
wherein the rule of economy over all personal relationships, the universal control
of commodities over the totality of life, turns into a new and naked form of
command and obedience.""4 4 This system of "integral self-preservation...,"
Horkheimer concluded, "is the death of the individual which is to be preserved."446
Capitalism and modernity have turned the "rational form of self-preservation" into
"an obstinate compliance as such."447
For Horkeheimer, the dissolution of the capacity of reflective reason and the
increasing need to conform to external ends for self-preservation, represented a
dialectical historical "process which originated in Renaissance and Reformation"
and "culminated into fascism," tying in its wake transcendentalism to empiricism
and Protestantism to industrialism. Fascism, Horkheimer argued, was only an
extension of this trajectory. "In fascism, the autonomy of the individual [is]
developed into heteronomy." 448 Horkheimer's term for this trajectory of dialectical
transformations in this early essay is "pattern" as well: "The totalitarian order marks
the leap from the indirect to direct form of domination, while still maintaining a
system of private enterprise. The National Socialists do not stand outside the
4" Ibid.
"1 Ibid. p. 39.
446 Ibid., p. 32.
447Ibid., p. 34.
448 ibid.
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pattern of economic trends."44 1 Pattern for Horkheimer is the shorthand for the
dialectical process of continuity and interruption that linked different historical,
political, philosophical and sociological phenomena that characterized modernity
in the West. The "End of Reason" introduces some key concepts of critical theory,
such as immanent critique, which, as Horkheimer described it, sought to both
unravel the structures that produced social reality and the theories that sought to
explain it. It is from this perspective, that the term pattern in this earlier essay
describes the subsumption of self in society as an open-ended dialectical process
of continuity and interruption, affinity and distance.
In the Unesco study as well, Horkhiemer employed the term pattern as a
shorthand for the dialectical process that tied individual to society: "Modern
man...," Horkheimer asserted, "shows an authoritarian readiness to pattern his
way of thinking and his behavior after norms laid down for him from the
outside."4" The use of the term "pattern" in the Unesco essay, however, betrays a
positivist turn from the open-ended approach of critical theory and immanent
critique and the dialectical treatment of the idea of individual and society in the
"End of Reason."45 1 In the Unesco essay, the term pattern represents the possibility
of interrupting the continuous subsumption of self in a manner not available to the
rationalizing impetus of the capitalist order of modernity. Consequently, Fascism
4 Ibid.
Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," in Tension that Cause Wars, op cit. p.228.
451 See, Martin Jay, "Preface to the 1996 edition," in The Dialectical Imagination: A History
of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, first ed. 1973), pp. xi-xxiv.
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constituted a form of "neurosis" that emerged from the discord between the poles
of "public and private life" that was treatable through therapy.452
It is from this perspective that defined modernity as an open-ended process that
could be held in check through positivist interventions that Horkheimer proposed
psychological therapy through "action research" as a solution to the crisis of
historical patterns in Europe (FIG):
Thus, if a person who has mild prejudices against some minority group within his
own country is asked a series of properly selected, pertinent questions on this
point, he may, and in fact often does, examine the problem objectively and
rationally for the first time. In a sense he is being appealed to as a kind of expert,
and so he becomes our collaborator. The end product is not merely the collection
of relevant data but also the exercise of a therapeutic influence on the subject.453
For Horkheimer neither the tradition of stoic individualism, nor the "mass-basis" of
enlightenment could rescue the fractured persona of the modern man as the
process of self-realization promised by action research. It was in this context that
Horkheimer turned to Unesco, imagining an international project in which,
through "the use of control groups, the investigators could determine the extent to
which the interviews introduce an element of rational deliberation in place of
emotionalism and stereotypy in the thinking on international relations."454 Had the
45 Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," op cit. p. 229. This point was also stressed
by Gordon Allport's description of disintegrated modem personae arising from the
divisions of modern life in the Unesco study.
4"1Ibid., p. 239.
4 Ibid. p. 240.
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Germans taken on such a project before the war, Horkheimer argued, "they would
have understood the ultimately destructive nature of [National Socialism]."'
Horkheimer's positivist optimism regarding the intensive interview is ironic
considering his own experience with such a project in the recent past. When
Adorno, Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock returned to Frankfurt in 1949, they
continued the intensive interviews Adorno had carried at Berkeley during the
American "exile" of the Frankfurt School. The supposedly therapeutic approach of
the project, however, produced a grand-scale scandal: two thirds of the eighteen
hundred people interviewed showed virulent signs of anti-Semitism and disturbing
ambivalence towards any feelings of guilt about the Third Reich.
While this experience of collective "irrationalism" led the aging Horkheimer and
Adorno to resign themselves to the destructive dialectics of capitalism, the Unesco
cadre was not willing to subscribe to such a pessimist view. The aforementioned
Gordon Allport, who had a paper in the same Unesco volume as Horkheimer, had
developed with fellow psychologist Carl Rogers what they termed techniques of
"non-directive therapy." "There is definite clinical evidence," Allport and Rogers
asserted, "to indicate that when social tensions and inter-personal conflicts are
handled non-directively in a group, the resulting process will be found to parallel
closely the therapeutic process which takes place in resolving inter-personal
conflicts through... therapy in individual cases."456 In all these social psychological
4" Ibid.
456 Carl R. Rogers, "The Implications of Non-directive Therapy for the Handling of Social
Conflict." As early as 1933, Allport had first made this argument through what he called
the Social Distance Scale. The greater the group's "social distance," Allport argued, the
more distorted and stereotypical was its cultural perception. See "A Social Distance Scale,"
in Sociology and Social Research 17 (1933): 265-271. Similarly, social psychologist Kurt
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studies, the emphasis remains on "self-realization." The subject is trusted as a
"collaborator" and a fellow "expert" who can realize the cultural distortions of
modernity.
What begins to unfold in these assertions is a model of expertise as collaboration
and participation. Modernity is seen as a terrain that is both open-ended and
susceptible to positivist intervention. The expert and subject work on molding this
terrain together. This framing of collaborative transformation was critical for
Unesco. One of the main goals of the Tensions Project was to formulate a "theory
of non-conflict" regarding socio-cultural and economic changes in the postwar era.
For the Allied-dominated UN and Unesco, the combination of modernity and
capitalism had to be rescued from being considered a lethal mix that pointed its
consumers down the path of destruction and conflict. Modernity, or at least its
capitalist variant, had to emerge as a historical process that held the possibility of
transformation without violence and rupture.
4.5 Patterns of Transition:
One of the first extensions of the Tensions Project into the Third World was a
"manual" for "technical experts" titled, Cultural Patterns and Technical Change,
edited by Margaret Mead, and published jointly by Unesco and the World
Federation of Mental Health.' Here, we see the term "pattern" representing not
Lewin had carried out several experiments targeted at eradicating racial prejudice in the
American South through similar "intensive interview" techniques. See Kurt Lewin
"Catharsis and the Reduction of Prejudice," in Journal of Social Issues, 1:3 (1945): 3-10.
457 Margaret Mead, Cultural Patterns and Technical Change: A Manual Prepared by The
World Federation for Mental Health (New York: Unesco and Mentor Books, 1955), pp.
294-5. The term "expert" here broadly included "policy-makers, specialists, technicians of
all sorts, chiefs of missions and teams... [and] all those who are immediately concerned, at
any level, with purposive technological change." Ibid. p. 16.
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only the idea of historical continuity in particular cultural contexts, but also
representing the possibility of identifying continuity across cultural contexts.
It was Mead's teacher and then colleague, Ruth Benedict, who had first analogized
"culture" with "pattern" in her famous book, Patterns of Culture..45 Following her
own mentor and teacher, Franz Boas' approach, Benedict had defined "culture" as
a sedimentary sphere of practices that determined the norms in each society.
Benedict and Boas had posited what later came to be known as "cultural
determinism," as a challenge to the biological evolutionism of the late nineteenth
century Victorian anthropology.4 11
In the opening pages of Mead's manual, however, we are reminded that unlike in
her previous work with Benedict we are not dealing with the well-being of small
"primitive" societies in the Third World context where the expert's role was limited
to reading the "ancient hallowed patterns" as possibilities of alternative social
norms in the West. In the development context, the expert's role was to bring
about "purposive technological change." Mead stressed that the idea of
development could only be communicated across cultural contexts by "stripping
each scientific technique to the bone, to the absolute essentials... [such that it] will
make it possible for other people to learn to use it... making [it] a new pattern
which is congenial and meaningful to them, as representative of their own
culture."460 Even though the influence of cultural determinism is evident here on
458 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934).
See, Louise M. Newman, "Coming of Age, but not in Samoa: Reflections on Margaret
Mead's Legacy for Western Liberal Feminism," in American Quarterly 48.2 (1996): 233-272.
460 Margaret Mead, Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, op cit., p. 16.
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Mead's thinking, unlike in her earlier work with Benedict, the idea of cultural
pattern is not foregrounded in sedimentary archeological metaphors, but in a
participatory model of socio-cultural transformation sustained through a process of
continuous "feedback."
Mead's use of the term "feedback" to describe the shift from the perspective of
cultural determinism reflects the influence of the emerging field of "cybernetics"
on the social and anthropological sciences. Cybernetics gained prominence with
the publication in 1948 of a book by the same name by Norbert Wiener, the MIT
professor and mathematician, that outlined a theory of communication in animals
and machines by modeling their interaction as continuously changing systems with
embedded "feedback" mechanisms. Cybernetics, immediately became renowned in
urban defense planning circles for its application in enabling anti-aircraft guns to
compute the trajectory of enemy aircraft during World War II by using vacuum
tubes called servomechanisms connected in "feedback loops" that re-evaluated
outputs with changing inputs. It was not long before the idea of feedback became
attractive to a host of sociologists, anthropologists, economists, architects, and
planners as a new basis for social intervention.
This was indeed an extension that Wiener himself did not approve of. Despite
initial acknowledgments, Wiener remained skeptical regarding cybernetics' ability
to model social phenomena.4 1 For Wiener, such an application erased the relative
distance between the observer and the observed, an abstraction required by
cybernetics:
461 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or, control and communication in the animal and the
machine (Cambridge, MA: Technology Press), p. 27.
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It is in the social sciences that the coupling between the observed phenomenon
and the observer is hardest to minimize. One the one hand, the observer is able to
exert a considerable influence on the phenomenon that came to his attention.
With all respects to the intelligence, skill, and honesty of purpose of my
anthropologist friends, I cannot think that any community which they have
investigated will ever be quite the same afterwards.. .There is much in the social
habits of a people which is dispersed and distorted by the mere act of making
inquiries about it.462
Cybernetics required an object "relatively abstract from its surrounding." In
observing social phenomena, the inability of the observer to separate himself from
the observed precluded such an "abstraction," exaggerated "inconsistencies," and
forced the scientist to resort to extended "generalizations" that undermined the
predictive function of cybernetic feedback. In the absence of this relative distance,
any attempt at measuring social change formed a tautological enterprise where the
scientist became part of the experiment."
As Wiener later elaborated in Human Use of Human Beings (1954), which
explained the theory to a "non-specialized" audience, this methodological
"confusion" was the most covert threat facing the scientist: "I have already pointed
out that the devil whom the scientist is fighting is the devil of confusion, not of
willful malice." This enemy within reflected an "entropic tendency in nature" itself,
a tendency that Wiener famously dubbed, the "Augustinian devil." It is this specter
462 Ibid. p. 190.
463 In an earlier paper-coauthored with his close collaborators, the physiologists, Arturo
Rosenblueth, and Julian Bigelow-Wiener had also emphasized the need for this relative
distance. See Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose
and Teleology," in Philosophy of Science 10 (1943): 18.
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of randomness in nature that the social phenomena threatened to unleash on the
cybernetic enterprise. 464
If for Wiener, social application formed a limit case for cybernetics, for social
scientists and anthropologists like Mead and Bateson, it was precisely this limit, at
which the scientist became part of the experiment, that promised a new model of
"participatory" social science across cultural boundaries. Their enthusiasm certainly
overcame Wiener's reluctance when they were invited to the meeting of the
cybernetic group at the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies in 1944 to explore
the social implications of the theory.
To Mead, Wiener's claim that all phenomena, in essence, are "messages [that]
are...a form of pattern," presented the possibility of rethinking strategies of
communicating technical knowledge across cultural barriers. 466 For Mead, the idea
of "pattern" was not useful in the postwar era if it was continued to be used to
present culture as sedimentary process. The promise of pattern as a conceptual
tool in the development context lay in its potential to frame cultural formations
through the revisionist logic of the feedback loop. The sociologist on the
development mission was not concerned with the technical but with the abstract
idea of "pattern" and "feedback" as intertwined methodologies of social
intervention.
464 Norbert Wiener, Human Use ofHuman Beings (New York: Da Capo Press, 1954), pp.
19-20.
465 Steve J. Heims, John Von Neuman and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the
Technologies of Life and Death, Cambridge (MA: The MIT Press, 1980): pp. 202, 373.
466 Wiener, Human Use of Human Beings, p. 31.
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In the Unesco manual, Mead makes clear that the stakes for reframing pattern as a
participatory process are high. The idea of Third World development could not
quell the threat of "revolution, uprising, and war" amongst the increasingly
nationalized masses by laying claim to scientific detachment or superiority. For
Mead, if Unesco was to achieve its goals of global socio-cultural modernization
without war, the expert had to consider development intervention as a process of
"learning" from the ground. Here, what Wiener saw as confusion became a mode
of "active" social intervention in which the development expert, in accepting his
own cultural bias, uses the idea of "feedback" as a process of "learning" from the
ground. The historical moment of decolonization demanded holding a dialogue
with the Augustinian Devil.
Despite the focus on changing the role of the development expert, the point of
presenting development as a shared project of making new patterns out of old is
not lost on Mead. We are reminded that this participatory enterprise is concerned
with the project of managing development, and in the case of the manual funded
by the World Federation of Mental Health, managing the "mental health
of.. .population[s] in transition." 467 The urbanizing Third World, in transition to
modernity, figures as a participant in the project of managing the future of
modernization. Yet this role serves as an alibi to launch a more transparent mode
of expertise and to refigure the language of socio-economic intervention.
Mead establishes a similarity between the modernization process in the West and
the non-West: both are driven by historical patterns, a continuous and slowly
transforming process without historical rupture. This appears as a striking revision
4 7ibid., p. vii.
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of the framing of the possibility of modernization in the non-West under the
umbrella of cultural determinism. Modernization in a context such as Samoa,
famously studied by Mead, for example, could only have been framed as an
unavoidable rupture from the "ancient hallowed patterns."468 In the development
context, however, modernization is presented as a universal process that is just at
home in the non-West as in its Euro-American provenance.
Yet, consistent with the logic of multiculturalism, there is also a sense of
dissimilarity, a sense of fundamental difference, implied in the idea of shared
universal patterns of modernization. Each pattern is unique to its historical
background and therefore demands a different planning strategy. For Mead, the
Third World migrant as a participant in the development project must chart her
own emergence into modernity. The development intervention in the Third World
is not a replication, but a unique enterprise particular to the requirements of the
historical pattern of each context. Is this differentiation simply a reflection of the
continuing vestiges of cultural determinism in the development context?
The dialectic of difference and similarity, affinity and distance, staged in Mead's
manual points to a different logic of intervention inherent in the joint UN and
Unesco efforts at curbing the possibility of aggression in non-European contexts.
The validation of development planning is neither established through claiming
direct precedence nor through asserting fundamental difference, but through
claiming an ambiguous relationship on the more abstract level of changing
historical patterns. It is here that pattern stands as a tool for censoring the terms of
468 Margaret Mead, From the South Seas: Studies of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive
Societies (New York: W. Morrow, 1939).
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difference in the modes of intervention in different contexts of the comparative
framework of modernization. Patterns of modernization in the West and non-West
were to be based on different strategies and modes of management.
4.6 The Mechanics of Modernity
Unesco's extended focus on the Third World resulted in setting up a number of
major research centers throughout the world. One such center, called the Research
Center on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, was
established in Calcutta. In 1956, two years after Ecochard's stint in Karachi, the
center held a joint conference with the UN and the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in Bangkok, producing a report that outlined the scope of the
Tensions Project in the global context.469
The possibility of a global civil society, we are told in Bangkok, depended upon
managing not one, but two patterns of socio-cultural formation. If one was the
pattern of fascism in Europe emerging from the internal discords of modernity, the
other was the historical pattern driven by the rush of demographic movement in
the non-West that threatened to produce similar effects.
A reversal has taken place in the transplantation of the project of securing
modernity from one context to another: the transformation of historical patterns in
the Euro-American world was posed as a problem that emerged after the onset of
modernization. In the Third World, the dialectic of continuity and interruption
implicit in the project of forming patterns of development is a project of
469 The conference proceedings were published in the UN report: Urbanization in Asia
and the Far East: A Joint UN/Unesco Seminar on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region,Bangkok, 8-18 August, 1956 (Calcutta: UNESCO, 1957). Ernest Weissmann represented the
UN Bureau of Social Affairs at the conference.
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prevention that must be put in place before the onset of further effects of
modernization.
For Horkheimer, the crisis of fascism-the imbalance between "public and private
life"-was necessarily a crisis of civil society, a crisis that only unfolded when the
process of differentiation between the political, economic, and social spheres of
modernity had been established. The crisis of the modern man under fascism,
then, was the crisis of the idea of modern citizenship itself. The modification of
historic patterns was shorthand for the "faculty" of citizenship, if you will.
Indeed, in his 1935 article, "On the Problem of Truth," Horkheimer faulted Hegel
for betraying the idea of civil society, the concept of irreducible play between the
individual and the social, by introducing the idea of an overarching Spirit as the
driving force of history.7 ' This was a last ditch effort, Horkheimer asserted, at
religious dogmatism to undermine the role of the citizen as the responsible agent
of modernity, opening room for not only authoritarian nationalism but also
bourgeois indifference that saw poverty and misery as inevitable steps in the
march of the Spirit. For Horkheimer, the idea of the Spirit when applied to the
interwar European context revealed that "[t]o the extent to which individual
activity is circumscribed and the capacity for it eventually stunted, there exists the
readiness to find security in the protective shelter of a faith or person taken as the
vessel and incarnation of the truth.",7' In Hegel's idea of social change,
Horkheimer maintained, the fate of human struggles, be it contingencies of
470 Max Horkheimer, "On the Problem of Truth" in The Frankfurt School Reader, op cit.,
pp. 407-443. Originally published in Zeitscbriftfir Sozialforschung, vol. IV (1935).
471 ibid.
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everyday life or revolutionary movements, was determined not in a struggle with
social reality, but a priori by the idea of historical synthesis.
In Horkheimer's dialectical thinking, it was precisely the continuous threat of the
emergence of Fascism that gave rise to the possibility of responsible modern
citizenship. It was the "[e]limination of the conflict between individual and
society," that turned modernity into Fascism.47 2 Modern man found his role in
history in resisting the historical pattern of modernity itself. The pattern of
modernity, then, must essentially be a mended pattern. The uniform lines of
historical trajectories do not betray the presence of democratic societies, but testify
to the rise of fascism and totalitarianism.
The transformation of the modernization from a project of perpetual correction to
one of prevention in development, however, takes us back to the Hegelian mold
of historical synthesis. It is precisely the possibility of resistance that is denied to
the Third World migrant. This includes resistance to development. If the Third
World migrant is rescued from being cast into the mold of cultural determinism,
and acknowledged as a participant in the modernization process, then s/he is only
a passive participant. In being framed in transition to modernity, the third world
migrant is seen to have not yet suffered the pains of modernity and is therefore
deemed unable to recognize its threatening patterns. For Horkheimer too,
modernity could avoid the pains of experiencing fascism, but only in constantly
resisting the latter's temptation. The modern man could only postpone this pain if
he is willing to take on another painful enterprise: engaging in the constant and
4 Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," op cit., p. 42.
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unending struggle to fight the tendency in the historical patterns of modernity to
coalesce into forms of domination and exploitation.
For the development ideologues, this burden of struggle falls onto the shoulders of
the development expert. The migrant is a participant in modernity, but only as one
who does not know the pattern of modernity. The responsible agent of modernity
in the transitory period must be the expert. This text is evident in the framing of
the process of urbanization in the developed and underdeveloped context at the
Bangkok conference, represented by the demographic "pull" and "push,"
respectively.
4.7 "Push" and "Pull":
As Phillip Hauser, the Bangkok conference's rappateur, and a professor of
sociology at the University of Chicago, argued in his introduction, the process of
urbanization in Asia was not simply an outcome of industrialization and
modernization as it had been in the American and European contexts.7 3 In Asia,
what we were seeing was a process of "over-urbanization," where urbanization
tended to move ahead of the social, cultural, and economic changes that
accompanied modernization. This resulted from the socio-economic "push factor":
the rural economy was unable to provide for the over-populated countryside,
resulting in "pushing" the "redundant" population towards the cities in search for
subsistence. In Europe as well as in America, the process of urbanization resulted
not from the Malthusian pressures in the countryside, but from the attractions, the
e7As the sociology at the University of Chicago became heavily involved with UN and
Unesco missions, Hauser became a major figure in development studies, chairing many
conferences and missions, including the UN/Unesco conference on urbanization in Latin
American in 1961.
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"pull" of social and economic opportunities in the cities.474 The push-factor resulted
in squalid slums overflowing with population whose skills had no use in the city's
economic structure. The masses attracted by the pull-factor, on the other hand,
were continuously absorbed by the expanding economic base.
This difference opens a space for the need for development planning while still
maintaining the structure of historical continuity established by the idea of
patterns. After all, if urbanization in the Third World followed the self-evolving
logic of "pull" factors, as was the case in the modernization process in the Euro-
American contexts, then there would be no need for socio-economic planning.
Hauser was not the only one to characterize the urbanization process in this
manner. The push-pull theory, if you will, gained immense currency as an
explanation of demographic displacement and socio-cultural change, as if
becoming an obligatory conclusion of all major reports, missions, and conferences.
Bert Hoselitz, Hauser's colleague at the University of Chicago, published a series
of studies that characterized the push-pull contrast under the title "Generative and
Parasitic Cities" in the journal Economic development and Cultural Change."47 The
474 Hauser reasserted the same argument in his, Population Perspective (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960); as well as in "Urbanization: An Overview," in The
Study of Urbanization, Phillip Hauser and Leo Schnore eds., (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1965). For the preponderance of Malthusian perspective in development economics,
see Eric Ross' excellent study of, The Malthus Factor (London: Zed Books, 1998).
" Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities, in Economic Development and Cultural
Change 3:3 (April 1955). For Hoselitz, ignoring the nature of urbanization was indeed a
crisis: "Although there is much talk of the industrialization and urbanization as two
processes which are apparently closely and necessarily related, the whole array of forces
making for urbanization in developing countries is often left unexamined, various types of
urban centre are left undistinguished, and the moral and social-psychological, as well as
economic and political, consequences of urbanization are left unexplored." Bert H.
Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries," in
The Journal of Political Economy (June 1953): 195.
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United Nations' Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation also subscribed
to the same view when it argued that "migration of peasants unable to support
themselves on the land.. .have resulted in a mushroom-growth of city slums..."476
When the UN sent out a Mission of Experts to South and South-East Asia to survey
the possibility of low-cost housing in the region, their opinions painted a similar
picture of a paralyzing influx of a population destined to be marooned in the city:
"Despite the substantial efforts of improvement trusts in major Indian cities, at the
present rate of progress there is no hope of keeping pace with the increase in the
city population."477 Richard L. Meier, an urban planner at Berkeley and author of
many UN reports, later made the same point to characterize the process of
urbanization in America: "The moves that people made... in the United States
were primarily attempts to optimize their own chances in life. They were not
pushed by distress and poverty, but were pulled by opportunity."478
4 United Nations Department of Social Affairs, Preliminary Report on the World Social
Situation. United Nations: New York, 1952.
4 Department of Social Affairs, United Nations, Low-cost Housing in South and South-East
Asia: Report of a Mission ofExperts, New York: United Nations, July 1951. p. 68. The
AmericanJournal of Sociology also devoted an issue on "World Urbanism" that pressed
the same qualitative difference. "World Urbanism," special issue of the AmericanJournal
of Sociology (Chicago), 60 (March 1955): 427-523.
478 We may also recall here the 1925 urban ring diagrams of Ernest Burgess. Chicago's
"stems of hobohemia," "zones of deterioration," "black belts with its free and disorderly
life," appeared to Burgess nothing short of a "purgatory of lost souls." Yet, these lost souls
were still able to chart their way through the economic landscape of the city, classified by
the rings. For Burgess, writing in the interwar era, the engine of this socio-economic
movement was the interaction of racial temperament with circumstance that allowed the
inhabitants of Chicago to find their place in the circles of urban life. See Ernest W.
Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert Park,
Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, eds., The City, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1968, first ed. 1925), pp 47-63. The aforementioned diagram is on p. 55 (FIG. 35).
The postwar moment of European and third world development, however, is beyond the
historical juncture when nineteenth century disciplines such as eugenics, racial studies and
physiognomy, or evolutionary biology could provide narratives of socio-cultural change.
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This exclusionary dimension of the project of global modernization is most evident
in the statements of Meier's well-known colleague at Berkeley, the famous
American housing activist and planner, Catherine Bauer. In addition to being
involved with the Bangkok conference, Bauer was also the leading organizer of
the next conference of the Tensions Project in Tokyo in 1958.4"
Bauer had been an active advocate for housing reform in the '30s and '40s and
had played a significant role in the passing of the 1937 United States Housing Act.
She and other planners and attorneys, including Charles Abrams, became well-
known by the self-proclaimed title, the Housers.80 Often working in close
association with urban sociologists and psychologists, Bauer was intimately
involved with the emerging development discourse. In 1956, Ernest Weissmann,
asked Bauer to write a report on the urbanization problem in Asia that could serve
as a background paper for the upcoming Bangkok conference.4 1 Bauer was part of
the development scene from the beginning. As mentioned earlier, it was Bauer,
who, in collaboration with CIAM secretary, Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, proposed the
formation of the UN HTCP at the 1946 Hastings Conference of the International
Union of Architects (UIA), a European planning body that later provided many of
the returning colonial planners as experts for UN missions. In 1954 she organized
In the postwar era, these narratives were replaced by those seeped in the language of
cultural relativism, as we saw in the case of Mead's manual.
471 United Nations Seminar on Regional Planning, Tokyo, 28 July to 8 August 1958 (New
York: United Nations, 1958).
480 Bauer's early career as a housing advocate is documented in detail in her biography by
Peter Oberlander and Eva Newbrunher. See Houser, op. cit.
481 Catherine Bauer, Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions: An Argument
for Regional Planning, to Guide Community Growth. 1956.
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a major housing exhibit in New Delhi with Tyrwhitt under the auspices of UN
HTCP, inviting Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew, Pierre Jeanerette, and other members of
Congr&s International dArchitecture Moderne (CLAM), working with Le Corbusier
on Chandigarh at the time.482 Her activities on the UN platform led the Ford
Foundation in 1958 to ask her to help draw a master plan for the greater Calcutta
region, as well as to participate in a similar project for Delhi.8
At the Tokyo conference Bauer presented a paper titled, "The Optimum Pattern of
Urbanization: Does Asia Need a New Type of Regional Planning?"4 84 As was the
case with Mead's manual, the notion of pattern establishes a comparison with the
history of Western modernization, yet retains a commitment to the separate
482 We discussed this conference briefly in the first section of the dissertation.
483 Bauer's presence in India itself betrays a larger "pattern" of First World experts'
involvement in the country. Bauer had been invited to draw a master plan for Calcutta
and also assist in the planning for a master plan for greater Delhi, already in progress
under the supervision of architect Albert Mayer. Mayer had been hired by the Ford
Foundation which also had a center in Delhi. The foundation head in India, Douglas
Ensminger, was inspired by the logic of patterns as a conceptual device and had recently
invited Charles and Ray Eames to Delhi to draw sample curricula based on their studies of
infinite patterns for several architectural schools in India. Eames left just before Bauer's
arrival after having been given a countrywide tour by the foundation. Complaining to
Ensminger about the lack of comprehensive statistics needed for Calcutta's master
planning, Bauer mentioned that she had sought the help of P. C. Mahalanobis, who
headed the Indian Statistical Institute, to find not only more data, but also methods of
interpreting patterns from limited data. The institute was housed in a Tagore-era mansion.
Mahalanobis had himself been Tagore's secretary and later became Nehru's close associate
as one of India's renowned economists and chief of the Indian Planning Commission. Yet
for the Ford Foundation, entrenched in the Cold War anxieties, Mahalanobis' international
reputation did not outweigh his socialist leanings. One of the main reasons for the
urgency of Calcutta's planning laid out by the Foundation in its feasibility report was the
immediate threat of the rise of communism in the region unless conditions were improved
to gain the sympathy of the masses. When Bauer mentioned approaching Mahalanobis, it
seemed a contradiction of the Foundations' argument. It is interesting to note that Bauer's
students and biographers would also uncritically reiterate the Foundation's Cold War era
view and describe Mahalanobis as an "avowed Communist." See Peter Oberlander and
Eva Newbrunher, Houser, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999). p. 280.
484 Catherine Bauer, "The Optimum Pattern of Urbanization: Does Asia Need a New Type
of Regional Planning?" Paper submitted to the UN Seminar on Regional Planning, Tokyo,
July 1958.
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historic pattern of Asian urbanization. This dual relationship is evident in the
framing of development planning as a process of "optimization," bearing the mark
of both a break and a continuation.
This ambiguous relationship between the processes of urbanization in the West
and Asia reflect the agenda of the Tensions Project of managing modernization
projects across the world by establishing a sense of complicity and participation.
Bauer begins by establishing a sense of global political urgency with Asia's
wayward urbanization. In Asia today, Bauer argued,
...physical living standard, worse than in many primitive villages;... crowded
insanitary housing (or no shelter at all), plus inadequate urban services, tend to
enhance ill health, social demoralization, broken families, unstable employment,
productive inefficiency, and political unrest.48
For Bauer, the migrant, despite living in conditions "worse than many primitive
villages," is still not a primitive. The migrant's forced presence in the city is a result
of the pattern of demographic displacement emerging in the Third World. Though
s/he has been "pushed" to the city despite his/her will, s/he is still a participant in
the development project.
Yet once again, underlying this affinity is the assertion that the migrant in Asia is
not familiar with the historical pattern of modernity. The real crisis in Asia was the
inability of the migrant to discern the demands of modernization for s/he has not
experienced the conflict-ridden patterns of modernity. Even though the "evils
inherent in metropolitan congestions are widely recognized..." Bauer asserted "the
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485 Ibid., p. 3.
growth of these swollen [Third World] centers continued unabated.""
Consequently, "[all] efforts to remedy present congestion are futile, unless and until
the future flood [of migrants] can somehow be diverted." 48
It is precisely in establishing this (dis)similarity, and opening up a space for the
Third World migrant as a participant and a collaborator in development that a
sense of fundamental difference is staged in the two processes of modernization.
The key task at hand in Asia, thus, was not enabling the negotiation of the
conflicting patterns of modernization, but "planning a pattern for urban
development," one that is unencumbered by the broken lines of historical ruptures
and conflict inherent in the historical pattern of modernity in the West.
It is a task that forever keeps open the role of the development expert. Asia
cannot take on this responsibility itself. It cannot look towards the West for
precedence because in the West urbanization was never planned. In the West, the
''pull" toward urban areas was already driven by cultural sensibilities that could
comprehend the terms of change. The First World "in-migrant," having gone
through the pains of modernization in the countryside, was already a citizen when
he arrived at the city gates. When he left his home in the countryside, he had
486 Bauer, Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op. cit. preface, i.
487 It is important to pay attention to the nature of the metaphors used to describe this
process. Bauer's fellow Houser, Jacob Crane, had also stressed the same point in similar
language: uncontrolled influx "from the rural areas to the cities has swollen the urban
population much faster than housing and community development could be
provided.. .Industrialization and economic development have not produced the automatic
improvement in housing that it is sometimes claimed will result; in fact, they have
produced worse, the most appalling, housing condition in all but a few countries...."
Jacob, Crane, Draft Report on Preparing National Problemsfor Housing and Community
Development. Housing, Town and Country Planning Section, United Nations, December
1951.
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already undergone the necessary transformation "in personal forms of thought and
conduct" that enabled him to understand and avail the opportunities offered by
metropolitan life.
Missing this experience, the Third World migrant therefore must be guided
through a plan. This contrast is apparent in the employment of the term "pattern"
in the description of Third World urbanization. "In developing countries," Bauer
argued, "the critical problem is not so much the decongestion of existing cities
(however obvious the need) but a rational pattern of urbanization for millions of
additional people."488 Instead of the therapist, it is the planner who becomes the
agent of social intervention. This change betrays a switch in the nature of the
subject as well. Instead of being a "collaborator," a fellow "expert," the
unsuspecting migrant is to be directed into a "rational pattern." Is this pattern not
the one which Horkheimer had so strongly warned against, the "authoritarian
pattern" imposed from the outside?
What the Third World migrant seems to be lacking is the power of "self-
realization" that the Western in-migrant had acquired through painful historical
experiences. In the West, cities emerged through patterns of historical conflict,
rupture, and transformation, weaving together a complex mix of economic, social
and cultural forces. Bauer asserted that in the West urban planning, therefore, has
not been a project of development, but only of re-development:
488 Bauer, Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op cit. p. 35. Bauer
reference here is August Lbsch, famous study, The Economics ofLocation (New Haven,
1954).
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[Clity planning only became a recognized profession and function of government
in the Western world after the major urban centres had grown up. It has therefore
been primarily concerned with reform within an established framework.. .rather
than with the guidance of entirely new development in regions where the big
push of urbanization is yet to come.489
For other development ideologues as well, modernization in the West, driven by
the pull-factor, was an all-embracing process of autonomous differentiation.
Demographers such as Philip Hauser would replace Horkheimer's model of
modern civil society with the market as the engine of the conflict-ridden process
of modernization. Cities emerged in "the Western countries," Hauser asserted, "[by]
the play of the market mechanisms [that] obviate[ed] the need for central planning
and broadly diffused the risks of decision making."490
In contrast, Bauer's Asia had to face its future under pressures of a modernizing
push though it had not experienced the costs of conflict. This makeup of Third
World urbanization, or "over-urbanization," is continuously reflected as the
inability of the Third World migrant to discern the pattern of modernity. This
inexperience becomes the migrant's pharmakon, a necessary poison.** On the one
hand, entering the process of modernization without the experiences of violence
and conflict holds the promise that such experiences can be bypassed. On the
other hand, this tangential entry prevents the migrant from ever fully claiming a
place in the process of modernization. For her, the journey to the city never ends,
489 Bauer, Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op cit. p. 22
90 Hauser, "Introduction," in Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, op. cit. p. 39.
49' Derrida draws on Plato's use of the word, pharmakon, which in ancient Greek means
both "remedy" and poison," to refer to writing. See, Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy" in
Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp.
63-171.
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the city never arrives, and the village is never completely left behind. "From a
relatively small and homogenous place of origin," Bauer reminded us, "the in-
migrant is confronted in the city with a bewildering and almost incomprehensible
vastness and heterogeneity." As opposed to the traumatized, yet discerning in-
migrant of the First World, the Third World migrant is unable to read the patterns
of metropolitan life. Having only partially seen the pattern of modernity, what is
missing from the underdeveloped psyche is the ability to place change in its
transforming design, to constantly break and mend the dynamic pattern of
modernity.
The difference between the First and Third world migration patterns became the
defining problem for the journal Economic Development and Cultural Change,
edited by another University of Chicago sociologist, Bert Hoselitz, along with
Philip Hauser. Since its beginning in 1952, the journal featured papers from
leading development experts, including economists, anthropologists, psychologists,
and sociologists. Many of the contributors, including Hoselitz and Hauser,
regularly served as experts on UN and Unesco missions throughout the '50 and
'60s. In a paper titled, "Problems of Adapting and Communicating Modern
Techniques to Less Developed Areas," Hoselitz argued that the greatest challenge
facing the transfer of technology to the Third World was not technology itself, but
the development of appropriate attitude toward technology.492 This assertion is
apparent in the curious replacement of the word "technology" with "technique" in
the title. What the Third World needed was not technology, but technocentricism:
4 Bert Hoselitz, "Problems of Adapting and Communicating Modern Techniques to Less
Developed Areas" in Economic Development and Cultural Change 2 (1953-54): 249-68.
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"The transmission of the new technique," Hoselitz argued, "is incomplete unless
persons can be found who clearly understand the long range implications of the
innovation." 4 " The Third World migrant lacks the ability to think in felicitous long
term patterns.
The promotion of techocentricric attitudes in the Third World, however, cannot
take the path it did in the West. The project of protecting the migrant from the
rupture of modernization demands that all techniques be camouflaged in existing
cultural patterns. This is, however, a contradictory goal. For if modernization is
presented in existing traditional patterns then it hinders the migrant's entry into the
arena of responsible citizenship.
Hoselitz was well aware of this counter implication of the nativization of
development. For Hoselitz, the migrant's inability to think in shifting patterns of
modernization stemmed from his/her refusal to complete the transition to urban
values and life. The migrant, Hoselitz asserted, "often maintains contact with his
place of origin through periodic visits which tend to disrupt the continuity of his
contact with the city, including his employment."494 The result is a population of
"floating migrants," "of footloose refugee populations" forever "in transition."49 1 Yet,
isn't this transitory status, this incomplete entry into modernity, the very quality
that the development planner is pressed to preserve to save the migrant the pains
of rupture from the historical continuity of tradition?
493 Ibid. p. 253.
494Ibid. p. 15.
49 Ibid.
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This indeed was the task outlined by Mead for the Unesco expert. For Mead, the
expert's primary responsibility was to protect the migrant from the ill-effects of
"maladjustment" that might result if technological development was not couched in
terms of native culture. "[W]ith slow and traditional introduction of small changes,"
Mead asserted,
the side-effects of a change can be felt and responded to by the members of that
society. When change is introduced by external forces, however beneficent in
intent, these protective behaviours cannot operate, and changes may go much too
far in some given direction before compensatory measures can be taken."'6
In the European context, culture figured as a force that was incorporated by
Fascism to corrupt the principles of change and transformation characterizing
modernity, to stage its own interest in the form of the uniformity of cultural
patterns. In the Third World, the relationship between culture and modernity is
inverted. Culture palliates the corrupting effects of modernity. In the process, the
subject's ability to negotiate the conflicts of agency and intention is also lost. The
project of modernization must now be presented in cultural terms. The subject,
instead of being trusted to overcome her cultural shortcomings by self-realizing the
principles of modernity, must be duped into modernity.
This emphasis on culture as the necessary frame of modernization in the Third
World also lets the expert actually avoid the responsibility of modernization taken
496 Ibid. p. 301. This sentiment was common in the postwar UN/Unesco expert cadre. For
Gardner-Medwin, a member on the Mission of Experts to evaluate Low Cost Housing in
South and South-East Asia headed by Bauer's fellow Houser, Jacob Crane, development
schemes "can only operate successfully in openly planned communities where native
traditions and native materials can be developed." See Gardner-Medwin, "Low Cost
Housing in South and South-East Asia," p. 294. The report was republished under the
title, "United Nations and resettlement in the Far East," in Town Planning Review
(Liverpool) 22 (January 1952): 283-298.
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away from the migrant. The expert only assists and manages the change that is
already underway. The rational pattern planned for the migrant is only a
rationalization of this process. If the plan falls short, it is the complexity of the
cultural pattern that is to be blamed. On one end of the spectrum spanning this
blame game are the diplomatic pronunciations of the UN expert, on the other, are
the derisive conclusions of Koolhaas for whom Singapore's modernization was a
reflection of "the inscrutable nature of the Asian mentality."
From this perspective, the architect/planner is the development expert/manager
par excellence. Architecture, once again, is the medium that serves modernity in
the required palatable form. It is one of the critical development tools that can
promote technocentric attitude in a cultural garb. The primary benefit of housing
in the Third World, Phillip Hauser argued, is that it "both encourages and
strengthens long-term patterns of saving. People will save for better housing who
would not make their savings automatically available for capital formation
otherwise."4 17 Architecture enables the migrant to negotiate the patterns of
modernization despite him/herself.
Yet this denial of agency must not be seen in opposition to its recognition. The
framing of the migrant as a subject in transition does not simply reflect a denial of
agency, but the censoring inevitably inherent in the recognition of agency, in any
form. The emphasis on participatory development is not a preliminary disclaimer
that is set aside to carry out the business of development as an external
imposition. The emphasis on participation accompanies all manifestation of
4 Hauser, Urbanization in Asia and the Far-East, op. cit. p. 25
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development planning. The text of exclusion inherent in it reminds us of the need
of the perpetual undoing of the opposition between recognition and un-
recognition, between subject and agency, between agency and intention.
"At most, we are like dead parents," Koolhaas tells us, "deploring the mess our
children have made of their inheritance.""9 In the narrative of patterns of
modernity, the children are constantly presented as unqualified to receive the
inheritance. In the development arena, the process of modernization is stretched
out as an infinite reading of the will. The presumed inability of the Third World
psyche to manage change has formed the very principle of technological, social,
cultural, and political intervention in the postwar era. The problem of Third World
development is never posed as a question of transfer of technology or capital, but
as a problem of preparing proper attitudes toward their reception, a problem not
of transferring technology, but developing technocentricism. The Smithsons'
changing man, Horkheimer's citizen, Bauer's migrants, Echochard's refugees, and
Koolhaas's apocalyptic bureaucrats, are figures in a theater of globalization that
stages new narratives of socio-cultural difference and affinity to hide old and
continuing patterns.
498 Koolhass, "Singapore Songlines," in SMLXL, op cit., p. 1031.
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5 Conclusion: Expertise that "Works"
We have argued in this dissertation that modern architecture and planning projects
in the development arena form the terrain where key assumptions of the
development discourse find credence. These include above all the idea of the
Third World as a sphere in transition between the village and the city, between
socially cohesive traditional rural societies and market-oriented modern urban
centers, possessing qualities of both. This framing justifies, on the one hand, the
implementation of market-oriented reforms and, on the other, allows ignoring the
absence of social welfare structures and political processes that can attend to the
asymmetric effects of those reforms. In this sphere, the development subject
appears as a self-motivated, freely choosing, and politically passive being whose
actions always have rational implications at another scale, foreclosing the
possibility of staging resistance to development. This is the scale of regional
planning patterns and global urban networks, where her proclaimed interests are
coded into legal, administrative, and economic frameworks and her consent is
secured as a participant in the development process despite herself.
These assumptions are very much with us today in the debates over how to shape
the present and the future of the Third World city, spanning discussions from
policy and planning circles to deliberations of "avant-garde" architects operating
on the global stage. By way of conclusion to this dissertation, we will take the
example of Rem Koolhaas' recent analysis of Lagos as a challenge to the logic of
"traditional" modern urban planning. We will show how the terms of development
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intervention are not undone in such readings but are reproduced in more
transparent forms in line with the current configuration of globalization.
On November 22, 2006, Koolhaas' lecture at MIT was turned from slide show to a
"conversation with faculty and students" when his Power Point presentation
refused to work.' This change in strategy resulting from an unforeseen
shortcoming of technology, however, turned out to be quite apposite to the topic
Koolhaas intended to discuss: his eleven year study of Lagos, the city where, the
architect maintains, nothing works as planned and everything is an exercise in
constant re-strategizing. For these reasons, Lagos presents, Koolhaas argues, a
model for the mega-cities of the future the world over where planning solutions
will have to be improvised on the run.
Koolhaas' analysis of Lagos, however, has been criticized in a variety of circles.
Recently a New Yorker article on Lagos by George Packer mentioned Koolhaas as
part of the group of researchers who abstract away the difficulties of life in Lagos
by framing it as a "hip icon of the latest global trends." 00 For Packer the most
troubling facet of Koolhaas' attention on Lagos is the comforting distance of his
research from the poverty on the ground, epitomized by the now notorious flight
over the city in the helicopter of President Obasanjo with the long-time
photographer of Africa, Edgar Cleyne. Packer recounts how in his essay
499 Reported by Stephanie Schorow for the MIT News Office in "Controversial architect
Koolhaas discusses future of cities," November 22, 2006. See
web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2006/koolhaas-1 122.html
George Packer, "The Megacity: Decoding the Chaos of Lagos," The NewYorker
(November 13, 2006): 62-75.
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"Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos,"'0 Koolhaas "described how his team, on its first
visit to the city, was too intimidated to leave its car. Eventually, the group rented
the Nigerian President's helicopter and was granted a more reassuring view."50 2
This reassuring view was described by Koolhaas in the essay as follows:
From the air, the apparently burning garbage heap turned out to be, in fact, a
village, an urban phenomenon with a highly organized community living on its
crust.... What seemed, on ground level, an accumulation of dysfunctional
movements, seemed from above an impressive performance, evidence of how well
Lagos might perform if it were the third largest city in the world.
For Packer, this manner of looking is "not so different from the more common
impulse not to look at all," to reiterate and reinforce the positioning of Lagos
squatters as "superfluous" to globalization.
Evaluating the broad terrain of theoretical responses since the 80s to the direction
of global urbanization, Matthew Gandy, an urban geographer by training, similarly
accused Koolhaas of not dealing with the "substantiality" of life in Lagos. 50 4 "Chaos
may also be characterized" Gandy writes,
Rem Koolhaas, "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," in 0. Enwezor, C. Basualdo, U.M.
Bauer, S. Ghez, S. Maharaj, M. Nash and 0. Zaya, eds., Undersiege: Four African Cities,
Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos, Documenta 11: Platform 4 (Hatje, Cantz:
Ostfildern-Ruit, 2002).
502 Packer, "The Megacity," op cit., p. 10.
Koolhaas, "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," op. cit.
504 Matthew Gandy, "Cyborg Urbanization: Complexity and Monstrosity in the
Contemporary City," in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29.1
(March 2005): 26-49.
323
as a more sophisticated, resilient and adaptable form of order as Rem Koolhaas
has suggested with respect to the dynamics of West African urbanism. The
theoretical novelty of such a perspective sits sharply at odds, however, with the
capacity for what one might term 'avant-garde urbanism' to actually explicate any
substantial dimensions to urban change.
For Gandy, the most critical effect of the architectural avant-garde urbanism like
Koolhaas' has been to draw attention away from the possibility of a "politically
driven strategy for the creation of more socially inclusive cities." 06
Indeed, Koolhaas himself has given fodder to these accusations of distance and
abstraction. In an interview with Jennifer Sigler for Index magazine, in response to
the comment that Lagos "must have been beautiful from a helicopter," Koolhaas
remarked: "The city has these unbelievable - you can only call it abstract -
compositions. Red turning into white turning into black. You've never seen
geometry at that scale in the world [emphasis added].""'
What is not evaluated in these criticisms of Koolhaas' abstract thinking about
urbanization at the periphery, however, is how the impulse to abstract intersects
with broader discourses of access and intervention in the global context. For if the
objections are limited to the question of abstraction and lack of substantiality, then
it seems these concerns have already been answered by William Mangin and John
Turner who, as we saw earlier in the dissertation, resided within the squatter
5 Ibid., p. 31. Gandy here refers to Koolhaas' "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," and the
"Harvard Project on the City," in Mutations (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2001).
506 Ibid., p. 42.
507 See: http://www.indexmagazine.com/interviews/remkoolhaas.shtml
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settlements in Lima precisely to document the "material" and "substantial"
experiences of the squatter. Turner and Mangin's reversal of earlier planning
approaches was another abstraction itself that worked to incorporate squatter
politics and practices into the development discourse under the guise of
proclaimed intimacy. How then does the next wave of "abstractions" coming from
architects (such as Koolhaas) operating on the global platform relate the periphery
to the expanding circuits of globalization?
Here, Perry Anderson's recent critical view of the UN's function in the global
geopolitical arena may be helpful."" Anderson re-evaluates the mounting praise of
Kofi Annan's career as an independent figure that stood up to dominant political
powers in the UN. Annan, Anderson argued, in appearing to stand independent,
censored dissenting voices and legitimized the US political agenda, from the mode
of intervention in Rwanda, to Kosovo, Iraq, and Darfur, and thus was far more
associated, albeit transparently, with the dominant political agenda than the most
ideologically motivated of previous Secretary Generals. Anderson's key point in
mounting this critique is this: the role of the UN is not to secure action, political or
military. Rather, the role of the UN is to create legitimacy for a particular path of
action over others.
Modern architecture and planning's role in the postwar development arena can
also be explained in a similar light. In the development discourse, architecture and
planning constantly overstep their circumscription as tools of implementing
particular development approaches and create legitimacy for economic and policy
508 Perry Anderson, "Our Man," in London Review ofBooks 29: 9 (10 May 2007): 9-12.
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initiative. This legitimacy, however, is of different order than the diplomatic
negotiations and the resulting resolutions that legitimize political action.
Architecture and planning constitute the sites where legitimacy is secured before
negotiation, framing the possibility of what can be negotiated in the first place.
In both their abstract and intimate garbs, architecture and planning create
legitimacy for particular modes of access into the periphery, modes which, as we
have seen in this dissertation, are critical to the operation of the development
discourse.' The partial incorporation of the Third World into circuits of global
capital was advanced at first along national and regional lines, and nowadays, it is
incorporated along what can be called the disseminated, spectacular and
discontinuous field of cultural and economic globalization. The shifts from one
scale of intervention to another are not discontinuous but form a series of
displacements that betray Koolhaas' provocations to be standing in the same
trajectory of development that includes Abrams and Keonigsberger's development
reports.
Koolhaas' analyses of the rise of modern urban phenomena in different parts of
the world have curiously followed Abrams and Koenigsberger's development
missions. In SMLXL, we were given news of a "rogue" Europe rising in
509 These include, as we mentioned earlier, the positioning of the Third World as a sphere
in transition to modernity, where traditional social structures can provide social welfare
support while individual rational sensibility can be presented as an alibi for instituting
market oriented industrialization. Inasmuch as the this sphere has remained in a perpetual
transition to modernization over more than half a century, development has constituted a
strategy of managing the partial or asymmetrical incorporation of different spheres of the
decolonized world into circuits of capitalist production while keeping them outside the
circuits of consumer capital and its attendant costs.
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Singapore." There, the hyper modernism of the Pacific Rim was blamed partly on
the idealist suggestions of Abrams, Keonigsberger, and Susumu Kobe's UN mission
that had visited the island in 1963. In 2001, Koolhaas appeared in Lagos, once
again a city that had previously been exposed to the master planning approach of
Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Kobe. Though, in Lagos, Koolhaas doesn't
acknowledge this development precedence by name, he nevertheless situates his
analyses as a challenge to the modernist master planning approach based on
"ideas such as carrying capacity, stability, and even order, canonical concepts in
the field of urban planning and related social sciences."511 In light of the historical
staging of the development subject that we have charted in this dissertation, these
reversals and oppositions, however, tell a story of continuing thematics that tie
Koolhaas to his precursors in the development arena.
Koolhaas reads Lagos as an interconnected and disseminated set of "ingenious,
critical alternative systems," a non-linear and shifting arrangement that "resist[s] the
notion that Lagos represents an African city en route to become modern." Here
Koolhaas turns the modernizing, evolutionary narrative of development on its
head. "We think it is possible to argue," Koolhaas asserts, "that Lagos represents a
developed, extreme, paradigmatic case study of a city at the forefront of
globalizing modernity." Saved from being an example of a primitive past in the
present, Lagos is projected as being an element of the future of modernity: "This
5 Rem Koolhaas, "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis...or Thirty Yeas
of Tabula Rasa," in Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Officefor
Metropolitan Architecture (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), pp. 1009-1089.
"1 Koolhaas, "Harvard Project on the City," in Mutations, op cit., p. 652.
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is to say that Lagos is not catching up with us. Rather, we may be catching up with
Lagos. ,512
Despite its "non-linear" narrativization, Koolhaas' project of finding the "paradigm
of the future" in Lagos cannot shake its developmental shadows. The opposition
between Koolhaas' analyses and Abrams, Koenigsberger and Kobe's development
planning approach can be challenged in light of the characteristics of development
we have identified in the latter experts' work. For Abrams and Koenigsberger,
specifically, development planning was never a project of simply outlining an
evolutionary model of change from the primitive to the modern for the Third
World. Their proposals, instead, cast development as a case study for identifying
West's own desired future. Similarly, development was never presented as a
project of implementing Western precedence in Third World contexts. Rather it
was seen as a project of establishing a comparative framework of mutual learning.
This comparative impulse to identify the future of modernity in the West through
Third World development is not lost on Koolhaas either:
The fact that many of the trends of modern, Western cities can be seen in
hyperbolic guise in Lagos suggests that to write about the African city is to write
about the terminal condition of Chicago, London, or Los Angeles. It is to examine
the city elsewhere in the developing world."'
Yet perhaps the strongest affinity between Abrams and Koenigsberger's
development planning approach and Koolhaas' analysis lies in the positioning of
law, or its absence, as the engine of urbanization, a linear argument that underlies
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512 Ibid. pp. 652-3.
513 Ibid., p. 653.
the chronologic non-linearity projected by both analyses. For Koolhaas, the
ingenuity of urban solutions in Lagos stem from the transforming boundaries of
property and ownership, both spatially and legally. "Despite the presence of both
land-use data collected at the regional scale and the national grid system,"
Koolhaas tells us,
a boundary of Lagos has never been drawn or agreed upon.. .Property lines are
continually reassessed and renegotiated in accordance with intersecting land law,
taxes, claims, and interests. This structural skein camouflages its ordering system,
but recognizes that one's right to reside and work in the city is flexible and
mutable."'
This mutating topography of the city "works" and reworks, Koolhaas argues, the
basic elements of modernist planning-such as the line, wall, and plot-on its
own terms. The traffic "bottleneck," a negative phenomenon in the traditional logic
of traffic planning, is described as urban presence that has its own economy of
street vendors and other "entrepreneurial activity." 15 In the aerial photographs
taken form the presidential helicopter, we see how Kobe's proposed highway
intersections, flyovers, and exit ramps have turned into parking lots, vender
markets, and cover for factories and other activities (FIG. 36, 37). This "illustrates"
Koolhaas asserts, "the large-scale efficacy of systems and agents considered
marginal, liminal, informal, or illegal according to traditional understandings of the
city. "16
514 Ibid., p. 661.
5"5 Ibid., p. 685.
516 Ibid., p. 652
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This staging of negative terms of traditional urbanism as positive urban
phenomena in their own right, however, keeps the logic of development
intervention intact. The most critical aspect of Abrams and Koenigsberger's core
housing and land reform proposals was the staging of the individual as an
originary legal subject that preceded the political process surrounding the
emergence of discourse of rights and citizenship. In this framing of development,
it is law, and not politics, that constitutes the originary moment of development.
The result is the axiom that if proper laws are instituted, development would
happen by itself. Koolhaas transforming topography of urbanism is simply a
reversal of this positioning of law as an originary moment before politics. For
Koolhaas, it is the absence of law that gives Lagos its unique character of
modernity. Both the positions argue for the presence of quasi-natural legal
phenomena to draw attention away from the political dimensions of socio-
economic change.
This view has recently been given renewed economic sanctity by the Peruvian
economist and now a Nobel laureate, Hernando de Soto, in his book, The Mystery
of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.' De
Soto claims that it is not that the poor do not have assets. Rather, "they hold these
resources in defective forms." 18 De Soto proposes finding legal solutions to bring
the land based assets of the poor into the legal system. There is "an implicit legal
infrastructure," de Soto asserts, "hidden deep within their property system - of
517 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and
Fails Everywhere Else (London: Black Swan, 2000).
518 ibid., p. 7.
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which ownership is but the tip of the iceberg. The rest of the iceberg is an
intricate man-made process that can transform assets and labour into capital.""'
This "iceberg" is none other than an expanded loan structure that could be based
on the legalized property as collateral. De Sotto argument shifts, once again, the
seat of value from labor to circulation of finance and commercial capital. In this
logic, if the poor could get capital through loans, that capital would simply grow
as it circulates.
For development institutions, Third World policy-makers, and major First World
political figures alike, the translation of property into legal forms that can serve as
collateral for loans is nothing short of a miraculous solution to the crisis of Third
World development. In addressing the British Labor Party in 2002, the former US
President, Bill Clinton, described his recent African tour as follows:
I have just come here from a trip to Africa which provided me with all kinds of
fresh evidence of the importance of politics.. .In Ghana.. .a new President is
519 Ibid., p. 9. According to the Institute for Liberty and Democracy established and run be
De Sotto, there are 9.3 trillion dollars in assets held by the poor in Third World to which
they do not have legal titles.
For De Soto, "law is the instrument that fixes and realizes capital." Ibid. p. 164.
Developing countries therefore, de Soto argues, "shouldn't just focus on the
macroeconomic side of the formula: stable money, fiscal equilibrium, and privatisation.
The core of the capitalist system...is essentially a legal property system." See
www.imf.org/external/pubs/tt/fandd/2003/12/pdf/people.pdf. Quoted by Ambreena
Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2006), p. 3. De Soto's
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) puts the centrality of law and circulation as
follows: "Four billion people in developing and post-Soviet nations -two thirds of the
world's population- have been locked out of the global economy: forced to operate
outside the rule of law, they have no legal identity, no credit, no capital, and thus no way
to prosper. The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), based in Lima, Peru, has
created a key that can open the system to everyone - a time-tested strategy for legal
reform that offers the majority of the world's people a stake in the market economy." See
www.ild.org.pe/home.htm.
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working with a great Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, to bring the assets of
poor people in to the legal system so they can get collateral for loans."'
The president of Ghana, John Agyekum Kufuor, also reiterated the same line of
thought when he described that with establishment of individualized tenure, land
is transformed into "bankable property," giving title holders access to credit."
"[T]his could prove," Kufour argued, "the vital part of the missing link that might
help generate prosperity that we all yearn for."522 Colin Powell similarly declared in
2002 that "the hidden architecture of sustainable development is the law. The law.
The rule of law that permits wonderful things to happen."523
For legal academics, such as David Kennedy, the emphasis on law-making
represents an unarticulated desire to skirt the "perplexing political and economic
choices" entailed in projects of land reform. Development practitioners and
scholars have tended, Kennedy has argued, to exclude political confrontations in
favor of "law, legal institution building, the techniques of legal policy-making and
implementation - the 'rule of law' broadly conceived - front and centre."524
Kennedy points out that we must take into account that "the idea that building the
rule of law might itself be a development strategy." 25 For other scholars of African
521 Cited in "Bill Clinton Helps Ghana's Poor Gain Property Titles," by the UNDP. See
www. undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2002/October/7oct. Quoted by Ambreena Manji,
The Politics of Land Reform in Africa, op cit., p. 2.
522 City by de Sotto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD). See
www.ild.org.pe/home.htm. Quoted in Ibid. p. 11.
523 We have argued in this dissertation that there is also a hidden history of architecture
and planning in the positing of land, property, and house as credit. Quote in Ibid. p. 11.
524 David Kennedy, "Laws and Developments," in Amanda Perry and John Hatchard, eds.,
Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21" Century (London: Cavendish, 2003).
Above quote from p. 18.
525 Ibid., p. 17.
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land reform such as Ambreena Manji and A. Claire Cutler, the interest in centrality
of law cannot be separated from the gender and class divisions that permeate
particular contexts. For Cutler, the emphasis on neutrality and centrality of law is
supported from within particular national contexts by groups who stand to gain
from the "particular legal culture informed by neo-liberal values and the
privileging of private ordering as the most natural, efficient, consensual and just
means of regulating commercial and productive relations."16 For Ambreena Manji,
"[1]and, as a social and economic asset, invites... contestation perhaps more than
any other. How land may be dealt in, and by whom, is a question of social,
political and economic importance.",1 7
What role does architecture play in this domain? From the perspective of this
dissertation, architecture as socio-economic activity not only constitutes the object
of this legal debate, but also the site where the development subject who forms
the possibility of this debate is staged. "Assets need," De Soto avers, "a formal
property system that draws out the abstract potential from buildings and fixes it in
representations that allow use to go beyond passively using buildings only as
5 See, A. Claire Cutler, "Historical Materialism, Globalization, and Law: Competing
Conceptions of Property," in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith, eds., Historical Materialism
and Globalization (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 230-56. Above quote from p. 231.
527 Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa, op cit., p. 12. Also see, Manji's
"'The Beautyful Ones' of Law and Development," in Doris Buss and A. Manji,eds.,
International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2005), pp. 159-
71. For Manji, deemphasizing the importance of politics results in exclusion of civil
representative groups from policy and legislative discussions. The brunt of this exclusion
falls, Manji argues, on women, whose chances of gaining access to land is further limited
as land is individualized and held as collateral. Banks, seeking security for credit, favor
individual ownership over joint ownership in a household. In a patriarchal system, this
requirement results in exclusion of women from access to land, furthering the burden of
household expenses and loan on them.
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shelters [emphasis added].""" The "abstract potential" of Lagos drawn out by
Koolhaas' analyses fulfills the requirements of this legalizing discourse even as it
identifies the absence of legal relations in the malleable terrain of property in
Lagos. It constitutes urbanization as a process that could be reduced to formal
relations, legal or illegal, and thereby lays out new terms of access and
intervention.
If there is a difference in Koenigsberger and Abrams' and Koolhaas' positioning of
legal relations at the origin of modernization, it is in the profile of the subject of
modernization on whom this positioning is based. This difference too, however,
represents the displaced continuation of the development logic in the post-
development era of free market reform rather than its undoing. For Abrams and
Koenigsberger, the subject of the quasi-legal originary terrain was the inhabitant of
the core house, the individual. The issue at stake for Koolhaas is not to
unproblematize the absence of an established welfare state structure, but rather to
unproblematize his own presence in Lagos as an observer of the process of
globalization. The legitimacy of this position is based on the positioning of Lagos
as a city that is one of many others in the cultural fabric of global modernity that
are finding their own path to modernization, challenging in their own way the
straightjacket of traditional modern urban planning. For this reason, it is not the
individual that is called forth as an alibi in the form of the native informant. Rather
it is the city itself that is staged as the subject of modernization.
528 De Sotto, The Mystery of Capital, op cit., p. 60.
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It is not surprising that in all of Koolhaas' discussion of Lagos and its
transformative topography, the individual is never presented as the agent of
change." The title of Koolhaas' soon to be released book on Lagos also asserts
this point: "Lagos: The City that Works." It is Lagos itself that is the native
informant of Koolhaas' global(izing) maps. For Koolhaas, Lagos must be
positioned as part of one of many maps of global statistics in his writings, and not
as a site where those statistics are undone (FIG. 38). Koolhaas' presence in Lagos
is based on its framing as a global city. It is this framing that forms the possibility
of Koolhaas' flight in the presidential helicopter as an observing expert whose role
is to do just that: observe. Though, as UN consultants, Abrams and Koenigsberger
were only required to make "suggestions" in the mission report, that report
nevertheless cut both ways: while it gave the experts their comparative authority, it
also bound them within a certain discourse of "responsibility," however limited
and fleeting. Koolhaas' presence in Lagos bears no such burden. As the caption to
the DVD documenting Koolaas documenting Lagos (released as a companion to
the forthcoming book) states: "Koolhaas doesn't want to build or change, but aims
to learn from Lagos, fascinated by the energy of this city and his wish to
understand modernity in all its aspects."530 It is the mutating city that is called forth
529 Koolhaas is not alone in this framing. Robyn Dixon, a staff writer of LA times and one
of the few journalists who has described Koolhaas's excursion in a favorable light in an
essay on Lagos, also describes the city as the subject of global modernity: "Papered all
over walls and suspended from any pole," Dixon writes, "are advertising billboards and
banners, as though the city were screaming out its own exuberant and often perplexing
monologue." See Robyn Dixon, "Lagos: 'The New York of Nigeria,"' LA Times (June 25,
2007).
530 Lagos Wide and Close: Interactive Journey into an Exploding City, Bregtje van der Haak
(director). The DVD, as the name implies, not only shows the footage taken from
helicopter but also while riding in car and on foot through city streets. The viewer has the
"interactive" choice at any moment to zoom in or out to the "wide" or the "close" view.
The expert's purpose in both the perspectives, however, is only to observe (FIG. 39).
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as the native informant at the scale of globalization, attesting to the presence of an
Other modernism growing in Africa.
The change in scale from the individual to the city, however, only displaces the
project of situating law as the originary moment of development onto a different
scale. For Abrams and Koenigsberger, the individual's actions were rational on
another scale that was not available to her. This allowed the experts to employ the
idea of the individual while bypassing the question of what the implications of that
framing were for the inhabitant. For Koolhaas, it is Lagos that is rational and
efficient at another scale, the scale of globalization, where the city can be seen to
challenge the logic of traditional theories of urbanization and modernization.
What unfolds in Koolhaas' analysis of Lagos is a discourse on managing the terms
of intervention into the development context that does away with the question of
welfare and politics altogether. The restraints of operating in a national context, of
staking a position in regards to instituting housing finance and mortgage
structures, forced Abrams and Koenigsberger to situate their proposal around the
idea of the individual. Their particular framing of the individual, as a rational
subject who preceded the emergence of the welfare state apparatus and its
attending political process, allowed them to negotiate the contradictions of this
requirement. Unbound by such restrictions, Koolhaas can stage a reading that
ignores the failure of the nation state, the absence of welfare structures, the
asymmetrical access to resources, the quandary of politics at the national level
altogether. For Koolhaas, the preponderance of law only needs to be managed at
the global scale to earn him the right of access as an observer of globalization in
Lagos.
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Marx had identified "work" as a term whose fixed duration belies the social costs
of regenerating the worker inherent in the remuneration received for the work
day. For Marx, work and rest were inseparable terms woven together in the open-
ended textuality of the chain of value production. Bypassing the calculus of work
surrounding the category of the individual in development, Koolhaas asserts that it
is Lagos, the city, and not its inhabitant, "that works" as a participant in the
process of globalization. The notion of work belies the contradictions of
asymmetrical modernization in Lagos and frames them as productive and positive
negotiation of modernity at the global scale. Nothing in Lagos points to the
undoing of the logic of globalization. It is the hidden rationality of a city that
"works" that makes it available to the rationalizing gaze of the global observer.
With this framing, Koolhaas bypasses how the working of Lagos as a city is built
upon a long history of successive development approaches, mobilized from both
national and international theaters. When Lagos "works" as a global city, it is this
dimension of globalization that is erased. Lagos then appears as a site of the
process of global modernization that is operating on its own. Consequently, the
expert in the presidential helicopter is a neutral observer following the unfolding
of this process across the globe, and not as the latest chapter in the history of the
new modes of socio-economic management that took hold in the postwar era with
the idea of development.
Architecture and planning's primary role on the global platform has been to create
terms of legitimacy and access that satisfy the requirements of partial incorporation
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of the decolonizing world into the circuits of global capital."' Without this
legitimacy, the logic of perpetuating intervention that characterizes the
development discourse cannot be sustained. It is the transitory state of the
decolonized world and the transitory state of the development subject that enables
the staging of critical theories of development economics. If architecture and
planning in the development arena draw on development economics, they also
open the space for its possibility.
We have attempted to chart the broad contours of this critical involvement. The
goal of this dissertation has been to open new domains of the history of modern
architecture and planning and explore the possibility of a new interpretation of
their role in the postwar geopolitical arena. This has involved looking at
architecture and planning as mediums whose contribution and impact has not
been limited to form alone but is irreducibly interwoven with the staging of new
means of access, control, and domination. To negotiate the unfolding of the
historical patterns of modernity, Horkheimer asserted, "[elveryone needs a
permanent alibi." For Horkheimer that alibi was the unreflective conformation of
the modern man to the requirements of mass culture. In the postwar era, modern
architecture and planning have provided such permanent alibis for the
development discourse and its attending structures of power.
531 How the terms of this access are utilized by international institutions can be witnessed
in the fact that Edgar Cleyne's photographs which constitute the centerpiece of Koolhaas'
book and the DVD, have already graced the cover of World Bank reports on African
urbanization. See, Christine Kessides, The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (Washington D.C.: The Cities
Alliance and the World Bank, 2006).
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(FIG. 1) Global map of "National and Regional Training Institutes or Seminars
Assisted or organized by [the USAID and UN] International Experts in 1955." UN
Archives, New York.
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Temporary and permanent hmoses side by side (Puerto Rico,
Temporary naterials added to permanent house
(FIG. 2) Before and After, side by side. Subsidized self-help housing in Puerto
Rico presented as global housing model in the United Nations' Manual on Self-
Help Housing, 1964.
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358
/(FIG. 3) USAID Technical Assitance Programs across the globe in 1955. UN
Archives, New York.
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360
(FIG. 4) Warren Cornwall (fourth left from center) and Ernest Weissmann (third
left from center) in meeting with Ecuadorian officials, 1954. From United Nations
Archives, New York.
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362
(FIG. 5) The structure of planning organization for Costa Rica proposed by
Antonio Kayanan in 1955. United Nations Archives, New York.
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364
(FIG. 6) Brochure for Warren Cornwall's 1954 Casaspor Bananas (Houses for
Bananas) program, "proposed [a] barter arrangements for the exchange of pre-
fabricated houses from Sweden for surplus bananas from Ecuador. United Nations
Archives, New York.
365
366
Mass construction of low-cost housing (Morocco)
(FIG. 7) Low-cost self-help demonstration project in Morocco, with untenured
public land in the background, from the United Nations' Manual on Self-Help
Housing, 1964.
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368
Interview with a self-help housing applioant
(FIG. 8) The self-help interview: family as the client of development. The map of
Puerto Rico on the wall shows the preponderance of Puerto Rico schemes as the
initial model of self-help housing in the development arena. From the United
Nations' Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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Group worker meeting with the self-help housing families
(FIG. 9) The next stage: self-help group organization, from the
Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
United Nations'
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Mass construction and plaing prefabricated roof elements
(FIG. 10) Mutual help self-help model where a group of inhabitants work on
standardized houses without knowing which house is to assigned to each one of
them at the end. From the United Nations' Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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(FIG. 11) Chart of elaborate administrative set-up required by mutual and aided
self-help models. From the United Nations' Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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Core house in Ghana,
finished by self-help
(FIG. 12) Core housing without a "core" in the Gold Coast (Ghana), poposed by
Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger. From the United Nations' Manual on Self-
Help Housing, 1964.
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378
(FIG. 13) The neo-traditionalist hearth in Frank Lloyd Wright's Coonly House,
1908 (above). From William J.R. Curtis, Modern architecture since 1900,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983, c1982).
(FIG. 14) Reyner Banham's "standard of living package" environmental bubble.
From Nigel Whiteley, Reyner Banham: Historian of the Immediate Future,
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).
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A row of houses
earth construction
H. Fathy(Egypt)
Open-air theatre
and village hall
earth construction
H. Fathy(Egypt)
(FIG. 15) Hassan Fathy's New Gourna project in Upper Egypt near Luxor (1945 to
1948), shown in UN publications as an example of standardized low-cost
construction that drew on "traditional" building methods and forms. This model of
institutionally provided "finished" houses was soon to be replaced with core
housing and sites-and-services schemes. From the United Nations' Manual on Self-
Help Housing, 1964.
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(FIG. 16) The house without an interior. From the United Nations' Manual on
Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971).
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Temperature Time
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28
4
Space
and activity
Kitchen
Living-room
Verandah
Courtyar1
(master's)
(males) = -
Courtyard 3(females)
Bedroom 1
Bedroom 2
Bedroom 3
MMD Men -- Outdoor air temperature
Key m Women Indoor airtemperature
C~~ Children Comfort zone
P1gar XXIV. Activity chart for lhrtomn, Sudan, hat sason, June
Notes
1. Men go to work at 07.30 and return at 14.30 (time spent at work is from 08.00 to 14.00
hours).
2. Children go to school at 07.30 and return at 14.30 (time spent at school is from 08.00 to
14.00 hours).
3. The verandah is used as a dining area at lunchtime and as a sleeping space during the
afternoon siesta.
4. Courtyard I is used at night as a sleeping area by parents only.
5. Courtyard 2 is used to entertain male visitors in the evening. At night it is used as a sleep-
ing space by the male members of the household.
6. Courtyard 3 is used to entertain female visitors. The whole family takes breakfast and
dinner here. At night it is used as a sleeping space by the female members of the house-
hold.
(FIG. 18) Daily activity climatological chart, mapping the core house as part of the
broader socio-economic activity. From Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney and
Martin Evans, Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and
Community Facilities, (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, 1971).
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Examples of expanIdable self-help housing built in stages
(FIG. 19) The many possible forms of the incrementally constructed core house,
with examples from Liberia and Costa Rica. From the United Nations' Manual on
Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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(FIG. 21) Squatter settlements in the Philippines (top), deemed politically unstable
by Abrams and Koenigsberger. "Organized" squatters of Lima, Peru (bottom) who
have been allotted individualized land tenure. From Charles Abrams, Squatter
Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: The Agency for
International Development, 1966).
393
55 Ad= - - - , - -- --
394
Disorganized
self-help housing
Well-planned project includ-
ing core self-help, row-houses
and multi-storey housing as
well as essential community
facilities (Madagascar)
(FIG. 22) The primary transformation from "disorganized" to "organized" core
housing is the establishment of the individualized land tenure. Soon, the formal
transformation accompanying this change will be discarded in favor allocating
tenure to the "disorganized" squatter settlements themselves. From the United
Nations' Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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(FIG. 23) Core house construction diagrams. The key elements of the core
scheme are the roof, the foundation, and the transitory subject of development.
From the United Nations' Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.
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(FIG. 24) The final form of core: home as the site of production. From Charles
Abrams, Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity (Washington, D.C.:
The Agency for International Development, 1966).
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(FIG. 25) Singapore Housing Developments (top) built on razed ground (bottom).
Shown by Rem Koolhaas in Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Officefor
Metropolitan Architecture, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).
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FIG. 26) The housing blocks (top) constructed by the Singapore Housing
Development Board (HDB) filled in the open space proposed by the Abrams,
Koenigsberger, and Kobe's master plan. Shown by Rem Koolhaas in Small,
Medium, Large, Extra-large: Officefor Metropolitan Architecture, (New
York: Monacelli Press, 1995).
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404
(FIG. 27) Smithsons' Haupstadt Berlin Plan of 1957 (top) and diagrammatic
studies of clusters, from Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson (ed.), Team 10
Primer, "Urban infra-structure," (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).
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(FIG. 28) Geddes' famous "valley section" (top), from Volker M. Welter,
Biopolis: Patrick Geddes and the City of Life, (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT
Press, 2002). Smithsons reflected doubling of the diagram in Team 10's 1954 Doom
manifesto (middle) and the Team 10 Primer (bottom). Both images from Alison
Smithson and Peter Smithson (ed.), Team 10 Primer, "Urban infra-structure,"
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).
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(FIG. 29) Atbat's density and movement studies, from Jos Bosman (top) in "CIAM
After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," The Last CL4Ms, Rassegna,
special issue, vol. 52 (4), December 1992.
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(FIG. 30) Michel Ecochard, aerial photograph of low-cost housing designed by
Atbat in Morocco, presented in Pakistan as evidence of previous experience in
dealing with mass housing. From the UN Archives, New York.
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(FIG. 31) Michel Ecochard analyses of Karachi's population density, from Michel
Ecochard, The Problem of Refugees in Karachi, December 1953, United Nations
Archives, New York.
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(FIG. 32) Michel Echochard, "Evolutive principles," of the proposed refugee
housing showing the movement of population to houses with higher "standard of
living" and lower density arrangements over time. From Michel Ecochard, The
Problem ofRefugees in Karachi, December 1953, United Nations Archives, New
York.
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(FIG. 33) Michel Echochard, site plan for refugee housing in Karachi (top), with a
study of the distribution of occupants density (bottom). From Michel Ecochard,
The Problem ofRefugees in Karachi, December 1953, United Nations Archives,
New York.
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(FIG. 34) Current state of the Nid d'abeille housing designed by Atbat members
Shadrach Woods, George Candillis, and Michel Ecochard. Shown by Jos Bosman
(top) in "CLAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," The Last
CIAMs, Rassegna, special issue, vol. 52 (4), December 1992, and by Minique Eleb
(bottom) in "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Ecochard, Candilis, and
ATBAT-Afrique," in Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Rejean Legault (ed.), Anxious
Modernisms, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000).
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(FIG. 35) Ernest Burgess, zone diagrams of Chicago's population distribution, with
"stems of hobohemia," "zones of deterioration," "black belts with its free and
disorderly life." From Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction
to a Research Project," in Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie
(eds.), The City, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, first ed. 1925).
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(FIG. 36) The present state of highway ramps proposed by Abrams, Koenigberger,
and Kobe in Lagos in 1957. Shown by Rem Koolhaas in Mutations, (Barcelona:
ACTAR, 2001).
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(FIG. 37) Koolhaas' sketch of the Lagos ramps. From Mutations, (Barcelona:
ACTAR, 2001).
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(FIG. 38) Urban population comparison chart. From Small, Medium, Large, Extra-
large: Officefor Metropolitan Architecture, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).
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(FIG. 39) Pre-release stills from DVD, Lagos Wide and Close: InteractiveJourney
into an Exploding City. Directed by Bregtje van der Haak. Produced by Sylvia
Baan for Pieter van Huystee Film.
429
